In the Battle of Changjin Lake, the 3 armies of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army confronted the elite 10th Army of the US Army head-on, creating a record of completely annihilating an entire regiment of the US Army in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, forcing the "United **" of the Eastern Front to retreat from the sea in a hurry, and the US Army also experienced the "longest retreat" in history. * Later assessment of the campaign was "9 Corps." Under extremely difficult conditions, a huge strategic task was completed" and behind this, the soldiers of the 9th Corps paid a huge amount of **. 19,202 people were killed, 28,954 were frostbitten, nearly 30,000 people were frostbitten, and more than 4,000 people froze to death. Because of the high proportion of extremely cold weather, every time I read the history so far, I am sad and emotional, and I can't help but have a question: Why are there so few cotton clothes and winter clothes in the 9th Corps?The answer to this question in some articles is simply categorized as "the time to enter the DPRK is tight, and it is too late to send winter clothes". So what exactly is the specific situation in history?Why is the 9th Corps so tight in time to enter the DPRK?Why is it too late to send winter clothes such as cotton clothes?How did this happen?Whose responsibility is it?01 Why the 9 Corps.
We now all know that the 9th Corps was assembled in the south as the main force to attack Taiwan before the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Then why was a unit trained in the warm south transferred to the icy North Korea?To answer this question, we must first briefly understand the history of the 9th Corps. The 9 Corps was subordinate to the 3rd Field Army. It is a heroic army that has been in the war for a long time. Before entering the DPRK, the 9th Corps had three armies under its jurisdiction. The 20th Army evolved from the Red Army guerrillas who had fought guerrilla warfare in Fujian for three years, and was the oldest in the entire 9th CorpsThe predecessor of the 26th Army was the troops of the Luzhong Military Region during the Anti-Japanese War, and defense was their strengthThe 27th Army was developed from the troops of the Jiaodong Military Region during the Anti-Japanese War, and was good at fighting tough battles. 
At that time, Song Shilun, the commander of the 9th Corps, graduated from the fifth phase of Whampoa, and had made great achievements in war, participated in the Long March, fought the Japanese, and defeated the Kuomintang reactionaries on the battlefield of the War of Liberation. Song Shilun's deputy, Tao Yong, had the title of "Desperate San Lang", and the shelling of the British Navy "Purple Quartz" during the Battle of Crossing the River was commanded by Tao Yong. The following three army commanders are also fierce generals who have fought for many years. The 9th Corps has rich combat experience, and in the War of Liberation, it encircled and annihilated Zhang Lingfu's reorganized 74th ArmyIn the Huaihai Campaign, the 9th Corps beat Du Yuming's group;The 9th Corps had rich combat experience, strict military discipline, and the commanders of the Corps were all excellent commanders and fighters at that time, and there was no doubt that they were the elite of the People's Liberation Army at that time. The enemy we faced in the Korean War was a "coalition" that was several times larger than our own, mainly the US military), which was known as the most powerful army in the world at that timeSince the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has a bearing on the safety of the newly-born republic, it must be a unit that can fight well, has a good work style, and is ideologically reliable. Why is the 029 Corps in such a hurry to enter the DPRK?
The 9th Corps was originally assembled on the southeast coast as one of the main forces for the liberation of Taiwan. At the beginning, the 9th Corps was designated as the second group of troops to enter the Korean War, but initially the 9th Corps was used as a strategic reserve and did not require immediate entry into Korea. However, "the plan could not keep up with the changes", and the plan of the 9th Corps to enter the DPRK was also changed many times. On September 7, 1950, the latest instructions of the Military Commission were conveyedThe task of attacking Taiwan for rectification and training was lifted, and the troops were immediately put on standby and prepared to go to Shandong for rectification and training. On September 20, 1950, the 9th Corps ordered all armies to move north. From October 1, in the order of the army, the corps headquarters, and the 26th army, they went north in turn. On October 12, ** asked the 9th Corps to leave for Korea ahead of schedule. At this time, the troops of the 9th Corps had not yet arrived in Shandong, and Song Shilun suggested that the time of the troops entering the DPRK be changed to November 15, and this suggestion was agreed to. The 9th Corps was the second group of troops to enter the DPRK, but at this time their combat missions and goals were not yet clear. On October 27, ** sent a telegram to Mr. Peng saying that the 9th Corps would be transported to the Meihekou area of Jilin for pre-war training on November 1, and that the front line could be called if there was an urgent strategic need, and it would not be easily called if there was no such urgent need. However, the development of the Korean war soon broke this original arrangement, and it turned out that at this time, the main force of our Volunteer Army was assembled on the Western Front, and there were only two divisions of the 42nd Army on the Eastern Front, about 30,000 people. On October 29, the 1st and 7th Marine Divisions of the US Army were successively deployed to the south of Changjin Lake, and the 10th Army of the US Army is likely to go north to Changjin Lake. The 10th Army of the U.S. Army has nearly 100,000 troops, which not only has an absolute advantage in numbers, but also has the highest preparation and logistical supply above our army. If only two divisions are allowed to defend the US 10th Army, it will be very difficult, once the Eastern Front is broken through. The volunteers on the Western Front will fall into a state of being flanked by the US army from both sides, and the form is very critical. 
