The United States and Ukraine not only have differences in strategy and tactics, but also have high expectations for Ukraine to launch an offensive in the absence of ** conditions and underestimate Russia's defense capabilities.
Ukrainian, U.S. and British officials conducted eight major staff wargames (Xi) to plan the campaign. But Washington has miscalculated the extent to which the Ukrainian army can be transformed into a Western-style combat force in a short period of time – especially without providing Kyiv with air power as an integral part of modern forces;
The United States and Ukraine sometimes have serious differences in strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon hopes that the attacks will begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its defenses. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting that they were not ready without additional ** and training.
The U.S. side believes that it is possible to carry out a mechanized frontal assault on the Russian defense line using the forces and ** that Ukraine has. Simulations show that the Ukrainian army can reach the Sea of Azov and cut off the Russian army in the south in 60-90 days;
The United States advocates a targeted offensive along this southern axis, but the Ukrainian leadership believes that its forces should attack at three different points along the nearly 1000-kilometer front, south in the direction of Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east in the direction of the city of **mut.
American intelligence agencies are more negative than the American side, believing that given the strong multi-layered defense that Russia has built up in the winter and spring, the chances of a successful offensive are only 50 50.
Many in Ukraine and the West underestimate Russia's ability to recover from battlefield disasters and use its long-term advantages: manpower, landmines, and extreme patterns for the lives of their own soldiers that few other countries can sustain.