London's realist tendencies
At the end of 1940-the beginning of 1941, the tendency towards political realism was strengthened in Britain, which manifested itself in the proximity of Britain and the Soviet Union and, to a considerable extent, inevitably led to the further establishment of the anti-fascist coalition.
Lenin regarded Churchill as "the number one hater of the Soviets." "Churchill was a sworn enemy of the communist system. However, to save the British Empire, its situation in the summer and autumn of 1940 was disastrous, and an alliance with the Soviet state could only be expected. Without this alliance, Hitler would sooner or later destroy the British Empire, and Churchill knew this. In this case, it is necessary to appropriately weaken one's hatred of the socialist state and embark on the road closer to the Soviet state.
Like Churchill, many real-life ideological activists in the British Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties favored proximity to Moscow and favoured the normalization of Anglo-Soviet relations, which had been seriously aggravated by the "doing" of Chamberlain, California, Astor and other British reactionaries.
On June 12, 1940, a new British ambassador, Stamford Cripps, arrived in the Soviet capital. He enjoyed a reputation within the Labour Party as a representative keen to improve relations between London and Moscow. On July 1, 1940, Kripps was received by Stalin. During the conversation, the parties discussed such issues as the military posture in Europe, the growing threat to the USSR from the German fascist side, the mutual relations between the USSR and Germany, and Anglo-Soviet relations.
Cripps handed Stalin a handwritten letter from Churchill dated June 25, 1940. Churchill said that Britain was prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union "any major question that would arise as a result of the present series of systematic German policies of occupation and encroachment in Europe."
On July 15, 1940, ** negotiations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain began in Moscow.
British politicians closely watched the deteriorating development of Soviet-German relations. At the end of October 1940, Stamford Cripps assured the Soviet political leadership in the name of Britain** that "the Kingdom of Great Britain will not take part in any attack on the Soviet Union." "This move is an important step in the direction of Anglo-Soviet approach.
However, there are still many political enemies in Britain who pursue a line close to the Soviet Union, and Britain *** is one of them. For example, on October 22, 1940, when Kripps spoke with the First Deputy People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, he suggested in the name of Britain that the other side conclude an agreement with Britain, and then suggested a non-aggression pact. Although Cripps stressed the secrecy of the proposal, a group of people immediately stabbed Cripps's diplomatic action to journalists and announced that they did not agree to it.
Then again. Although the trend of Anglo-Soviet proximity was slow, the road was opened after all. On 27 December 1940, the new British Foreign Secretary, Eden, who had replaced the Munich element Galifax, met for the first time in London with the Soviet plenipotentiary. Aiden stated that there were no irreconcilable contradictions between the USSR and Great Britain, and that it was quite possible to maintain friendly relations between the two countries. The Soviet Plenipotentiary pointed out that if Aiden really wanted to bring about an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, he should eliminate friction over the accession of the Baltic republics to the Soviet Union.
On January 3, 1941, British Deputy Foreign Secretary Butler informed the Soviet plenipotentiary that "Eden is now considering ways to better adjust Anglo-Soviet relations." ”
In the first half of 1941, the trend towards greater mutual understanding between London and Moscow was noticeably strengthened.
On January 17, 1941, the British Joint Intelligence Service (represented by representatives of all three services) became aware of new facts about the preparation of fascist Germany to attack the Soviet Union
1. There are quite a few new indications of Germany's attempt to attack;
2. Germany's military intentions are evidenced by the following three main facts: a. military deployment;b. Improvement of road and rail communication lines;c. Construction of field fuel depots and equipment depots, etc.
3. The military deployments related to ** need to be pointed out:
Norway: There is information that 2 German divisions have been stationed in the northern area of Narvik. ...
Finland: The German team has been strengthened. Finland was an ally of Germany.
Poland: Between June and August 1940, the number of German divisions on its eastern border had increased from 23 to about 70 (i.e., 1.5 million to 2 million men), and fortification works were under way near the Russian-German border.
Slovakia: It is believed that there are already 6 divisions here.
Romania: It is believed that there are currently eight greatly strengthened German divisions stationed here.
4. As for the lines of communication, the improvement of the roads on Polish territory to the borders of Germany and ** is being intensified ......
5. The transportation of fuel and equipment for the ** campaign is underway. ”
However, British intelligence considered both the movement of the German troops and the military preparations at the adjacent border to be "normal". According to the Joint Intelligence Agency, the defeat of Britain remained the main objective of Germany.