Therefore, the elite 9 Corps must enter the DPRK as soon as possible. This is also why on 27 October, the chairman was still saying that "if there is no urgent need, it will not be easily called", and two days later, on 29 October, the chairman said in a telegram that the three divisions of the puppet head, the puppet 3rd and the 7th US division in the east were extremely likely to attack north from Hamxing, and that it was necessary to use the main force of Song Shilun to be sure in this area, otherwise it would be unfavorable to the overall situation. I ask you to consider whether the remaining two armies, except for the 27th Army, which will go directly to Ji'an or Manpo from Tai'an on 1 November, will continue to open up the area and rest and recuperate in order to be used if necessary. On 31 October, the 9 Corps received an order to set out, and the 9 Corps should all start with one corps on 1 November, and the other two corps would continue to move without interruption. On November 1, the 27th Army was the first to board the train and head to the northeast. It was followed by the 20th and 26th armies. On November 2, the military order came down again, and after the two divisions of the 27th Army arrived at Andong (now Dandong), they did not stop and immediately entered the DPRK. This can only show that the situation on the Korean battlefield is becoming more and more tense. On November 5, the task of the 9th Corps was already very clear: "Jiangjie and Changjin should be determined to be fully undertaken by the Song Corps," and after several changes, on November 7, the 20th Army, the vanguard of the 9th Corps, entered Korea from Ji'an and went to the battlefield. It is not difficult to see from the order given to the 9th Corps that because of the rapid changes in the situation on the Korean battlefield, the tasks of the 9th Corps have changed greatly in a short period of time, from a reserve to "immediately enter Korea". It is necessary to transport about 150,000 people of the three armies, together with a large amount of military supplies such as equipment, grain, grass, and medicines, to the DPRK in a short period of time, which has to be said to be a huge test for the newly established New China. 03 Why is the winter clothing of the 9th Corps insufficient?
The 9th Corps urgently entered the court, but the cotton and winter clothes did not fully keep up. There are many reasons as to why this is the case. There are both the 9 Corps' own and logistical reasons. The 9th Corps was assembled on the southeast coast before entering Korea, and most of the 9th Corps came from East China and South China, and most of the 9th Corps were southerners compared to Northeast China or Korea. The commanders and fighters of the 9th Corps are more accustomed to the climate in the south and coastal areas, and they have no concept of the severe cold in North Korea, let alone think that they are about to face the extreme cold weather that North Korea will encounter once in decades. This can be seen from a telegram sent by Song Shilun to his superiors: We should do our best to meet the needs of the equipment supplement, and at present, the winter clothes of the corps are all sewn according to the climate in the south of the Yangtze River, and I am afraid that they are not cold-resistant. We have no experience in the cold climate, and we don't know how to sew to meet the standards. From this telegram, it can be seen that the 9th Corps has no experience of the cold winter in North Korea, and does not know what kind of cotton clothes can adapt to the climate there. The soldiers' existing cotton clothes are made according to the winter conditions in the south of the Yangtze River. 
