Recently, according to the New York Times, the Israeli military had been aware of Hamas's plans for the attack more than a year before it launched the terrorist attack on October 7, but did not pay attention to it. The incident sparked a wide discussion about intelligence processing, risk assessment, and strategic miscalculation.
According to the report, the Israeli military and intelligence ** had been in possession of a document code-named "The Wall of Jericho" more than a year ago, which detailed Hamas's operational plan to launch a devastating invasion. However, these ** believe that it is difficult for Hamas to implement the plan, dismissing it as a utopian dream and not taking it seriously. As a result, Hamas acted almost exactly according to the plan described in the October 7 attack, which had a huge impact on Israel.
The roughly 40-page document outlines point-by-point a devastating invasion that killed some 1,200 people. The document details Hamas's tactics of attack, including firing rockets, using drones to destroy security cameras and automatic machine guns along the border, and the massive influx of gunmen into Israel on paragliders, motorcycles, or on foot. All of this was verified in actual attacks, showing Hamas's high level of organization and planning.
In addition, the plan includes details about the location and size of the Israeli army, communications hubs and other sensitive information. This raises questions about how Hamas gathers intelligence and whether there are leaks within Israel's security apparatus. This also reinforces the importance of intelligence warfare and the urgency of protecting sensitive information from leakage.
The document was reportedly widely circulated among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that Hamas could not afford to launch an attack of this scale and ambition. This shows that the Israeli military and intelligence services have failed in risk assessment. They focus too much on Hamas's skills and prowess and neglect its progress in organizational and programmatic capabilities.
It is unclear whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior political leaders have also seen the document. However, whether they knew it or not, the incident exposed Israel's loopholes and deficiencies in security and defense. It also reminds States** and military agencies of the need to exercise a high degree of vigilance and caution when dealing with similar intelligence to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
Overall, the Hamas attack has once again highlighted the importance of intelligence processing, risk assessment, and strategic decision-making. States** and military institutions need to learn lessons, strengthen intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, improve the accuracy of risk assessments, and develop effective strategies to address security challenges. At the same time, it is also necessary to strengthen international cooperation and information sharing to jointly address transnational terrorism and regional security threats.