The Long March is a great miracle in human history, in two years, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, tens of thousands of workers and peasants under the leadership of the Kuomintang army all the way to the pursuit of the Kuomintang army, began a long journey from the ** Soviet area, over the mountains and mountains, across the rivers, across the grasslands, over the snow-capped mountains, the journey of 25,000 miles, through 14 provincial borders, and finally got rid of the enemy, the victory achieved the goal of strategic transfer.
So, what was the situation that caused the epic Long March?This article revisits this period of history and pays tribute to the difficult years of the Chinese Revolution.
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
After the success of the Northern Expedition in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek tore up the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and began to frenzied the communists and the revolutionary masses. He also announced that he had entered the second stage of the "three stages of construction", that is, the "period of political training", and finally made himself Chairman Chiang in charge of everything.
Against this background, in order to save the revolution and resist the white terror waged by the Kuomintang reactionaries, the CCP began to implement the struggle methods of agrarian revolution and armed uprising. The Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi, and the Guangzhou Uprising occurred one after another, forming a group of the Communist Party's own army.
In October 1927, the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army led the Autumn Harvest Uprising to Jinggangshan, and in April of the following year, he led the remnants of the Nanchang Rebel Army to join Jinggang, and the number of revolutionary armed forces reached 10,000 people.
In May 1928, according to the "Circular No. 51" issued by the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was renamed the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The 4th Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army in the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area was renamed the 4th Army of the Red Army in June of this year, and it became what Chairman Chiang saw as "the first to start dispatching troops in a vain attempt to wipe out the Communist army early."
During the Jinggangshan period, the local Kuomintang troops, mainly the Kuomintang troops in Hunan and Jiangxi, carried out several "advance suppressions" and "meeting suppressions" against the Red Army, but all of them were defeated by the Red Army without exception. Far from being weakened, the Red Army became more experienced by virtue of its mountainous terrain, its mobile methods of warfare, and the Soviet power established everywhere.
In December 1928, the Pingjiang Uprising troops led by ** and Teng Daiyuan also came to Jinggangshan to join the Red 4th Army, and the strength of the Red Army was further enhanced. By the summer of 1930, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army had grown to about 100,000 men, and had opened up more than a dozen revolutionary base areas in more than 10 provinces.
Seeing that the Red Army was growing stronger and stronger day by day, and that the Soviet areas were being built more and more, Chiang Kai-shek could not hold back.
In the winter of 1930, after winning the Great War in the Central Plains between Chiang, Yan, and Feng, he was no longer satisfied with the poor results of the local Kuomintang troops in attacking the Red Army, and personally deployed a large number of troops, upgrading the military scale of the revolutionary base areas, calling it "encirclement and suppression."
From December 1930 to October 1934, the Kuomintang army carried out five "encirclement and suppression" operations against the Red Army in the Soviet area, each time with greater intensity and more troops, from the initial 100,000 troops to the last million-strong army. To this end, the Red Army carried out five corresponding "counter-encirclement and suppression".
Five anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns
In the first four "encirclement and suppression," the Kuomintang army failed to achieve its goal, but suffered a lot of losses.
1. The first time was in December 1930, when the Kuomintang army gathered 100,000 troops and came to the center of the base area. The Red Army adopted the main strategy of luring the enemy into depth, attacking its protrusion, slacking the enemy's formation, and breaking through each of them, and responded flexibly and maneuverably.
In this process, he expounded the principle of the famous guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare: "The enemy advances and retreats, the enemy is stationed and disturbs, the enemy is tired and I fight, the enemy retreats and we pursue, and the odds of victory in guerrilla warfare are exercised."Advance and retreat in great strides, lure the enemy deep, concentrate forces, break through each one, and annihilate the enemy in a mobile war. In this way, the Red Army has accumulated experience in military struggles in one battle after another.
At the end of the month, the 18th Division of the Kuomintang Army, which had never received a strong lesson in the Red Army, rushed forward alone, trying to find the main force of the Red Army to fight the victory, but was ambushed by the main force of the Red Army, and more than 9,000 people were annihilated, including the division commander Zhang Huizan.
