The recent move by the Burmese army** has come as a surprise. They suddenly refused to hand over what was done to Bai and seemed unwilling to continue working with China. Behind such abnormal political maneuvers there must be deliberate strategic considerations.
In the face of changes in the situation in northern Myanmar, China must take measures to protect its interests from harm. We should strengthen communication and cooperation with all parties in Myanmar to bring them back to the negotiating table and promote a peaceful settlement.
China can increase pressure on the Burmese military, mediate and mediate to make it aware of the importance of cooperation with China for its own development. At the same time, we can also use the strength of the local armed forces in Myanmar to exert influence on the military to make them willing to compromise and solve problems.
In addition, in the "infrastructure competition" in South Asia, the United States, China and India and other countries are also actively participating. The United States has been trying to expand its influence in South Asia through investment and aid, while China and India are competing for regional resources by building infrastructure and strengthening exchanges.
As far as China is concerned, we cannot passively wait and see, let alone miss the opportunity. We should strengthen cooperation with India and unite against the expansion of US power. At the same time, we should also win more support and recognition by increasing investment and assistance to South Asian countries.
In the face of changes in the situation in Myanmar and "infrastructure competition" in South Asia, China must remain vigilant and take proactive measures to protect its own interests and regional stability. Only in this way can we play a greater role in the international arena and jointly seek peace and development. Let's wait and see how China shines in this complex strategic game. Judging from the perception that the blackmail forces in northern Myanmar will disappear completely after the end of the conflict, the results are striking.
The Chinese side had previously issued a wanted warrant for the Ming Xuechang family, but soon after, the four members of the Ming family committed suicide or surrendered to the lawThe Chinese side then issued arrest warrants for members of the Kokang "Four Families" such as Bai Socheng, Wei Huairen, and Liu Zhengxiang, but the Myanmar military ** seems to have difficulty controlling the wire fraud militia groups in these places, so it can only cooperate with the Chinese side to crack down on the fraud gangs and extradite these people back to the Chinese side for trial.
However, what people never expected was that two weeks had passed, only to find that the siege of Lao Cai was still going on, and the forces of the electric fraud militia led by the Bai family had not succumbed. In the face of the fact that the Burmese army had no intention of handing over the wire fraud forces, on the contrary, they deployed a large number of troops to garrison Lao Cai and joined forces with the local wire fraud militia to resist the attack of the local ethnic forces.
What is even more surprising is that Min Aung Hlaing also directly reversed the previous ceasefire agreement reached in Kunming, redeployed his best 88th Division to northern Burma, and rekindled the war, trying to directly destroy the Kokang Allied forces and recapture the port of Mujie.
The development of this situation is ridiculous, on the one hand, the survival of the electric fraud gang is incredible, on the other hand, the act of sending troops to garrison Lao Cai is also incomprehensible. And Min Aung Hlaing's actions are even more surprising. This series of changes indicates that the situation may be more complicated in the future, and it is not known what the outcome will be.
It doesn't seem like the story is coming to an end. Let's wait and see!Sure enough, the conflict in Myanmar has restarted, and all Myanmar ** have reported on this incident. In a report on the 20th local time, the "Irrawaddy River News" pointed out that the positions occupied by the Kokang Allied Forces were heavily bombarded by the Burmese Army, and it was the Army ** who took the lead in tearing up the agreement and launching an attack, forcing the Kokang Allied Forces to have no choice but to fight back.
Min Aung Hlaing, it seems, is simply using the peace talks as a ploy to buy time for the Burmese army to resupply and reorganize against ethnic militants in northern Myanmar when the Burmese army is under intense pressure.
However, China and Myanmar have cooperated in the fight against fraud, and there is an explicit ceasefire agreement brokered by China between the armed forces in northern Myanmar. If the agreement is flouted in this way, it will have many adverse effects on the Myanmar military, and at least the bilateral cooperation between China and Myanmar will no longer be able to proceed as smoothly as before. The Chinese side will certainly be concerned about the credibility of the Myanmar army, and can no longer trust Min Aung Hlaing.
Fighting in such a deep mountain jungle, the Burmese army's advantage in heavy equipment cannot be fully exerted, and it is not easy to completely wipe out the local ethnic armed forcesThe army has lost more than 400 military strongholds and townships, and the coalition of local ethnic armed forces in northern Myanmar has taken control of the 169-kilometer-long China-Myanmar region at the time of the peace talks, and has seized some strategic points that are easy to defend and difficult to attack, which has brought greater difficulties to the ceasefire in the conflict in northern Myanmar, even if Min Aung Hlaing is confident after regrouping his elite team, it may not be able to change the situation.
What's more, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has now joined the fighting, and this unit has received US assistance and is equipped with a full range of American-style equipment. If Min Aung Hlaing's army seeks to completely eliminate the Kachin Independence Army, it will definitely provoke the wrath of the United States behind it, and it will be difficult for the army to retreat from the army.