The lack of awareness of extremely cold weather has led some cadres to not take this to heart. Before the 60th Division of the 26th Army entered the DPRK, it left more than 600 cotton coats replenished by the northeast in the country. Although there are subjective reasons of the 9th Corps itself, our descendants cannot criticize them harshly for this. Don't say 71 years ago, just now, it is difficult for friends in the south to establish a specific concept of the severe cold in the northeast, how to wear clothes, how to prevent freezing, I think most friends in the south are also difficult to say one, two, three, four, five. Seventy-one years ago, the transmission of information was not as convenient and abundant as it is today, and the officers and men of the 9th Corps did not have enough understanding and experience in this regard. The 9 Corps itself had no experience, but the logistics department knew about it. Roughly at the end of August or the beginning of September 1950, the logistics department had already drawn up a plan for replenishing the winter clothes of the 9th Corps, and the Northeast, North China, East China, and Central and South China were each assigned plans to make cotton clothes, cotton shoes, gloves, and hats. On October 18, the logistics department believed that "200,000 sets of cotton clothes" would be prepared, and 50,000 sets would be made in North China, Northeast China, Central South and East China, and it would be completed in December. That is to say, at this time, the ** plan given by the logistics department to the 9th Corps is probably scheduled to be completed in December. This is based on the fact that the 9th Corps was not in such a hurry to enter the DPRK. The situation on the battlefield changed rapidly, and the entry time of the 9th Corps into Korea was changed many times and repeatedly advanced. At that time, New China had just been established, everything was in ruins, and in the face of sudden changes, the logistics department hurried to catch up, but there was still a big gap. After the 9th Corps arrived in Shandong, Song Shilun reported the situation to Shandong**. Shandong said that it would help solve the problem, but before Shandong could catch up with the production of cotton clothes, the 9th Corps had already boarded the military column to the north. On the other hand, the 9th Corps was originally scheduled to assemble in Shenyang and Meihekou, and the winter clothes for the 9th Corps were also transported to these two places as planned. As a result, after the plan was changed, the materials had to be rerouted from Shenyang and Meihekou to Ji'an, which was undoubtedly a severe test for the fragile transportation capacity at that time, and it was inevitable to be in a hurry. After arriving in the Northeast, Song Shilun's old comrade-in-arms He Jinnian was the deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region. As soon as He Jinnian heard Song Shilun's complaints, he immediately ordered that a total of 50,000 pieces of Japanese coats and cotton shoes seized in the warehouse of the Northeast Military Region be given to the 9th Corps. When the 9th Corps was in Shenyang, it also received about 35,090 cotton coats from the original 13th Corps. At the same time, the Northeast Military Region made every effort to produce cotton coats, and various localities urgently dispatched a batch of cotton coats to provide support. By the end of November, a total of more than 220,000 cotton coats of various types had been distributed to the 9th Corps. Seeing this, some friends may ask, the 9th Corps has a total of only 150,000 people, and there is still a surplus of more than 220,000 cotton coatsWhy will there not be enough on the battlefield?Well, this brings us to another problem: the logistics capacity of the volunteer army cannot keep up. 
In other words, although winter clothes such as cotton coats are available, the limited transportation capacity cannot guarantee that the cotton clothes will be distributed to every soldier. At that time, the Northeast Military Region once calculated that the Volunteer Army needed 1,500 cars for food alone, and the total number of cars in the Volunteer Army at that time was less than half. When the DPRK first entered the DPRK in October, there were a total of 735 vehicles of the Volunteer Army. And these 735 vehicles, under the indiscriminate bombardment of the US military, by November 2, 315 were lost. Moreover, at that time, New China lacked the capacity to make its own production of automobiles, and the cars ordered from the Soviet Union could not be delivered for a while. Limited capacity must be prioritized for securing ammunition and food. In this way, the distribution of more than 200,000 cotton coats was a huge project, which also led to the fact that the cotton clothes received by the 9th Corps in the early days of its entry into Korea were far less than the number of cotton clothes planned to be equipped. At this point, we can summarize: because of the rapid changes in the situation on the Korean battlefield, the 9th Corps entered the DPRK earlier than the original time. However, the logistics capacity of winter clothing did not keep up with this change, the 9th Corps had insufficient understanding of the extremely cold weather, and the relatively backward logistics system of the Volunteer Army in the early days of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea could not fully meet the requirements of winter clothing transportation, and many reasons eventually led to the lack of cold equipment faced by the 9th Corps in the battle of Changjin Lake, which was caused by China's backward industrial system at that time, and could not and could not be attributed to a certain individual or unit. 
Living today, it is difficult for us to imagine how weak our industrial and material foundation was at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China, and it is also difficult to imagine that in the weather of minus 40 degrees, the soldiers still have to maintain a fighting state, and it is also difficult to imagine how the martyrs of the volunteer army fought with such rudimentary equipment and advanced enemies, and won victory after victory. This period of history deserves to be remembered, and the group of young people in 1950 deserves to be remembered. Without them, we wouldn't be where we are today.