On December 4, 1948, in Zhangjiakou, in the corps headquarters of the Kuomintang army, the hot pot was set up and the mutton was put into the pot. ** Guo Jingyun, commander of the 35th Army, and a group of senior generals of the Kuomintang North China "suppressed the general" waited for the arrival of the commander-in-chief Fu Zuoyi.
Guo's predicament stemmed from the failure of the 35th Army under his command to engage in a decisive battle with the PLA's Yang Chengwu Third Corps. Although intelligence indicated that Yang's corps was a face-to-face enemy, in Zhangjiakou, Yang Chengwu's troops did not show their usual ruthlessness. Guo Jingyun felt puzzled in his heart.
Guo Jingyun was born poor and joined the Beiyang Army early. The 35th Army is Fu Zuoyi's hole card starting from the Jin Army system, and it is the elite of North China's "suppression of the general". In the Battle of Laishui in January 1948, the 35th Army was mostly annihilated by the PLA. The People's Liberation Army's attack on Zhangjiakou was also a "battle of revenge" for Guo Jingyun.
However, Fu Zuoyi made this trip to arrange the retreat. Guo Jingyun felt both wretched and incomprehensible, and his heart was depressed. Miyun, an important town in the Pingjin area, has been captured by the People's Liberation Army, and Fu Zuoyi hopes that the troops will immediately return to help strengthen the defense of the core area of Pingjin. Guo Jingyun's plan came to naught in front of a telegram.
The drafter of the telegram was ***, and the place of power generation was Xibaipo. The telegram was entitled "Attracting Several Troops of Fu Zuoyi's Division to the Pingzhang Line." The recipients of this top-secret telegram involved many military chiefs of the People's Liberation Army, marking the official start of the Pingjin Campaign, one of the three major strategic decisive battles of the Liberation War.
The fact that so many founding generals gathered on the recipients of the telegram is enough to see the importance of this telegram. **One of the telegrams with the highest level of secrecy personally issued during the War of Liberation is not only the secrecy mark of "top secret" and "4 A", but also the four words written by *** himself: "burn immediately after reading".
Fu Zuoyi felt that his wishful thinking had failed. In the second half of 1948, the Kuomintang suffered successive defeats in Northeast China and East China, and Chiang Kai-shek pinned his hopes on North China to maintain its military and political presence in the region north of the Yangtze River. Fu Zuoyi was under great pressure, and he had established a reputation in the Jinsui region, but now became the last hope for maintaining the rule of the Kuomintang.
In North China, Fu Zuoyi was not only under pressure from the People's Liberation Army, but also under the orders of Nanjing, to quickly retreat south. Chiang Kai-shek hoped to preserve the vital strength of the Kuomintang army and strengthen the resistance to the Communists' "crossing the river". Fu Zuoyi understood the necessity in military affairs, but in politics, he had his own considerations.
On the one hand, he knew that the factions within the Chiang army were complicated, and Fu Zuoyi, as a local official who had been in North China for a long time, could not take much advantage in the struggle between military and political factions. On the other hand, Fu Zuoyi was dissatisfied with the personnel arrangements for the "suppression of the general manager" in North China. His voice in North China was restricted, especially as the deputy commander of the old Chiang dynasty.
Fu Zuoyi acquiesced to the suggestion of retreating south, but deep down he had a different idea. He planned to lead his old troops back to Suiyuan, to sit on one side and wait and see the situation. Before the decisive battle of Pingjin, he arranged his troops into a "long snake" situation, handed over the east to the ** army, and left the west to his old Northwest Army.
On the side of *** and the CCP, they don't want Fu Zuoyi's troops to retreat south, but they are also unwilling to let them return to the Jinsui area. The increase of hundreds of thousands of troops after the southern retreat is undesirable for Xibaipo, and it will affect the PLA's future plan to liberate the northwest. ** After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, it was pointed out that the war of liberation could not be delayed.
The PLA has a strategic advantage, while Fu Zuoyi is in a political and military dilemma. His plans clashed with Chiang Kai-shek's expectations, and *** also expressed concern about Fu Zuoyi's southward retreat. This infighting in North China will usher in a decisive scene in the Pingjin Campaign.
Commentary: Fu Zuoyi and the internal and external difficulties before the Battle of Pingjin.
In this article, we gain an in-depth look at the key moments on the battlefield in North China during the Kuomintang-Communist Civil War, especially Fu Zuoyi's predicament before the Battle of Pingjin and his internal and external difficulties. The article outlines the hot pot feast in Zhangjiakou and the anxiety of the army generals with vivid brushstrokes, making the historical battle situation vivid and concrete in front of readers.
First of all, Fu Zuoyi is under tremendous pressure at the strategic level. The article mentions that in the second half of 1948, the Kuomintang suffered successive defeats in Northeast China and East China, and Chiang Kai-shek pinned his last hope for maintaining the region north of the Yangtze River on North China. This made Fu Zuoyi have to seek his own living space in the double attack of politics and military. For him, the retreat to the south was a military necessity, but it clashed with his political choice.
Second, the factional struggle within the "suppression of the general government" in North China also became a problem for Fu Zuoyi. In the article, Fu Zuoyi, as a local magistrate who is not a descendant, is influenced by the intricacies of factions within Chiang's army. This limits his right to speak, especially in personnel arrangements. Such a situation made Fu Zuoyi have to balance the idea of retreating south and "temporarily holding Pingjin" to seek the greatest interests for himself.
At the intersection of politics and military, Fu Zuoyi seems to want to maintain his local power and avoid becoming a political victim after the retreat to the south. The contrast between his complex mind and the vagaries of the political situation added a lot to the complex situation of the entire period of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war.
** and the strategic thinking of the CCP is also glimpsed in the article. They did not want Fu Zuoyi's troops to withdraw southward, which would affect the strategic plans of the PLA, and they were unwilling to let them return to the Jinsui area to prevent the formation of new warlords in the Chiang Kai-shek era. This kind of meticulous strategic layout and consideration shows the foresight and firm determination of the first in the period of the Liberation War.
Finally, by revealing the contents of the telegram, the article shows the highest level of secrecy of the telegram personally issued by *** during the War of Liberation, and the importance of the telegram. This highlights the key position of the Pingjin Campaign as one of the three major strategic decisive battles of the Liberation War, and enables readers to have a deeper understanding of the key moments of the historical war.
Overall, this essay vividly outlines Fu Zuoyi's internal and external difficulties before the Battle of Pingjin through nuanced narration and analysis. The complexity of the war situation, the plight of individual generals, and the game of political struggle are all vividly displayed in this article, presenting readers with important historical episodes during the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
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