Compared with the Kokang Alliance, which pursues local ethnic autonomy and still recognizes Burma's sovereignty, the Kachin Independence Army is more inclined to independent statehood. If the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) issue cannot be properly handled, Myanmar is likely to find itself in a situation in which the army will be even more passive, and the conflict, which could have ended with peace talks, will drag on indefinitely. Min Aung Hlaing**'s decision to reignite the conflict in order to protect Myanmar's national interests is indeed puzzling. But if we analyze it closely, it also reveals that Min Aung Hlaing may have several political considerations.
Min Aung Hlaing believes that the Chinese political power in the Kokang region is not reliable. Although the Chinese community is the main ethnic group in the Kokang area, they have always had cultural differences with the Burmese, such as different languages and scripts. Min Aung Hlaing** has kept a certain distance from China since coming to power and has actively developed diplomatic relations with Russia. This may be because Min Aung Hlaing fears that China will use the Chinese power in the Kokang region to influence Myanmar's internal affairs.
Min Aung Hlaing** expressed concern about the armed forces in the Kokang area. If the armed forces in the Kokang region are not eliminated, there is a risk that they will be used by China. In order to ensure that Myanmar's Min Aung Hlaing decided to rekindle the conflict at all costs and prioritize the elimination of armed forces in the Kokang region.
Min Aung Hlaing** hopes to consolidate his dominance by reigniting the conflict. In the political battles at home and abroad, Min Aung Hlaing needs to show his determination and ability. By successfully handling the conflict in northern Myanmar, he can increase his political prestige and gain recognition at home and abroad.
In summary, Min Aung Hlaing**'s decision is not unfounded, and their political considerations may involve concerns about the Chinese political power, armed forces, and their own dominance. However, regardless of their considerations, the final outcome remains unchangeable. It is only through genuine efforts to solve problems and promote peace and stability that the support and trust of the people can be earned. The Kokang region had a special significance for Min Aung Hlaing, as he rose through the ranks of the military by overthrowing the Peng family's rule over the region in collusion with Kokang. Kokang is where he gains merit and starts, and once he loses his autonomy, it means that his past efforts are in vain, so he is naturally unwilling to give up.
At the same time, the Kokang local telecom fraud syndicate is known to be a force that Min Aung Hlaing has single-handedly fostered. There is mutual interest between them, it can be said that they collude with each other and depend on each other. Now, if Bai Suocheng and others are handed over, the investment over the years will be wasted. Min Aung Hlaing wants to continue to squeeze the value of Baek So-sung and the other three other families and buy time to deal with the evidence left behind by their collusion. The fighting in northern Myanmar has put China in an awkward position, and it needs to adjust its strategy.
I thought that tearing up the brokered ceasefire agreement would only offend China, but I didn't expect that with the war with the ** forces supported by the United States, it would be almost impossible for Min Aung Hlaing to turn the situation around. He was just jumping from one pit to another, unable to escape the fate of failure. Rather than continue to struggle and further offend China and the United States, it is better to put aside the luck mentality and end the conflict through dialogue, restore ethnic autonomy in northern Myanmar, and leave a way back. This is because telecom fraud in northern Myanmar will inevitably be punished by law.
And, despite the damage to China, we need to adjust our strategy to protect our long-term interests. Agence France-Presse reported that the Myanmar military recently carried out air strikes and naval bombardment of Langli Island in Rakhine State. And this place happens to be the location of the Kyaukphyu Port, a deep-water port project invested by China. It is understood that the Myanmar authorities have ordered a ban on all fishing boats and transport vessels from entering the waters near Kyaukpyu Port until February next year. This news has undoubtedly had a serious impact on the construction work at Kyaukphyu Port, and may even lead to further stagnation.
This stagnation will have further implications for China's strategic vision of gaining access to the sea in the Indian Ocean. According to previous plans, once the port of Kyaukphyu is operational, merchant ships from the Indian Ocean to China will be able to avoid the Strait of Malacca and unload their cargo directly at the port of Kyaukphyu, and then the cargo will enter China through the China-Myanmar railway. However, the northern part of Myanmar through which the China-Myanmar Railway passes is currently under the control of the Allied Forces, and the port under construction has become a battlefield between the Arakan Army and the Burmese Army. It can be said that this strategic plan faces huge challenges in the short term, and it is difficult to continue to push forward.
Today, the blockage of the construction of the Chinese-invested Kyaukphyu port is not only a matter of economic interests, but also a matter of geopolitical strategy in the Indian Ocean. For some time now, China has been working to find an outlet to the sea in order to better protect its maritime routes and overseas interests. However, due to the actions of the Myanmar military, this idea faces significant obstacles.
How China will respond to this situation and how to safeguard its interests in the Indian Ocean is undoubtedly an issue of great concern. As the situation in Myanmar continues to evolve, the answer to this question is exciting. As far as China-Myanmar relations are concerned, the future of the Kyaukphyu Port under construction has also become one of the focuses of attention.
