Text |Zhou Xianxian
EdZhou Xingxing**Management fee Recently, the establishment of the first batch of 20 floating management fees after the public offering fee reduction** seems to be a hint of warmth under the chill at first glance.
At present, the market performance is poor, investors are generally anxious, and the exploration of breaking the "drought and flood guarantee" of the first company cannot be stopped. As one of the directions of the rate reform, the floating rate reflects the exploration of the "benefit sharing mechanism" between the manager and the holder.
After many years, the starting point is good, but looking back at history, the floating management fee** is not only now, but it has not caused much splash. So, Xiao Zhou will compare the previous ones, is the new batch of floating rate management ** still not only a "gimmick"?Can the people really benefit?
part 1
Product design has really improved
Variable rates are nothing new.
The first floating management fee in China was issued in August 2008, and Dentons strengthened the income secondary bond base, after which the company successively launched various forms of floating management fee. Due to the extreme market** in 2015 and the unrestricted rules for the withdrawal of performance remuneration in the industry, the approval of floating management fees** was suspended for a time and was not restarted until the end of 2019.
As of now, there are only 126 floating management fees** in the market, but the fee rules are very complicated.
The mainstream of floating management fees established in the early days is: benchmarking absolute returns, charging management fees in different tranches;Benchmarking performance benchmark, i.e. "pivot rate";Performance-linked management fees, etc.
The floating management fee** established after the public offering fee reduction is divided into three categories: management fee linked to performance;Scale-linked management fees;A management fee is charged based on the investor's holding period. Through this different linked billing model, it also reflects the expectations and constraints of the current policy on different dimensions of the industry. The "performance-linked method" aims to promote the consistency of the interests of managers and holders, and break the old model of managers to ensure income in drought and flood. This model is currently the mainstream of floating rates, and it is also the main model in this article. Compared with the batch of "performance-linked" floating rates** (hereinafter referred to as "performance-linked method 2019") established in 2019, the new product (hereinafter referred to as "performance-linked method 2023") limits the upper limit of performance-based remuneration on the basis of the original rules:
That is, when ** does not achieve positive returns, the management fee rate is 05%；When the annualized income exceeds 8% and the annualized income of the performance benchmark, 20% of the excess income of the relative 8% and the annualized income of the performance benchmark is charged as the performance remuneration, but the proportion of performance remuneration shall not exceed 1%.
The two new models of "scale-linked method" and "investor-holding period-linked" are the first to conform to the pricing logic of "diminishing marginal cost" and to motivate the people to invest for a long time. The specific rules of the above modes are as follows, and will not be repeated one by one.
*: wind, investment**.
part 2
It seems to save money, but it may notFrom the perspective of product design, the newly established floating management fee** has been significantly improved, so, from the perspective of effect, can the floating rate really reduce the fee for investors?
Since the new ** has not yet been put into operation, Xiao Zhou referred to the calculation method of China Merchants ** and compared the new and old performance-linked methods with the fixed rate with and without the upper limit of performance remuneration.
If a single ** is taken as a sample, assuming that the investor purchases 6 billion shares of A** at the beginning of 2020 and does not subscribe and redeem during the period, the amount of management fees charged in different ways is calculated for holding for one year, holding for two years (from the beginning of 2020 to the end of 2021), and holding for three years (from the beginning of 2020 to the end of 2022).
The results show:The rate of the performance-linked method is highly correlated with the market trend, and when the ** achieves positive returns, the new and old performance-linked method rates are higher than the fixed rate.
In the time period when ** is positive and outperforms the performance benchmark, the management fee charged by the performance-linked method (2019) is significantly higher than the fixed management fee, and the management fee charged by the performance-linked method (2020) is between the former and the fixed rate;When ** is a period of negative returns and does not outperform the performance benchmark, the management fees charged by the performance-linked method (2019) and the performance-linked method (2023) are lower than the fixed rate.
*: If China Merchants ** takes the active equity ** of the whole market as a sample, selects 1742 active equity** that are fully operating from 2020 to 2022 and meets the 3-month position opening period, and calculates the distribution of management fees of these **.
The results show that in 2020, when the overall performance was excellent, the management fee rate of the performance-linked method (2019) without the upper limit of performance remuneration was even more than 20% on average, while in 2022, when the market weakened, the management fee rate of the vast majority of ** was still 08%。The performance-linked method (2023) optimizes the formerWhen the income is getting higher and higher, and the proportion of performance compensation is capped at 1%, the management fee rate begins to decrease slightly, but it is still higher than the fixed rate.
In other words, the purchase of floating rate ** is equivalent to a "VAM" agreement between the manager and the holder: if the product loses, the management fee will be less, and the product will be overcharged if the product is earned.
Seeing this, it is already clear that if the fixed rate is "drought and flood protection", the floating rate may not be a loss for the company.
In addition, the centralized issuance of floating management fees at the current point in time** implies to a certain extent the manager's judgment that "the probability of subsequent market upside increases", and if the market is repaired in the next few years, then the management fee charged by ** company will be greatly increased.
part 3
Save confidence first, but not much
To sum up, it is not difficult to find that although the starting point of promoting the consistency of the interests of the manager and the holder is good, in the long run, it remains to be seen how the "money-saving effect" of the floating management fee will be for investors.
Returning to the essence, the upper limit of the operation of active equity still depends on the ability of the manager, and excessive incentives may not be able to achieve the desired return. At the time of the public offering, the floating management fee was introduced, perhaps what investors felt was only a massage at the level of "confidence".
But even so, it is undeniable that this direction of reform is more consistent with the interests of investorsAfter all, if you have to choose between "losing money and paying a fixed management fee" and "making money but paying more management fees", I believe investors can only choose the latter.
However, whether there is a better option is a more worthy question. After all, what makes the people mind the most is the loss, not the loss if they pay less.
Reference: Current Situation and Actual Utility Estimation of Floating Rates**
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Original article, unauthorized, do not**.
The above views do not constitute investment advice.