In recent years, the Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission have repeatedly emphasized the severity and necessity of anti-corruption in state-owned enterprises. The Second Plenary Session of the 20th ** Commission for Discipline Inspection held at the beginning of this year clearly listed deepening the rectification of corruption in areas such as state-owned enterprises where power is concentrated, capital intensive, and resource enrichment as a key task. Since the beginning of this year, the number of managers of state-owned central enterprises who have been put on file for review and investigation has increased significantly compared with the same period in previous years.
Judging from the cases disclosed so far, the problem of corruption in state-owned enterprises is mainly manifested in the financial, tobacco, grain, salt, energy and other industries. The red line of anti-corruption in state-owned enterprises has long been drawn, so why are corruption problems such as benefit transfer, rent-seeking, misappropriation and embezzlement, and "inbreeding" still prone to occur?
State-owned enterprises have greater power and influence in resource allocation and market competition, which also increases the risk of corruption. Mao Zhaohui, director of the Anti-Corruption and Integrity Policy Research Center of Chinese Renmin University, told the reporter of the Integrity Lookout Office: "From the macro level, the problem of corruption governance in state-owned enterprises has a lot to do with the monopoly of state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises often occupy the economic high ground through industry monopoly. At the same time, local state-owned enterprises with good economic benefits are often important local tax collectors, so in a sense, they occupy the local political high ground. The two energies are superimposed, causing state-owned enterprises to become the focus of competing interests. ”
The secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of a certain provincial state-owned enterprise said that at present, the anti-corruption system of state-owned enterprises is basically perfect, but there are still some relatively conspicuous shortcomings, especially concentrated in them.
The second, third, and fourth levels of subordinate enterprises have a lack of discipline inspection and supervision organizations. "Due to the limited and fragmented means of supervision and case handling, the internal discipline inspection and supervision organizations of these enterprises can hardly rely on audits to find some clues to problems. At the same time, when the integrity risk prevention and control mechanism is lowered to the front line of grassroots projects, it is more reflected in the 'wall', rather than from virtual to real. ”
The concentration of people, finance, and affairs involves complex interests
State-owned enterprises in China assume the dual functions of economy and society, not only to assume the economic responsibilities of enterprises, but also to assume more social welfare and other responsibilities, people, finance, and affairs are highly concentrated, and the interests of all aspects are involved. Quite a number of people in the industry interviewed pointed out that the leading cadres of state-owned enterprises hold an important economic lifeline and a certain amount of public power, and under the condition of lax internal and external control, the motive and risk of corruption are prone to rise, and this is the key factor in the continuous struggle against corruption in state-owned enterprises and the unceasing prohibition of corruption.
State-owned enterprises have greater power and influence in resource allocation, market competition, etc., which also increases the risk of corruption, a word from the leader may determine whether a matter is implemented, and there are still various problems in the field of bidding, such as winning the bid, and there are phenomena such as power-for-money transactions, and there is a large space for rent-seeking in power. The secretary of the above-mentioned state-owned enterprise discipline inspection commission pointed out.
A cadre of the provincial-level Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision said: "In particular, many central enterprises are in non-competitive industries such as resources and military industry, and their natural monopoly makes the managers of these enterprises in a rent-seeking advantageous position. ”
State-owned enterprises in industries such as engineering and construction have long since gradually jumped out of the production task distribution mode within the system and fully participated in the fierce competition in the social market with the changes in the market operating environment. "In order to occupy a place in the limited market, in the process of opening up the market, individual state-owned enterprises will not only use normal means of competition, but also use some abnormal means of 'socialization', thus providing a certain soil environment for the breeding of corruption. A cadre of the State-owned Enterprise Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out.
Taking construction state-owned enterprises as an example, some management cadres of state-owned enterprises often intervene in bidding and bidding, procurement of materials and equipment, etc., to seek benefits for their relatives and friends, and choose their relatives and friends to carry out the construction of the project, artificially increasing the difficulty of project management. Some introduce relatives, friends or specific related persons to brother companies by "changing hands and tickling" to use power for personal gain.
For a long time, the evaluation of the main leaders of state-owned enterprises has placed more emphasis on economic standards, while political standards are still very virtual, which will inevitably lead to the phenomenon of "capable people governing enterprises". However, there are some 'capable' cadres who have excellent ability and can bring economic growth to the enterprise, but they lack control over themselves, and they are often prone to accidents. Mao Zhaohui said.