All in all, the Myanmar military's air and naval bombardment of Langli Island had a serious impact on the Chinese-funded Kyaukphyu port project. Stalled construction threatens China's strategic vision of gaining access to the sea in the Indian Ocean, which is undoubtedly a major challenge for China. How to deal with this situation, China will face many tests. We will wait and see how this issue develops further. To this end, China must increase its attention and investment in the Indo-Pacific region. China should learn from the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and establish close cooperation with neighboring countries such as India and the Philippines to form an encirclement of its own. The Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea route are important passages for China's energy imports, and anyone who wants to block this route will pose a huge threat to China's energy **.
China is currently very dependent on energy in the Middle East. In 2022, China's total imports reached 24 trillion yuan, relying on Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman and the United Arab Emirates – four countries accounted for nearly 45% of the total imports. Once the United States strengthens its investment in the Indo-Pacific strategy and blocks the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea route, China will lose this important energy import route and will suffer a huge blow, with a scale of more than 1 trillion yuan.
This is an unimaginable disaster for China. As the world's largest manufacturing country, oil is the indispensable blood for the operation of the entire production system. Without the safety of the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea route, China will face a serious risk of losing energy**, like a sword hanging over China's head, ready to stab at China's lifeblood at any time. Therefore, China must take action to ensure the safety of this important strategic maritime shipping route to safeguard its own energy needs. As a vital part of China's offshore energy lifeline, South Asia is also a region that cannot be ignored when it deals with the damage to China's interests caused by the conflict in northern Myanmar.
Therefore, in the face of the reform of the Myanmar military, China should not easily give up on promoting peace talks, but should remain patient and find a solution to the problem. At the same time, he called on all parties in Myanmar to cease fire and restore stability in northern Myanmar to maintain the strategic cooperative relationship between China and Myanmar.
At the same time, China should actively look for alternatives to reduce the negative impacts in Southeast Asia. This could include continuing to expand land energy with Russia**, developing offshore energy on the China-Russia Northern Sea Route**, and accelerating the construction of a second Eurasian road and bridge connecting China and Central Asia.
In addition, China also needs to strengthen its own defense capabilities in case of emergency. As a last resort, China should be strong enough to deal with external forces from the South China Sea to the Strait of Malacca, and to impose a heavy price in the battle to force the United States and its allies to be more cautious in their containment actions from Malacca to the South China Sea.
In summary, China should make strategic adjustments to deal with the potential damage to its interests from the conflict in northern Myanmar and be able to respond in a timely manner when a crisis strikes. At the same time, it is important to realize that South Asia occupies an important position in China's offshore energy lifeline. Therefore, China also needs to make more efforts on the issue of South Asia. "South Asia and the Indian Ocean region have always been the sphere of influence of India, a regional power. India has always sought to gain geopolitical interests by controlling South Asia as a regional power and suppressing external power in the region.
However, in the process of global multilateralization, some small South Asian countries do not want to be completely constrained by India. As a result, major powers such as China and the United States have exerted influence in South Asia, and geopolitical scholars have even put forward the idea of 'the Romance of China, India, the United States and South Asia'.
According to an article in the South Asia Research Newsletter on December 23, China, the United States and India have all strengthened their participation in the construction of energy infrastructure in South Asia in the past decade. This has led to a marked increase in competition, cooperation and interaction between the three parties on the topic. At present, the competitive and cooperative relationship between these three parties is changing from a weak relationship to a strong relationship, but it has not formed a clear tripartite relationship structure, which is not enough to be regarded as a stable multilateral relationship. ”
In my opinion, this article is a reflection of the competition and cooperation between China, the United States, and India in South Asia in terms of development, infrastructure, and security. The article mentions the dual logic of development and security, as well as the consideration of the United States and India to jointly contain China. And while there are opportunities for cooperation between China and India, their competition is escalating. In order not to undermine the interests of the three parties, the three countries must cooperate and complement each other to provide better infrastructure options for small and medium-sized countries in South Asia.
In the current environment of fierce competition, it seems to be an ideal goal for China, the United States, and India to reach a political blueprint for cooperation and complementarity, which is beneficial for the three countries. However, it can be difficult to achieve this in practice. In the complex arena of South Asia, China has always adhered to the principle of multilateralism in foreign cooperation, and has maintained an important position in this relationship, which will actually have a certain impact on the security of China's Indian Ocean shipping routes. Therefore, we need to do more to help the Indian Ocean countries develop their infrastructure and compete for a place in South Asia.
It is important to note, however, that our ultimate goal is not to compete with the United States and India, but to achieve common development. As mentioned in the article, China and the United States have formed a complex relationship of competition, cooperation, and containment and joint operation, which shows that we do not want to confront them. Because although the United States also wants to exert influence in the region, its influence is actually quite limited due to the limitation of crossing the ocean. At the same time, India's quest for regional influence will not tolerate a superpower building a wide range of influence in South Asia.
Therefore, judging from the current situation, the most likely situation in the South Asia-Pacific region is that India will become bigger, and at the same time, China and the United States will form a relationship of competition, cooperation, and containment. In such a situation, how China will respond will have an important impact on the safety of China's Indian Ocean routes.