The decisive battle in northern Myanmar has entered the countdown, and the remnants of the "four major families" have been defeated, with only their last breath left
After about three days of fierce fighting, the Kokang Allied forces successfully captured the "Erawan Shrine", a key strategic point on the outskirts of Lao Cai, the capital of the Kokang region. The countdown to the conflict in northern Myanmar has begun.
Before we get into the details of the battle situation, let's take a brief look at the "Erawan Shrine".
The name actually refers to a scenic spot built by the Welfare Lai Group, a member of the Liu Ah Po family, one of the "four families" in the Kokang area, on Da Ying Mountain, just outside the Dongcheng District of Lao Cai. Located at the top of Da Win Mountain, the attraction overlooks the Lao Cai city and has a militaryly important commanding height, which is of key tactical significance.
With the launch of the Kokang Allied Army "1027", the Burmese army stationed in Lao Cai and the armed forces of the "Four Families" built fortifications in the area to prepare for a possible attack by the Allied forces.
During a month of fierce fighting, the Allied forces captured most of the Burmese strongholds on the outskirts of Lao Cai. In recent days, the Allied forces have officially launched an offensive against the "Erawan Shrine", a key outer defense line in the Dongcheng District of Lao Cai. The defenders held out in the fortifications for about three days, but were ultimately unable to hold on. The Allied Forces have released a ** overlooking the scene of Lao Cai Dongcheng District from the "Erawan Shrine".
The loss of the Erawan Shrine will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the battle situation in Lao Cai and even the entire Kokang area. With the loss of this area, the Allied forces were able to attack the city of Lao Cai without any problems, although a few outlying strongholds, such as the Yanglongzhai Port and Nantianmen Mountain, had not yet been fully conquered.
The Allied forces were now faced with two choices: one was to attack only the outlying strongholds such as Mixiangou that might have an impact on street fighting, surround but not attack strongholds such as the Yanglongzhai port, concentrate their forces to attack the urban area of Lao Cai from the east, completely eliminate the "four major families" and the Burmese army, and recapture Lao Cai. As long as Lao Cai can be captured, the remaining outlying strongholds may collapse as a result.
Another option is to take advantage of vantage points such as Erawan Shrine and bombard targets in the city, while continuing to fight on the outside to clear the remaining Burmese strongholds on the periphery before moving on to a final siege.
Considering that the recapture of Lao Cai was the Allied forces in "1027 "One of the most important strategic objectives of the offensive, the deep hostility between the top of the Allied forces and the "Four Families". Regardless of the strategy, the siege of Lao Cai is inevitable and can be brutal.
At present, it is difficult for the outside world to ** the specific trend of the siege of Lao Cai. The Kokang Allied forces are gaining momentum and morale, but Lao Cai has been the territory of the Burmese army and the "Four Families" for many years, and there are many high-rise buildings in the city that can be used as a defensive core. The ability of the Allied forces, which were able to successfully break through in peripheral operations, to capture these high-rise buildings remained a question.
It is worth noting that the Allied forces and other civilian forces are seriously lacking in heavy ** suitable for attacking fortifications. They had almost no tanks, armored vehicles, and even fewer guns with a caliber of more than 100 mm. While some heavy ** may have been captured from the Burmese army in the near future, ammunition stockpiles are far from enough to support a siege. Relying only on mortars, drones and other fire support in street battles is bound to be very heavy. The only thing the Allies can do at the moment is to launch a propaganda offensive at the same time as the siege to further demoralize the opponent and lower their own **. However, as long as the other side cannot be prompted to surrender into the establishment, it seems inevitable that a certain amount of ** will be paid.
For Myanmar**, the loss of Lao Cai will not be tolerated. If the allies do retake the area, the Burmese army will not only further lose control of the Kokang region, but will also suffer a heavy blow to morale.
On the contrary, the "National Unity**" and other civilian forces will be demoralized by the Allied victory, and may even follow the example of the Allied forces in attacking other key towns in Burma. Such a joint response is undoubtedly something that the Burmese military has tried to avoid.
However, for senior Burmese military leaders such as General Min Aung Hlaing, the challenge is that more than half of Myanmar's provinces are in flames as more and more civilian forces pour into the battlefield, and the Burmese army is not well stocked. The deployment of additional troops to Lao Cai will inevitably affect other fronts.
In addition, most of the roads on the outskirts of Lao Cai were controlled by the Allied forces before the capture of the Erawan Shrine. Other civilian forces in Mandalay province and other places, in coordination with allied forces, continued to attack Burmese military convoys, making it difficult for the Burmese army to provide support on the ground in the direction of Lao Cai.
Therefore, the most likely action of the Myanmar military is to intensify air strikes and give full play to its own equipment superiority to prevent a rapid rout of the Lao Cai defenders. As long as it can delay for a period of time and cause the allied forces to be larger through street fighting, the Burmese military may still have the opportunity to redeploy troops.
It is worth noting that before the official fall of the Erawan Shrine, the Myanmar military had already released a signal of "reconciliation" under internal and external pressure, hoping to solve the problem through political means. However, the parties have yet to engage substantively. Therefore, in the coming period, the development of the war situation in the direction of Lao Cai will, to a certain extent, affect the possible start of peace talks and the final result. After all, the truth that the battlefield determines victory or defeat will not change no matter how far it goes.
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