At the end of March 1941, the military attaché in Bern informed London of the following:
If they come to the conclusion (referring to the Berlin side) that the offensive against Britain will not be successful, then the preparation of the offensive ** (referring to Germany. ) will be done at the fastest speed:
1. The recruitment of new recruits is continuing;
2. It is reported that three army groups have now been formed, the temporary headquarters of which are located in Hamburg, Breslau and Berlin;
3. Continue to mobilize new regiments, including 6 motorized corps;
4. The formation of new tank units and the increase in the production of 36-ton tanks;
5. Printing ** coins;
6. Construction of a secret airfield in the suburbs of Warsaw;
7. Draw a map of the Russian-German border from Warsaw to Slovakia through aerial photography.
8. Transfer the commander from the Western Front to the Eastern Front:
9. An officer of the engineering unit said that he was training his troops on a bridge site in East Prussia that could withstand 36 tons;
10. Preparations for the administrative bodies working in Romania are taking place;
11. Fortifications are being built on the Polish-Russian border. ”
This information was obtained from a British spy in Berlin.
The authoritative Times speculated that "Hitler may well have been at the mercy of the enormous attack with his own army." ”
Rumours were spreading in Britain and elsewhere that Germany had drawn its troops from the Western Front to concentrate on the border with the Soviet Union, that roads, railways, and airfields were being built in Poland, and that secret military preparations were underway in Romania and Finland.
At the end of March 1941, Churchill learned that German tank units had been transferred from Bucharest to Krakow. "For me," he wrote, "it was a bolt of lightning that illuminated everything in the East. The sudden mobilization of such a large tank force to Krakow, which was needed in the Balkans, could only indicate Hitler's intention to attack in May. ”
On 7 April, the Joint Intelligence Agency reported to Churchill that "news of the German invasion was circulating everywhere in Europe" and that Germany was "about to go to war".
After receiving this extremely important information, Churchill sent a letter to the British ambassador in Moscow, Cripps, through Aiden, asking him to immediately inform the Soviet Union of these circumstances. However, ......For some unknown reason, the letter was put on hold. Churchill wrote to Eden that "I think this personal letter of mine to Stalin has a special effect, and I do not understand why they should stop its delivery, nor do the ambassadors understand the military significance of these facts." It was only on April 22 that Churchill's letter to Stalin reached him. In this way, almost 3 weeks were lost. And, as Marshal Zhukov recounted, Stalin "looked at the matter with suspicion."
On April 4, Britain sent a telegram to Stamford Cripps, in which it said, "Hitler's present attempt to attack Yugoslavia will postpone his earlier plans to threaten the Soviet Union." If this is the case, the Soviets will be able to create an opportunity to take advantage of the situation and strengthen their positions. This postponement shows that the enemy's strength is limited ......The USSR should be made to understand ....Hitler had to attack (the Soviet Union) sooner or later as long as he could. "Britain *** commissioned the ambassador to inform Stalin of this extremely important information.
On April 16, Aiden held talks with Soviet Plenipotentiary Majsky in London. The talks touched on the issue of improving Anglo-Soviet relations in the conditions of the growing threat from fascist Germany to the USSR.
As far as we have confirmed," Aiden told the ambassador, "there is no end to Germany's military intentions, both now and in the coming months, and the attack on the Soviet Union is ...... so much."There is abundant evidence of Hitler's determination to destroy the Soviet Union. In the face of this situation, we very much hope to have a friendly exchange of views on the issue of relations between our two countries......to achieve as close as possible. ”
The Soviet ambassador reiterated the desire of the USSR to improve relations with Great Britain.
The British** received a great deal of information from various intelligence agencies and through various channels about Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.
During the talks between Aiden and Maysky on June 5, 10, and 13, 1941, Aiden informed the ambassador of Hitler's fascist Germany's "danger to the Soviet Union." In particular, at the June 13 talks, Eden told the ambassador that if Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Great Britain would be prepared to assist the Soviet state, to use the British air force against the Germans, and to send a military mission to Moscow and indeed to give as much military assistance as possible. In a note dated June 14 from Aiden to the Soviet Union, he reported information that "the German detachment was massing on the borders of the Soviet Union."
To be continued, this article** comes from the Internet).