At the same time, the iterative updating of corruption methods has made it quite difficult for discipline inspection and supervision organs and discipline inspection departments within enterprises to investigate and handle cases. When our supervision methods are improved and enriched, they will also improve their own criminal methods, through deferred payments, shadow companies or more complex and multi-level transaction structures and other new, hidden corruption methods, so that state-owned assets are used for interest exchange, so as to transfer or lose. The above-mentioned interviewed discipline inspection and supervision cadres said.
The allocation of anti-corruption forces is still uneven, and the effectiveness of supervision is declining layer by layer
The occurrence of corruption in state-owned enterprises is directly related to the weakening of the party's leadership and the abuse of power within the enterprise. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are resource-intensive and capital-rich, and the excessive concentration of power among SOE leaders (especially the "top leaders" or leaders in charge of key areas) provides opportunities for corruption.
A cadre of the Discipline Inspection Commission of a state-owned enterprise interviewed said that in terms of the operation of power, some state-owned enterprises have the problem of "grasping development with one hand and grasping party building with one hand", and the internal supervision mechanism of the enterprise is useless to the "number one" of the unit, and the "number one" uses power willfully and cronyism, and lacks effective supervision within the enterprise.
For example, the decision-making system of "three major and one large" is often a formality in the daily implementation, sometimes just to go through a process, whether it should be done or not, may not necessarily be decided by the participants, but depends on the external environment or other pressures, and its meeting minutes are only satisfied with the form of coping with inspections, and are not necessarily really studied and discussed, and the substantive effect is poor. It is easy to often form a 'one-word hall', and the phenomenon of 'the number one' having the final say occurs from time to time. The cadre said.
The internal control system of some enterprises has always been imperfect, and the supervision of the leadership of state-owned enterprises is not in place. Supervisors also lack effective means of supervision, and at the same time, there is often a fear of difficulties in the process of supervision, resulting in a lack of effective supervision by the leadership of state-owned enterprises.
The imbalance between the anti-corruption forces within enterprises and the targets of supervision makes supervision often superficial.
Du Zhizhou, a professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Public Administration of Yanshan University, director of the Center for Integrity and Governance, and director of the China Society for the Study of Integrity and Legal System, believes that the leadership of some state-owned enterprises changes frequently, and the focus of the previous leaders is different, and the internal control system established by the previous leader may not necessarily be recognized and valued by the next leader, and it cannot be truly implemented.
At the same time, a small number of leaders of state-owned enterprises are excessively flexible in the process of implementing the internal control system, blindly emphasizing flexibility and particularity, and some employees of state-owned enterprises are afraid of the authority of a few leaders and choose to cooperate passively, so that the internal control system is a mere formality and loses its due rigidity.
Leading cadres of state-owned enterprises at or above the deputy department level who have problems shall be investigated by the discipline inspection and supervision organs at the provincial level. Middle-level cadres at the county and department levels are largely scattered under provincial state-owned enterprises as the objects of supervision.
Second, third, fourth, and fifth-level subsidiaries, the number of cadres in this part of a provincial state-owned enterprise has reached hundreds. However, there are only more than 10 people engaged in discipline inspection work in the next second-level company, and the lower you go, the weaker the discipline inspection force becomes.
This reporter also learned that the discipline inspection commission set up within a state-owned enterprise in a prefecture-level city is even equipped with only two staff members. According to the staff of its Commission for Discipline Inspection, as an internal organization, they are mainly responsible to the secretary of the party committee and the chairman of the company. "We are already stretched thin on our day-to-day work, let alone overseeing the company's leadership team and key positions. ”
In the face of a large number of supervision objects, there is a huge disparity in the internal discipline inspection forces of state-owned enterprises, which is a practical problem that many internal discipline inspection and supervision organizations of state-owned enterprises have to face.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the current problem of violations of rules and disciplines by young cadres and employees at the grassroots level of state-owned enterprises is growing, but some units have not discovered and updated this risk point. At the same time, in recent years, the company has been restructured and managed, and the front-line personnel engaged in enterprise discipline inspection at the grass-roots level have gradually decreased, and the front-line supervision is mostly held by part-time personnel, and the personnel are not professional, and the quality of personnel has also been affected, resulting in the supervision work is not in place.
The secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of a provincial state-owned enterprise and a second-level company told reporters: "The image is analogous that there is already a 'ninth-level wind and waves' above, and it may not move at all when it comes to the grassroots level." ”
In addition, some ordinary employees of state-owned enterprises reported to reporters that they have low trust in the discipline inspection and supervision organizations of enterprises. Party members in individual state-owned enterprises lack a high sense of responsibility and mission for the party's cause, and lack enthusiasm and initiative to participate in supervision and management. At the same time, the lack of external supervision and social participation in the supervision and management of party members can easily lead to the lack of supervision and management of party members, and there is a phenomenon of slackness and laxity.
