In the Huaihai Campaign, the 120,000 men and horses of Huang Wei's 12th Corps, which were all equipped with American-style equipment, were wiped out in just over 20 days, which made Huang Wei very unconvinced.
Until his later years, Huang Wei still said stubbornly when interviewed by reporters: "If it weren't for Huaye's 6 columns, I would have stayed there and let Zhongye fight, and Zhongye wouldn't want to enter for 3 months." ”
But in fact, from Chiang Kai-shek to the Ministry of National Defense, and then to Huang Wei, as the commander of the Corps, a series of command mistakes were made, which doomed the 12th Corps to a dead end no matter what.
Dissect the reason——
Chiang Kai-shek's misuse of personnel, Huang Wei's decision continued, the support of friendly troops was ineffective, Du Yuming gave up his pawns to protect the car, and the 12th Corps defended but did not solidify, suddenly but not strongly, and finally dispersed.
In the second phase of the Huaihai Campaign, with the close cooperation of the East China Field Army, the Central Plains Field Army annihilated the Huang Wei Corps, which had 120,000 horses and was known as the "first-class force" of the Kuomintang.
The annihilation of the corps not only deprived the Kuomintang of its elite division. And finally isolated the Du Yuming group in the Chenguanzhuang area. The defeat of Huang Wei's corps, among other fundamental causes, was also an important reason for the serious mistakes made by the Kuomintang army in command.
Huang Wei's 12th Corps is one of the main forces of the Kuomintang, which was established in Hankou in September 1948.
However, after finding nothing, it had to be withdrawn to its original position in early November. By November 6, the main force of the corps had just been assembled, its 85th Army had not yet reached the assembly area, and the Huaihai Campaign had begun. Chiang Kai-shek then ordered him to come to the aid of the east and "not to delay the operation under any pretext."
As a result, the entire 12th Corps did not have time to rest and mobilize, and hastily set out from the Queshan and Zhumadian areas on November 8, followed the designated route, and began the "march to death."
Huang Wei's corps was temporarily ordered to rush to Xuzhou, and originally planned to reinforce Xuzhou from Zhengyang, Xincai, and Fuyang through Mengcheng and Suxian. However, due to the pursuit, flank attacks, and interceptions of the 2nd and 6th Columns of our Nakano Column and local troops along the way, the movement was very slow, and it was not until 18 November that they reached the front line of Mengcheng and the Whirlpool River.
When forcibly crossing the vortex river, Huang Wei found that the enemy in front of him not only had the original detection of the 6th column of the middle field, but also other troops in the middle field, and the People's Liberation Army was building fortifications on the north bank of the vortex river, and the fortress-like strong bunkers were scattered all over the place, which was unprecedented, and it seemed that there was a tendency to fight a tough battle.
Yang Botao, the commander of the 18th Army, suggested staying in Mengcheng for observation to avoid falling into a trap, and Huang Wei also felt the same way. However, Chiang Kai-shek forced him to capture Suxian within a time limit, and Huang Wei's corps only advanced along the Mengsu Highway.
Due to the planned retreat of our army to the north, Huang Wei's corps progressed "smoothly".
On November 23, the Huang Wei Corps, which had reached the front line of the Huhe River, with its "trump card" 18th Army as the main force, fiercely attacked the Nanpingji area in three directions, and was immediately resolutely blocked by the 4th and 9th columns of our Nakano.
That day and night, our persistent troops were ordered to take the initiative to evacuate Nanpingji, and Huang Wei thought that our army had been defeated, so he ordered the 10th Army and the 18th Army to cross the river and continue to advance north.
On the 24th, when the 18th Army advanced to Qilimiao and Dazhujia north of the Huhe River, and the 10th Army crossed the Huhe River at Zhukou and was successively blocked by our army, Huang Wei found that its vanguard attack force had entered the pocket of our army, and its flank was threatened.
On the afternoon of the 24th, he ordered the 18th Army and the 10th Army, which had crossed the river, to retreat to the south bank of the Hunhe River, intending to move to Guzhen, and by 6 p.m., the troops had reached Shuangduiji. Because the chariots and cars could not travel at night, they had to camp on the spot.
At this time, seven columns including our Nakano, the 12th Brigade of Southern Shaanxi and the Henan-Anhui Independent Brigade took the opportunity to attack on all fronts at dusk of the same day, and after a night of fierce fighting, by the morning of the 25th, the Huang Wei Corps was encircled in an area of less than 20 miles centered on Shuangduiji.
Chiang Kai-shek, as the supreme commander of the Kuomintang, and Huang Wei, the battlefield commander, had unshirkable responsibilities for the siege of Huang Wei's corps.
First of all, Chiang Kai-shek misemployed people, and the art of war was cloudy: "For a great general, he must anticipate people first." This is the basic law of war guidance. Because the implementation of strategic decisions depends not only on the organizational planning of high-level decision-makers, but also on the selection and use of high-level decision-makers for the implementation of decision-making commanders at all levels.
Huang Wei's appointment as the commander of the corps was highly recommended by Chen Cheng, but Huang Wei had a withdrawn temperament, was stern and unkind, and had been away from the battle for a long time, and lacked combat experience in the PLA.
