When Zhu Huarong, chairman of Changan Automobile, opened the Changan Qiyuan brand during his tenure, it meant that it was a major mission above all else - slightly inferior but about equal to Mr. Xu Liuping's Hongqi brand. This is a new brand that must be successful for Changan Automobile.
After all, although Deep Blue Automobile and AVATR are both new energy brands, they are also joint ventures, and only Changan Qiyuan is the "biological son" of new energy electrification. Moreover, it meets the high requirements of the upper leadership for the new energy autonomy of core automobile enterprises. In the context of the armament group, Changan Automobile is even more so. Therefore, for this reason, Changan Automobile can almost streak the Auchan brand, which has been selling very well, and abolish Auchan from the perspective of organization. You can also not care about Deep Blue Automobile and AVATAR, and on the basis of the high degree of electrification of its existing brands, it will quickly come to a new brand origin.
This is the background and mission of Chang'an Qiyuan, and this is also the most important stroke in Mr. Zhu Huarong's personal resume in the future.
But for such an important and mission-filled brand, how can it be done well? To this end, we have seven questions, and we would like to ask Mr. Ye Pei, Executive Vice President of Changan Automobile
1. With Mr. Ye Pei in charge of Qiyuan, pouring the strength of Chang'an and revitalizing the overall resources, is it at the expense of the normal ecology of Chang'an's original channels to support Kaiyuan? As we all know, Mr. Ye Pei is almost in charge of Changan Automobile's most important channel resources, which is the lifeline of a new brand. However, is the excessive tilt and pouring of resources too much, so that Kaizen cannot afford it, and at the same time, it will cause chaos in the channel that is not only oriented to selling products?
2. As an important brand of Changan New Energy, is the talent structure of Kaizen too traditional? That is, the adaptation and adaptation of traditional automotive industry talents to new energy vehicle brands can also be briefly described as "old experience cannot solve new problems". In the structure of Chang'an Qiyuan, the brand public relations department: Mi Mengdong, Li Guoliang, Ran Zhen, etc.; Brand Division: Yuan Li, Di Zhirui and others all belong to the traditional talents of Changan Automobile, and they are also very good. However, is it due to the overly traditional operational thinking, which is not suitable for the different strategic play styles from the era of fuel vehicles, which indirectly leads to the inability of the Kaizen brand to rise rapidly? Is this contrary to Mr. Yip's vision of transforming into a smart low-carbon mobility technology company?
3. In terms of user reputation, how to eliminate the current biggest user perception of "Leek Qiyuan"? On the Internet platform, there are many complaints and complaints from users about the disguised price reduction of Qiyuan in the short term after buying a car. However, in the face of such loud feedback, in order to stimulate sales, Kaizen has recently launched a time-limited preferential policy for its three models in December, with A05 and A07 reaching up to 10,000 yuan for 1,999 yuan; The pre-sale Q05 is 1,999 yuan to a maximum of 22,000 yuan (based on the pre-sale **) In addition, dealers in different regions have also appeared 140,000-20,000 yuan terminal price reduction**. Has Kaizen done anything to "stabilize people's hearts" for users who have already purchased cars? Is it necessary to sacrifice the interests of the earliest supporting users for the short-term achievement of sales data?
4. In terms of sales data, is it necessary for Kaizen to use data to prove that it sells well? And how to ensure the survival of the channel? In the October data of the Passenger Car Association, the sales of 2,601 Qiyuan A06 are counted, and this sister model of the Changan UNI-V is neither on the market nor for pre-sales. Of course, if the vehicle has arrived at the store but has not been sold, it can also be calculated as a wholesale sale. After all, Di Zhirui once told ** that Qiyuan "already has nearly a thousand core channels", if this statement is true, such data test drives and show cars can be digested. However, based on the sales volume of Kaizen over the past two months, the average monthly sales volume of each core channel is 902 vehicles, how can this support the profitability and service quality of the channel?
5. Is it necessary for Kaizen to rush to pursue a complete product matrix? According to a number of ** reviews, Kaizen's "shell replacement" products have been continuously evaluated. **It is generally questioned why Changan Automobile dares to launch a new brand with a few "shell cars"? Although Kaizen is a new brand, it has launched products very quickly, from the official launch at the end of August to December 12, and has already planned four models: A07, A05, A06 and Q05, but they can all be found in the original models of Changan Automobile. For example, Qiyuan A07 and dark blue SL03 have the same height and wheelbase; A05 is close to Changan Yida and A06 is close to Changan UNI-V; In the information declared by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Q05 is completely consistent with the third generation of Changan CS55 PLUS in terms of length, width and height, and wheelbase size, which can be regarded as a typical oil-to-electric + shell-changing car. How much impact has such a "shell-changing" reputation had on Kaizen's brand image? Once users have formed such a general brand perception, how many resources do they need to spend to correct it later?
6. Is Kaizen eating the old capital of Changan Automobile's resources or really starting electrification? According to Di Zhirui, "Changan Qiyuan carries the strategic mission of Changan Automobile's electric electrification transformation and brand upward development." However, according to the data of the Passenger Association, the sales of PHEVs and EVs of the Kaizen A07 in the two months were 2,947, 4,722, 271 and 486 respectively, with a ratio of about 10:1, that is, only 1 EV model was sold after 10 PHEVs were sold. Kaizen's electric models have not been accepted by the market. When the sales of Kaizen electric vehicles are blocked, can it undertake the mission of the birth of the brand?
7. Why do you put the weight of product launch speed above quality and product polishing? According to the feedback from riders, Kaizen's first model, A07, generally has poor sound insulation and high tire noise; The smell in the car is high; The battery life of the power battery is seriously false, and the battery life of the air conditioner in winter is only about 30, which is far lower than the average level; The reversing brake is abnormal, and the Bluetooth of the car machine is stuck; As well as the fuel consumption of 100 kilometers of power loss, the meter shows 5L, and the actual 7L; Multiple faulty lights and alarm lights at the same time and other problems. Is this one of the reasons why the A07 was launched in September, but was quickly iteratively launched in December, just 3 months later**? Rather than "innovating" so quickly, why not retain the strict standards of traditional car companies in terms of quality control and quality? What is driving the hasty launch of a new brand? Will this have an irreversible impact on Kaizen's product layout?
Text = Chen Guangyao Luo Zuxing