During the victory against "encirclement and suppression," more than 10,000 enemies were annihilated, and the key thing was that more than 10,000 guns of various kinds were also captured, and experience and materials were accumulated, which was extremely important for the development of the Red Army. **For this reason, I am in a good mood and composed a lyric, which I believe many people have read, called "Fisherman's Pride Against the First Great "Encirclement and Suppression"", one of the most impressive sentences is "I caught Zhang Huizan in front".
Second, in the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the Kuomintang was obviously cautious. After more than three years of "attacking, meeting, and encirclement," Chiang Kai-shek attached great importance to the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. He sent He Yingqin, Minister of Military Affairs, to lead 200,000 troops to attack the ** Soviet area by different routes.
The time was in the spring of 1931. Chiang Kai-shek thought quite textbook and told Director He: The main point is to gather a large number of troops, closely encircle and slow advance. This means that with superior forces, the Red Army will be besieged in the Soviet area, cut off the material exchanges between the Red Army and the outside world, and finally compress and concentrate on annihilation. I have to say that this trick is actually very powerful.
At this time, the Red Army had different opinions on how to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression", after all, there were too many enemies, and they adopted the method of advancing step by step, and they could not be forced. After many discussions, it was finally decided to continue with the first method, that is, to lure the enemy deep and break each one, focusing on the essence of "movement and change".
There are many and long stories about the course of the battle, but here we will only talk about the results: under the guidance of the secret of luring the enemy into depth and concentrating troops, and with the vigorous support and cooperation of the masses in the Soviet areas, the Red Army wiped out about 30,000 Kuomintang troops, seized a lot of supplies, and expanded the Soviet areas.
Third, it was not easy for He Yingqin, a capable general, to come forward, and Chairman Jiang could not sit still. In June 1931, the third "encirclement and suppression" was organized, and from the perspective of time, this was basically a continuous battle, which shows the urgency of its mood.
This time, Chiang Kai-shek personally went out and mobilized 23 divisions plus 3 brigades, and the total strength rose to 300,000, of which one-third were Chiang's descendants, commonly known as the "** army". Since the first two tactics failed to achieve results, Chiang Kai-shek set the tone of the third battle policy on the four words "long drive straight ahead." Relying on the strength of the troops and the strength of the horses, the number of people and the strength of the people, the toughness of the attack.
The response of the Red Army was still mainly to lure the enemy into depth. In the face of the enemy's numerical superiority, the Red Army, under the correct leadership of Mao and Zhu, "avoided the enemy's main force and attacked its weakness," and while playing hide and seek with the Kuomintang army, it constantly launched local superior battles to destroy the enemy. Once again, the Kuomintang army found that they could not find the main force of the Red Army, and chased after it and disappeared, and just wanted to stop and rest, but they were beaten. In this way, he was dragged to his nerves, exhausted, and constantly suffered losses.
After 3 months of fighting, Chiang Kai-shek had to order the withdrawal of the army. The third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign was victorious.
This victory is also of great significance to the Red Army, that is, through three actual combat operations against "encirclement and suppression," the entire operational principles of the Red Army have basically been formed. In this sense, the combat effectiveness of the Red Army was cultivated by Lao Chiang.
The results of the third battle were similar to those of the second, and at the same time, the two base areas of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian were connected, reaching the heyday of the **Soviet region.
Fourth, after the frustration of his own attack, Chiang Kai-shek stopped for a year. In the winter of 1932, the fourth "encirclement and suppression" made a comeback. This time, the commander was still Chiang Kai-shek, who flew to Nanchang to personally serve as the commander-in-chief of the "anti-bandit" army, with his right-hand man Chen Cheng as the middle route army, commanding 160,000 descendant troops, plus Cai Tingkai's division of the left route army and Yu Hanmou's division of the right route army, with a total strength of 400,000.
Clever readers have discovered that Chairman Chiang's military policy this time has changed again, dividing the army into three routes, and using the trick of "dividing and attacking together." Not to mention, when Jiang was the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy, he still had some knowledge in military books, and he couldn't be said to be a layman.
This time the Red Army still won the victory, the difference is that the command has become ** and *** They used the experience of the previous times, and at the same time developed a new method of fighting according to the new strategy of the Kuomintang army, using the method of ambush warfare of the large corps, and inflicted heavy losses on Chen Cheng's troops. Although there is no first place in terms of results.