When aiding Xuzhou in the east, Hu Lian was not in the army, and the chief of staff Xiao Rui also resigned due to illness after accompanying the army to Mengcheng, and the deputy chief of staff Wei Zhenfu and others were all on the battlefield for the first time after Xiao Rui left. With such a large corps fighting, the headquarters itself is not sound, and when it comes to fighting, it is natural that there will be many mistakes and omissions.
Moreover, Huang Wei himself was hesitant to command the battle.
On November 23, Huang Wei's corps pushed from Mengcheng to the front line of the Huhe River, and Huang Wei urgently ordered the 10th Army and the 18th Army to quickly break through the enemy in front of him and advance to Suxian. After a day of fierce fighting, there was no progress.
It was day and night that our army took the initiative to retreat, and the 10th and 18th armies did not know what to do, so they boldly crossed the river and continued to attack. After crossing the river, they found that on both sides of the road leading to Suxian, the People's Liberation Army had built a large in-depth position in the form of fish scales, with strong troops, and was ready for battle, and according to the follow-up troops, the 85th Army, which had just returned to the formation, reported that Mengcheng had been occupied by our army.
At this time, the Huang Wei Corps had fallen into an encirclement, but the PLA's encirclement of the corps had not yet been fully formed. The town of Guzhen in the southeast of Nanpingji was guarded by Li Yannian's corps, and the two places were more than 80 miles apart.
However, although Huang Wei had a plan to transfer, he had no determination to transfer, and he did not give the transfer order. He also asked the 85th Army and the 14th Army to retreat more than 20 miles each and deploy defenses along the Huhe River to cover the 18th Army and the 10th Army leaving the battlefield first.
As a result, all four corps were on fire on their heads, those who wanted to take off could not take off, and those who wanted to leave could not go, and almost the entire corps was entangled with the PLA, resulting in a delay in the transfer of the entire corps and delaying military aircraft.
Bingjiayun: "The harm of using soldiers is the greatest hesitation."
Because Huang Wei hesitated, lost his ground in advance and retreat, and threw himself into the net, which created a good opportunity for our army to annihilate the enemy. Huang Wei's mistake in command was completely exploited by our army.
After the annihilation of Huang Baitao's corps and the end of the first phase of the Huaihai Campaign, because Huang Wei's corps came from a long distance, walked in a hurry, and crossed many rivers, it was attacked and harassed by our army's guerrillas, and its baggage fell on the road behind, and the car ran out of gas, and mechanization became a great disaster.
Moreover, the 12th Corps was not effective in reconnaissance, and it did not know the situation on the battlefield, so it did not know that our Nakano troops were in **, and they got into the pocket of my Nakano preset without knowing it.
According to the changes in the enemy's situation, at 22 o'clock on November 23, Liu, Deng, and Chen sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission and told Su Yu and others that "the time to annihilate Huang Wei is very good" and asked Huaye to defend Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's corps with 3 to 4 columns, and to participate in the operation to annihilate Huang Wei with at least 4 columns.
However, the Kuomintang was at a loss for our army's war attempts, and even mistakenly believed that our army's concentration of troops on the southern front was to annihilate Li Yannian's corps first, and hurriedly ordered it to retreat to Bengbu.
He also mistook our army's lure of Huang Wei as the retreat of our army, and rejected Huang Wei's suggestion that Huang Wei's corps move south to move closer to Li Yannian, causing Huang Wei's corps to fall deeper and deeper, and finally we were surrounded in the Shuangduiji area.
At the beginning of the siege of Huang Wei's corps, the strength of our Zhongye troops assembled in the Shuangduiji area was about one to one. In terms of numbers, our army does not have an absolute superiority, and in terms of equipment, our army is still at a disadvantage.
On 26 November, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Huang Weiying to attack eastward with the main force in spite of everything, breaking the enemy in front of him and joining forces with Li Yannian's corps.
On the 27th, Huang Wei's corps, with the support of the air force, artillery and tanks, began to break through with the cover of four main divisions alternately.
However, due to the fact that the 110th Division of the 85th Army, the vanguard of the enemy, took the opportunity to hold a battlefield uprising, which disrupted the entire breakthrough plan, coupled with the low morale of the troops and the interruption of supplies, the breakthrough was never succeeded under the resolute resistance of our army.
On the 28th, Gu Zhutong, chief of staff of the Kuomintang army, flew to Shuangduiji and asked Huang Wei to "stand firm, hold on to the spot, and expand the occupied area." It also promised air-dropped food and ammunition supplies. After Huang Wei had no hope of breaking through, he adjusted his deployment on the 28th and was forced to hold on to wait for reinforcements.
Huang Wei's corps was surrounded in a plain village, there was no danger to defend, fighting in all directions, it was impossible to defend, there were no reinforcements outside, there was a shortage of food and ammunition inside, and "waiting for help" was essentially "defending to the death".
By the beginning of December, the entire corps had been annihilated, and the number of insurgents had reached more than 30,000, and the mobile assault force was insufficient.