The executives of state-owned enterprises are politically connected, and it is difficult to restrain active corruption
An expert on clean government said that since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the investigation and handling of corruption cases in state-owned enterprises have reflected that some enterprises have become "self-reserved land" and "money bags" for individual interest groups. Most of the leading cadres of state-owned enterprises are appointed by the competent departments at higher levels, and they have strong political relevance. Whether it is a first-tier state-owned enterprise or the person in charge of its subordinate companies, in fact, they attach more importance to their political identity and do not regard themselves as an entrepreneur.
The "revolving door" of politics and business has always existed, and when some party and government leading cadres feel that it is difficult to "progress" in their political future, they apply to be transferred to state-owned enterprises as senior executives in order to obtain more personal benefits.
After being dismissed, the 'top leader' of a state-owned enterprise once revealed that he had a sense of insecurity in the leadership position of the overseas subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise, and what he wanted to do most was to quickly improve his performance and then return to China as soon as possible to be promoted. Some leaders of state-owned enterprises do not regard themselves as entrepreneurs, but consider themselves to be both officials and businessmen. The expert said.
Xiao Yaqing, former party secretary and minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, has been at the helm of Aluminum Corporation of China for many years.
Xiao Yaqing, former party secretary and minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, is a microcosm of this kind of fallen cadres who have been transferred from enterprises to politics. Their success in their careers has set a "goal" or "example" for many leaders of state-owned enterprises, leading some leaders of state-owned enterprises to hope to embark on this path.
And when they are unable to achieve their personal political goals, these people turn to excessive economic interests and intensify the realization of power.
According to statistics, the age group of 50 to 59 years old is the highest proportion of fallen state-owned enterprise executives, and the "59-year-old phenomenon" is more prominent. As some leading cadres of state-owned enterprises are approaching retirement and have no hope of further promotion, they have lost themselves in the process of exercising their powers, and they have the mentality of "making a fortune and leaving" in terms of ideology and concepts.
A cadre of the Discipline Inspection Commission of a state-owned enterprise said that most of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises who have fallen off their posts have subjective thoughts of greed and evil thoughts, and are willing to be "hunted" or take the initiative to take advantage of their positions to engage in active corruption such as accumulating wealth. There are also some leading cadres of state-owned enterprises who laugh at the so-called thank-you fees, running expenses, and hardship expenses with "traditional culture" and "sophistication", and over time, they have gradually broken through the bottom line by "using less to collect more" and "growing from small to large".
At the same time, the corporate culture within some state-owned enterprises has not yet fundamentally reversed the trend of fighting corruption and advocating clean government. The so-called "passive corruption" caused by the culture of the corporate circle still exists, and there are widespread or more corrupt behaviors in the environment in which the parties live, and in order to cater to the environment, they integrate into the so-called "circle", give up their ideals and beliefs, passively accept the fact of corruption, and go with the flow.
State-owned enterprises were originally developed under the planned economy, and most of the appointments of various types of personnel were made by superiors rather than by market-oriented competition; the management has the characteristics of concentrated power, strong relevance, and strong human governance, and the power of posts is large, and the supervision of appointees is not in place, and these are very likely to cause corruption. In the process of personnel appointments and dismissals, there are also cases of obtaining promotions through means such as small circles of interests and bribery, or arranging for 'related households' such as cronies to enter important posts. An industry person who has been studying the restructuring of state-owned enterprises for a long time said.
Some interviewed discipline inspection cadres of state-owned enterprises said that the reason why the prevention and control of integrity risks in some units has not been satisfactory is that this work has not been considered in the overall situation of the construction of party style and clean government, and there is a perfunctory and formality phenomenon, which makes the operation and management and integrity risk prevention and control not effectively integrated and coordinated, resulting in an imbalance and imbalance in the effectiveness of integrity risk prevention and control between different units.
Individual grass-roots units directly applied the templates issued by the superior company or directly copied the risk points sorted out by other units, and did not conduct in-depth searches in combination with actual work. Some local state-owned enterprises have conducted questionnaire surveys on their subordinate units and found that the "Project Integrity Risk Prevention and Control List" has not been dynamically updated since the project entered the site and formulated the "Project Integrity Risk Prevention and Control List". When formulating prevention and control measures, some units often see "broad, empty, and general" expressions such as "complying with regulations" and "strengthening learning Xi", and lack specific institutional norms and guiding standards, resulting in non-standard work development.
When group unethical behavior overcomes fragile oversight and defense mechanisms, corruption can become a widely accepted form of behavior within the group. The above-mentioned interviewee said.
*: Inspector's Office.