Two or three times, but also a lot of gains.
In September 1933, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized a million troops to "annihilate" the Red Army in one fell swoop. Among them, the number of troops used to attack the ** Soviet zone reached 500,000. Judging from the deployment of "encirclement and suppression" set up by Chiang Kai-shek and the scale of his troops, he was determined to win: several generals under his command poured out of the nest and divided into three routes, northern, western, and southern, respectively commanding corps-level troops, and made all kinds of preparations in advance. At this time, the Japanese invaders had occupied the northeast for two years and were attacking North China step by step, and Chiang Kai-shek stubbornly believed that "if you want to conquer the outside world, you must first settle the interior." Leaving the Japanese invaders alone, he put a million heavy troops in front of the Red Army.
Not surprisingly, this time Principal Jiang's strategy was adjusted to the "fortress tactic", with the help of the huge advantage in troops, he wanted to fundamentally strangle the thorn in the eye and the thorn in the flesh.
Unfortunately, after the first four anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, the Soviet zone and the main Red Army, which had just improved a little, lost its leadership. During this period, the "left-leaning" adventurist strategy represented by Wang Ming prevailed, and Bogu, the provisional leader of the Communist Party of China, and Li De, a military adviser to the Comintern, advocated "keeping the enemy out of the country."
How many troops did the Red Army have at this time?The main force of the Red Army was only more than 80,000 people, only a fraction of the Kuomintang army. This hard-fought style of play allowed the Red Army to survive a difficult year. I won't expand on it for the sake of space - it's a long war drama that sings and weeps.
By September 1934, the Red Army, which was dominated by positional warfare, was compressed into a small **Soviet area, and tens of thousands of people were forced by the Kuomintang army from several directions, and the situation was extremely critical. If the enemy forces formed an encirclement situation, everyone could imagine what it would mean for the Red Army, which had no room for maneuver.
In early October, the main leaders of the CCP made a decision: to abandon the Soviet zone.
Note: On December 1, 1931, the Chinese Soviet Republic was established.
Long March
The transfer began on October 10, when the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission led the Red Army Corps and the team directly under the Military Commission, totaling more than 80,000 people, from Ruijin, Jiangxi, Changting, Fujian and other places to carry out strategic transfers. More than 10,000 people, including the 24th Red Division, remained in the **Soviet area, persisting in the struggle and covering the actions of the main forces of the Red Army.
At this time, the goal of the Red Army was not yet northern Shaanxi, but was preparing to join the Red Army Corps in the Xiangxi region. However, this intention was seen through by Chiang Kai-shek, who "pursued" and intercepted it with heavy troops all the way. In the "Xiangjiang Campaign" that took place on both sides of the Xiangjiang River, the Red Army suffered heavy losses and its strength was sharply reduced, and after just over a month, only more than 30,000 people remained in the main force.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had already set up heavy troops on the Red Army's road to Xiangxi, and if the thin Red Army still acted according to the original plan, it would be tantamount to taking the initiative to seek a decisive battle against the other side, which would inevitably be a catastrophe.
At this critical juncture, ** stood up and looked at Guizhou.
In mid-January 1935, the Zunyi Conference was held, which summed up the experience of failure, re-established the leading position in the Red Army and the Communist Party of China, and passed a life-and-death moment.
After that, it was the four crossings of Chishui, and the Red Army's Long March goal was to look at northern Shaanxi.
To sum up, the purpose of the Long March was to carry out a strategic shift of the main Red Army and get rid of the encirclement and pursuit of the Kuomintang army. The direct reason for this was the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.
After going through many hardships and dangers, sacrificing countless young martyrs, and traveling 25,000 miles, the Red Army finally reached northern Shaanxi.
In October 1936, the three main forces of the Red Army joined forces, and the Long March ended victoriously. From here, the eight-year War of Resistance and the War of Liberation began.
The Long March is a great epic of revolutionary heroism and a unique feat in human history. The spirit of the great Red Army's Long March proclaimed to the world that the Communist Party of China and the people's army under its leadership are an invincible force.
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