Seven or eight regiments.
Although Hu Lian returned from Nanjing to cheer up the officers and men, and Huang Wei, who was in the encirclement, also ordered his troops to engage in so-called "ravaging tactics" aimed at sabotaging the PLA's offensive around Shuangduiji, they could not stop our army's offensive, and the encirclement became smaller and smaller.
From 5 December, under the continuous attacks of our three attack groups in the east, south, and west with focus and in various directions, we were completely annihilated by 24 o'clock on 15 December.
Huang Wei's corps was annihilated by our army in only more than 20 days in the encirclement, and the reasons for its defeat should include at least the following three points if analyzed from the aspect of the command of the Kuomintang army
1. Chiang Kai-shek's rescue was ineffective
Huang Wei's purpose was to wait for reinforcements, but until the entire corps was annihilated, no support army arrived.
On November 28, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram ordering Du Yuming to go to Nanjing for a meeting, and Du Yuming repeatedly emphasized at the meeting to relieve the siege of Huang Wei: "The only way to do this is to let Huang Wei hold on, contain the enemy, withdraw the troops from Xuzhou, reach the Mengcheng, Wuyang, and Fuyang areas through Yongcheng, rely on the Huai River, and then attack the enemy to relieve the siege of Huang Wei."
The essence of Du Yuming's plan was to sacrifice Huang Wei's corps to cover the retreat of the three corps in Xuzhou to the south bank of the Huai River.
On the evening of the 30th, Du Yuming led Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang and other troops to abandon Xuzhou and retreat westward, but they were soon surrounded by 8 columns of our East China Field Army with 200,000 people in the Chenguanzhuang area.
2. Huang Wei is not solid
At the beginning of the siege of Huang Wei, he underestimated the strength of the PLA, and his deputy commander Hu Lian also thought that Liu and Deng would not be able to swallow us at once.
In order to hold on and wait for reinforcements, Huang Wei used the main force of the 18th Army to defend the two commanding heights of Shuangduiji, Pinggudui and Jiangudui, as a defense in depth, and with this as the core, the 85th Army to the west, the 14th Army to the east, and the 10th Army to form a circular defense system in the north-south direction.
Every day, 1 to 3 regiments were dispatched with the firepower of combat vehicles and artillery to assault the positions of the PLA, but soon the situation could not be maintained due to the delay in the arrival of reinforcements and the airdrop of food and ammunition.
I, Nakanohara, were ready to take advantage of the chaotic retreat of Huang Wei's corps and quickly intervene in an attempt to annihilate the enemy in the movement. However, due to the limitation of troops and firepower, this goal could not be achieved.
After Huang Wei's corps gained a firm foothold and turned to a firm position, Nakano changed his tactics in a timely manner, adopted a resolute compression, and gradually attacked the tactics of capturing and consolidating a village, building a deep and strong offensive and defensive position, and taking advantage of the enemy's breakthrough or attack to inflict heavy casualties.
In terms of preparations, special emphasis was placed on close operations, and the Huang Wei Corps used a small force to attack our PLA troops in close quarters, but was intercepted by the PLA troops who were in ambush.
Huang Wei's corps also adopted the method of trench operation, that is, it also built a communication trench in front of the position, advanced to the PLA's communication trench, and intercepted it head-on, so as to delay the PLA's approach to the position. However, due to the hunger and cold of the soldiers, the physical strength was exhausted, and the progress of the operation was extremely slow.
The prisoners said: We are most afraid of the close work of the PLA, and the trenches dug into our position overnight, and in the face of the PLA's attack, the situation is relatively clear, but the countermeasures cannot come out, and the Huang Wei Corps has no way to defend it, so it can only sit and wait to defend to the death.
3. Break through and become scattered birds and beasts
Huang Wei's corps is the first to wait for help, and the last to break through and save itself. Chiang Kai-shek originally planned to let the air force cover the Uyghur Corps to break through, but the result of Huang Wei's contact with the air force was that it could not be carried out as planned.
In order not to be restrained, Huang Wei and deputy commander Hu Lian decided to break through the encirclement on the 15th, but the policy they adopted was to open bows from all sides, counterattack on all fronts, find cracks and drill gaps, and break out of the encirclement.
In fact, it was a plan to flee for your life. At this time, if you can clench a fist and rush hard, you may be able to escape part of the force.
However, at this time, the soldiers had no fighting spirit, and some troops moved ahead of the specified time, and as a result, they tried to be exposed, which eventually led to the annihilation of the whole army.
Looking at the entire process of the Huang Wei Corps' eastward aid, encirclement, liberation, breakthrough, and annihilation, it is not difficult for us to see that the defeat of the Huang Wei Corps was not only due to the mistakes made by the Kuomintang Supreme Command in military decision-making, but also to the mistakes of the battlefield commanders in military command.
It was precisely because the Kuomintang army had more strategic failures than tactics and made mistakes in the command of the campaign that our army was able to capture the fleeting fighter plane in time, encircle and annihilate Huang Wei's corps, and complete the key battle in the Huaihai Campaign.