Russia's Baikal-Amur Mainline railway line recently suffered a sudden ** attack. A Russian train loaded with diesel fuel was moving normally on the railway, and while passing through the tunnel in Severomuisk, it was hit by a bomb. Although **did not build **people**, the goods on the train suffered heavy losses. Similar railway attacks are unprecedented in Russia, and it is suspected that they were also committed by Ukraine. Investigators quickly arrived at the scene to investigate, but the cause of the accident has not yet been announced. It is reported that this incident was a special operation planned by the Security Service of Ukraine. According to sources, with the help of a spy network in Russia, they planted four bombs on the railway line in the tunnel to draw medicine while the train was passing by. The attacked railway trunk is part of the Trans-Siberian Railway and one of two important transport arteries in the Russian Far East.
Last year, the railway carried more than 14.9 billion tons, part of which was shipped to the West, that is, to the Russian-Ukrainian front. It is estimated that the attacked railway trunk line is more than 4,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian front. Even at such a long distance, the Ukrainian army ** still launched an attack, which was really unprepared. Unlike the Russian Belgorod power plant and the Crimean bridge, which were attacked, this attack took place at a greater distance from Ukraine. Therefore, such acts of sabotage deep into the territory of Russia are really rare. Since the outbreak of the war, the logistics of the Russian army have been under criticism. This time, because of the negligence of the defense, the railway line was attacked by the Ukrainian army, and the Russian military should be vigilant about this. In September last year, Russia replaced the head of logistics for the "special military operation". The former head, Bulgakov, was removed from his post and replaced by Mizintsev, the former head of the Russian Defense Command Center. Despite the firepower of the Russian military, the logistics appear weak. Some people describe that although the Russian army is a 21st century army, it still relies on the logistics of the 19th century, which really undermines its combat effectiveness.
The Russian army encountered a severe frontline situation in September last year, and the Ukrainian army continued to launch**, capturing the important cities of Redman and Kharkiv. Ukrainian soldiers even trampled the Russian flag under their feet in these cities, causing great embarrassment to Putin. Therefore, it is reasonable to rectify the most important personnel in charge of grain and grass. Mizintsev is no ordinary man, and he must have been an extraordinary figure in winning Putin's trust at such a critical time and having the ability to solve this dilemma. Mizintsev, nicknamed "The Butcher of Mariupol", was born in 1962 and is a general of the Russian Army who personally commanded the siege of Mariupol. Prior to that, he had extensive experience in Syria with Surovikin. At present, he is no longer in charge of the logistics of the Russian army, but has been transferred to the deputy commander-in-chief of the "Wagner" group, which shows that he is not only proficient in military command, but also enjoys a high prestige in the Russian army, even the "Wagner" group of outlaws can be suppressed by him, which shows his extraordinary features.
During his tenure in logistics for the Russian army, he insisted on a tough approach to reform. The logistical problems of the Russian army were already present at the beginning of the "special military operation", and this was largely due to Serdyukov's military reforms. The reform, which began in 2008, drastically reduced the total number of Russian troops, bringing the total number of armed forces to 1 million. At the officer level, the reform has also undergone significant changes, with the Russian army reducing nearly 250 generals, nearly 100,000 colonel-level officers, and 30,000 lieutenant-level officers, and merging 65 military academies into 10 military training centers. The original 24 divisional units were disbanded and merged into 10 army groups. Clearly, Serdyukov's intention was to streamline the Russian army as a whole, but this reform has led to a weaker logistics department. The logistics and material transportation of the Russian army group mainly relies on 10 "material and technical support brigades", each of which has two truck battalions.
The truck battalions are equipped with a total of 150 logistics trucks, 50 trailers and 260 specialized trucks, for a total of less than 500 trucks, which are required to supply the entire army group, rather than a battalion-sized tactical group. The Russian army initially had at least hundreds of battalion-sized tactical groups on the battlefield, and 10 "material technical support brigades" were responsible for delivering supplies and ammunition to these tactical groups, and one can imagine what a difficult task this was. Even in the most efficient case, supplies will certainly not arrive in time, not to mention that these truckers will need to rest, their vehicles will be damaged, and they may also be attacked by Ukrainian forces. The roads in Ukraine have always been muddy, so the logistics units of the Russian army often queue up and are directly blocked into a "long snake formation", and then become the target of artillery and drones of the Ukrainian army. Even Mizintsev could not fill such a huge gap. Solving the problem of the lack of trucks in the Russian army will not happen overnight. Since last year, the Russian army has frequently carried out "tactical position adjustments", for example, because logistics supplies cannot be **, they simply abandoned the Kherson and Dnieper regions.
Russian troops also withdrew from Izyum after the railway line north of Izyum was blown up. After shortening the battle line, the Russian army avoided excessively long logistics transportation routes, effectively avoided the weak links of truck transportation, and instead relied more on railway transportation, which made the logistics situation of the Russian army temporarily improved. Since 2023, the Russian army has been on the defensive and has not launched a large-scale offensive campaign, so the supplies transported by rail are already enough to meet the ammunition and ** consumption of the Russian army. However, despite this, the logistics of the Russian army are still not capable of supporting a large-scale offensive. Even if the Russian army occupies new territory, it may not be able to control it for a long time without railway support. Ukraine, of course, understands this, and therefore sends ** to attack railways within Russia. However, while this approach is worthy of Russia's vigilance, it will not help Ukraine completely turn the tide of the war. The massive defeat of Ukraine has already led to the loss of too much living forces and Western equipment by the Ukrainian army. As Ukraine's war potential is gradually depleted, sooner or later Russia will take the absolute initiative.
However, the "special military operation" also has much to reflect on for Russia: after all, this is a war on its own soil, and with the help of its own railway system and Belarus, the logistics of the Russian army are so difficult that it can be judged that the Russian army's overseas strategic projection capability has almost zeroed. Compared to the war in which the United States was able to attack Iraq halfway around the world, the Russian army is clearly incapable of carrying out such an operation.