Since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the poor performance of the IDF has refreshed people's perception of them again and again, and gradually reduced the world to the ridicule of the professional army. In the early days of the conflict, due to the disparity in strength between the two sides, people said that Hamas might not be able to hold out for even a month before it was defeated, but now it seems that the Israeli army has suffered heavy losses and is still far from victory. The fundamental reason for this situation is the Israeli army's various erroneous policy decisions and frequent tactical mistakes.
Judging from the various ground engagements, the Israeli army always loves to gather together, take the big road, blindly, stop in an open environment, and disconnect the infantry and the tank, and the lack of infantry and tank coordination is very fatal. The soldiers were afraid of Hamas's bazookas and mortars, and they were also afraid of being accidentally injured by the tank's passive defense, so that they did not dare to get out of the car at all during the battle, which led to the Israeli Merkava tank always being exposed to the intricate urban lanes without cover, and the poor vision of the tank itself was a good "cover" for Hamas Hamas fighters were able to successfully destroy Israeli armored vehicles with rocket launchers or even directly on the body of the vehicle, and the Israeli army's solution to this problem was only to install cameras on the tank.
Hamas militants planted bombs on tanks.
On the other hand, the performance of the Israeli army in tactical command can also be called disastrous, after encountering an ambush, neither use smoke bombs to block the opponent's field of vision, nor provide fire support, but actually step forward one by one to rescue teammates, this kind of "gourd baby to save grandpa" style of "sending people to the head" tactics gave Hamas armed personnel a lot of tactical opportunities, so that they could set up multiple ambush points to send reinforcements, so that the Israeli army, which was already insufficient reinforcements and not fully prepared, was extremely heavy.
In the early days of the war, the Israeli army's key attack target was northern Gaza, aiming to clear Gaza and eliminate the elite Qassam brigade of the Palestinian resistance, but after a month of fighting, the Israeli army was still circling around the periphery, and it was unable to enter the city at all and suffered huge losses, but the Israeli army did not choose to rotate its troops or increase the intensity of the attack, but withdrew the soldiers from the north and began to attack southern Gaza. Originally, as long as the north and south of Gaza were cut off and blocked, the sub-divisions and entrenched Hamas were equivalent to losing their combat strength in the south, but now the Israeli army has taken the initiative to abandon the north and attack the south, "helping" Hamas to make up for their tactical weaknesses.
What's worse is that Yemen's Houthi rebels have cut off the Red Sea transportation line, and the Israeli side can only rely on the Mediterranean Sea and air to replenish supplies. According to incomplete statistics, they have consumed 50,000 tons of ammunition in the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli army's stocks have long been emptied, and they can only rely on supplies.
Under all kinds of mistakes, the Israeli army's ** is naturally disastrous. However, according to the figures released by the Israeli army, the number of officers killed far exceeded that of ordinary soldiers, and even three majors were killed in a single day. Of the 433 people he admitted to being killed in battle, nearly 30 percent were officers, 66 percent were non-commissioned officers, and only 4 percent were ordinary soldiers. According to the normal army, the ratio of front-line officers to soldiers should be more than one to five, and since most of the officers are in the command headquarters, the ratio of officers to soldiers should be about one to ten, which is a more reasonable situation. The reason for this phenomenon may be that Israeli officers are generally "high-level and low-level", and they always like to adopt the radical strategy of fighting side by side with soldiers and charging together, but some people also point out that the Israeli army has concealed the news of the death of a large number of grassroots soldiers, which makes the rate of officers ** surprisingly high.