One day in 1986, Yang Di, chief of staff of the Shenyang Military Region, made a detour to Dalian and specially visited the old chief Zeng Siyu. The two old comrades-in-arms met each other, excited about each other, full of endless past events and topics. Zeng Siyu revealed a piece of news to Yang Di: "I am writing a memoir of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. ”
In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea more than 30 years ago, Zeng Siyu served as the commander of the 64th Army of the 19th Corps of the Volunteer Army, while Yang Di served as the deputy director of the Operations Division of the Volunteer Army Headquarters and the director of the Operations Division of the West Coast Command. Recalling that period of history, Zeng Siyu suddenly remembered a past incident and asked: "When I led the 64th Army into Korea to participate in the fifth campaign, the first echelon had not yet entered the charging position, and the artillery was only entering the position, but I suddenly received an order from Yang Dezhi, the commander of the corps, to launch an offensive attack. At that time, I called Commander Yang Dezhi to explain, but I was refused, and I was asked to follow the order. For so many years, I don't know what's going on, Comrade Yang Di, it's okay for you to tell me what you know. ”
Listening to Zeng Siyu's question, Yang Di smiled slightly: "Old chief, didn't you ask Commander Yang Dezhi later?"Zeng Siyu also shook his head helplessly: "It's not good to ask, let's talk about it." ”
Yang Di thought for a moment, and finally told Zeng Siyu: "Since it has been thirty years, then I'll talk about it." At that time, Zeng Siyu and Yang Dezhi had a superior-subordinate relationship. During the Anti-Japanese War, Yang Dezhi was the commander of the 685th Regiment of the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and Zeng Siyu was the head of the ** unit of the 685th Regiment;During the War of Liberation, Yang Dezhi served as the commander of the new Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, and Zeng Siyu served as the commander of the Second Division of the Military Region. It lasted until the period of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, Yang Dezhi became the commander of the 19th Corps of the Volunteer Army, and Zeng Siyu served as the commander of the 64th Army. In terms of relationship, Zeng Siyu and Yang Dezhi are closer, so there is nothing that cannot be said explicitly. But this also has to start with the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
According to Yang Di in his memoirs "In the days of the Volunteer Army Headquarters", the launch of the fifth campaign was a little "urgent". In late March 1951, the United ** advanced the front to the vicinity of the "38th Parallel", and disputes arose over whether to cross the 38th Parallel again. Due to global strategic considerations, the United States decided to move north, but it decided through negotiations what to do next. By April 15, the Volunteer Army was the first.
3. The 19th Corps was transferred to the Korean battlefield and assembled near the 38th parallel, at which time the joint ** terminated the operation, and the fourth campaign came to an end. But *** is still concerned about the situation on the front. After learning about the increase in U.S. troops and the training of new divisions by the South Korean Army, he believed that the United States might launch an "Inchon landing." Therefore, ** instructed the Volunteer Army: "Our army should take advantage of the fact that the enemy's foothold in the north and south of the 38th parallel is not stable, carry out a counterattack, and strive to destroy the US army and the five divisions of the South Korean Army tens of thousands of people head-on, and then advance south." So, the Volunteer Army began to prepare for the fifth campaign. Against this background, the commanders of the corps and corps were convened to discuss the specific plan, and the start date of the campaign was finally determined to be April 22.
However, the situation on the front line changed rapidly, especially after learning about the increase in US troops and the training of new divisions by the South Korean Army, ** felt that the enemy had a plan to repeat the "Inchon landing", so he launched an attack a few days in advance. In terms of campaign preparations, the logistics of the Volunteer Army faced great problems, and the material supply lines were often attacked by the United **. In this case, considering the follow-up operation, the supply of materials becomes a major problem. And at the beginning of the campaign, the logistics of the Volunteer Army were barely improved, and only a minimum ** was guaranteed. The newly entered volunteers were not familiar with the terrain and the enemy's situation, and they were in a hurry to prepare. This makes the battle more complicated and dangerous.
Yang Di recalled the scene at that time, and he mentioned that the commanders of each corps reported on their preparations at the meeting, saying that the troops could arrive at the starting point of the attack by April 20 and assemble. However, both Yang Di and the chief of staff of the reconciliation side realized at the meeting that the troops could only reach the starting point of the attack by 20 April at most, and there were still 20 or 30 kilometers away from the starting position of the assault, and the specific implementation plan for the coordination of infantry and artillery among the armies, divisions, and artillery had not yet been drawn up. This made Yang Di worried, because in the atmosphere at that time, everyone didn't seem to pay enough attention to this issue. Although the chief of staff of the solution pulled Yang Di and instructed: "You look at the atmosphere at the meeting, wait and see the situation." But in the face of the hasty launch of the campaign, Yang Di was worried about the direction of the battle. He knew that this was a challenging and dangerous battle, and that the over-optimism of the various corps could lead to uncertainty in the outcome of the battle. After all, the gap between actual combat and the plan is sometimes difficult to bridge. And Yang Di's worries became more obvious in the post-war retrospective.
In 1986, time passed, Yang Di came to Dalian again, looking back on the past, Zeng Siyu had a deeper understanding of the scene of that year. Yang Di also smiled bitterly in his recollections: "They are almost exactly the same as our thinking when we first entered the DPRK, we were also blindly optimistic and confident at that time, and after four battles with the US army, we came to a correct understanding ...... from actual combat."In the four battles, a total of more than 5,300 American troops and other ** people were captured. They are too underestimated. ”
Regarding why Zeng Siyu was forced to attack in a hurry at that time, Yang Di finally revealed the truth to his old comrades-in-arms: "At that time, you called Yang Dezhi ** and asked for a day to prepare, can he report to Mr. Peng?"Because they have all guaranteed Mr. Peng, they patted their chests. ”