In the people's army, there are many famous generals who are both wise and brave, and who are all-round in civil and military affairs. But if you are undefeated in your life, there are only a handful, and the founding general Han Xianchu is an outstanding, experienced battle, and never tasted defeat. He was good at learning Xi, good at capturing fighters, had a natural battlefield instinct, and his command was so subtle that even arrogant Western military strategists had to bow their heads. 
In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Han Xianchu commanded the poorly equipped volunteer army with little food and clothing in the face of the threat of the United States, the arrogant and invincible number one military power, and won one brilliant victory after another, continuing his myth of invincibility. In the entry for "Han Xianchu" in the "Encyclopedia of Chinese Affairs", there is a very special evaluation: "In the first to the fifth battles, he commanded operations on the front line. It can be said that Han Xianchu is the only leader of the Volunteer Army Headquarters who has been on the front line in the whole process of the campaign warfare, and he is the indispensable "urgent vanguard" of the Volunteer Army. General Han Xianchu commanded the battle, which was always as fast as a wind. In the civil war, Han Xianchu served as the commander of the 3rd Column of the Four Fields, fighting from the icy northeast to the hot Hainan, so he was feared by the enemy and called "General Whirlwind". In North Korea, Han Xianchu also blew his own whirlwind. On October 19, the Chinese People's Volunteers officially entered North Korea. The CCP decided to appoint Han Xianchu as the deputy commander of the 13th Corps. The first battle of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was fought by Han Xianchu's old department, the 40th Army. Before the war, Han Xianchu said to his successor commander Wen Yucheng: "The 40th Army must fight well and make an appearance!"Otherwise, my old military commander doesn't look good!On October 25, the 118th Division of the 40th Army really lived up to expectations, defeating the 2nd Regiment of the 6th South Korean Division at Liangsudong and winning the first battle to resist US aggression and aid Korea. 
Subsequently, under the close attention of Han Xianchu, the 39th Army gave full play to the advantages of the Volunteer Army's strength in mobile warfare, deployed troops to make continuous assaults, severely damaged the first ace cavalry division of the US army, and annihilated 1,840 enemies. Entering the second campaign, Han Xianchu, who had made great contributions in the first campaign, was entrusted with the important task of commanding the 38th Army and the 42nd Army on the Western Front. It is known that in the first campaign, the 38 Army acted slowly, which led to the escape of the enemy and the failure to complete the interspersed tasks. At the combat meeting afterwards, Liang Xingchu was severely criticized. Because he was still not at ease with the 38th Army, he appointed Han Xianchu as the direct leader of the 38th Army. After the battle began, the 38th Army really changed the delay and hesitation in the first battle, and its intersperses and detours were like lightning. First of all. The 38th Army broke through the South Korean 7th Division at Tokugawa, opened a huge gap in the "United **" front, and cut off the connection between the enemy's eastern and western fronts. Subsequently, the 38th Army quickly advanced along the east bank of the Qingchuan River, and controlled the only way for the enemy to retreat - Sansho-ri, Suncheon and Sucheon, forming three "anvils" blocking the enemy. In order to complete this strategic concept, the 113th Division of the 38th Army rushed 140 miles in 14 hours, outnumbered the enemy's wheels with both legs, and took the lead in seizing Sansholi. Later, Han Xianchu discovered the strategic point of this *** leakage in Longyuan. Once the enemy captures Longyuanli, our army will be in vain for the enemy's encirclement. 
So Han Xianchu exerted his subjective initiative and ordered a regiment of troops to capture Longyuanli and completely block the enemy's southward retreat. As a result, the main force of the 38th Army and the 42nd Army joined forces to attack the besieged American troops and annihilated most of the 2nd American Division. According to the history of the U.S. Army, there were more than 18,000 people in the 2nd Division of the United States, and only more than 8,000 people finally escaped to the base camp, which was a brilliant victory. It can be said that without Han Xianchu's overseers, it would be difficult for the 38th Army to achieve the prestige of the "Long Live Army". In this battle, our army annihilated a total of 2 enemiesMore than 30,000 people, more than 500 artillery pieces, more than 100 tanks, and more than 2,000 automobiles were captured and captured. As of 24 December, the eastern and western fronts of the Chinese People's Volunteers had basically recovered all the lost territory north of the "38th Parallel," thus fundamentally reversing the situation of the Korean War. Although he won many battles, Han Xianchu was not complacent. On the contrary, Han Xianchu constantly strengthened his study Xi and constantly proposed new and effective methods of fighting in light of the characteristics of the enemy's attacks and some effective fighting methods of various units. You must know that Han Xianchu has always had the nickname of "warmonger". Although he is not highly educated, he is good at summarizing and learning Xi, and is especially good at studying new tactics. At his initiative, the volunteers began to build hidden fortifications in the concave and convex areas and valleys on both sides of the mountains, and the infantry began to dig cave-like bunkers for individual soldiers, and so on. These new tactics not only preserved their strength under the enemy's heavy artillery fire, but also helped our army to counterattack and annihilate the enemy. On December 31, 1950, our army launched its third campaign. In this battle, Han Xianchu took heavy responsibility and commanded the 38th Army, 39th Army, 40th Army, 50th Army and six artillery regiments. 
In this battle, our army can be described as "overwhelming". The new commander of the "United **" Li Qiwei arranged five lines of defense of the ABCDE around Seoul. However, it took only three days for our army to break through on all fronts, and the enemy "collapsed and retreated in a hurry." In this regard, Han Xianchu felt that something was very wrong, and he immediately ordered his officers and soldiers to quickly annihilate the besieged enemy, and at the same time, they should also pursue the "fleeing enemy" desperately. At the same time, Han Xianchu also went against the norm and asked the soldiers to dare to twist with the enemy during the day. You must know that during the day is the world of the US military, and under the enemy's air superiority, our army will always face a heavy **. However, this time, Han Xianchu hoped to catch up with the enemy army as much as possible and annihilate the enemy's living force. Because if we don't, our army will only be able to capture the empty city of Seoul. Therefore, Han Xianchu set his sights on the Han River Bridge, which is the necessary place for the general retreat of the "United **". Hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and hundreds of thousands of refugees crowded on this bridge, what kind of scene was that, and what a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy!In fact, this was the best time to completely annihilate the Eighth Army, the main force of the United States, and end the Korean War ahead of schedule. This is what Li Qiwei is most worried about. However, contrary to expectations, the equipment of our army is too poor. Knowing that the enemy was crowding near the bridge over the Han River, our troops did not have even a single artillery. With even one cannon, the enemy, who has nowhere to hide, is bound to suffer heavy losses. However, it is a pity that the enemy's air superiority is too obvious, how can you drag the artillery to the front line?What is even more tragic is that Han Xianchu noticed that our army's supply has reached its limit. The enemy soldiers ran wildly in cars, but many of our soldiers did not even have a pair of shoes. And the rice bags that the soldiers carried with them also became empty. In the third campaign, logistics could only cover a quarter of the food of the troops on the Western Front. Originally, Han Xianchu had proposed to pull the 40th Army to the Western Front and make a detour with the 42nd Army on the outer layer. However, due to the lack of food, a good move to ensure the key direction could not be implemented. If the food supply is a little more decent, the 42nd Army will inevitably outflank it, and it is not impossible to completely annihilate the main force of the 8th Army. Only then did Han Xianchu realize that the victory in the first and second battles, from a macro point of view, was to grasp the enemy's weakness of not knowing the truth and underestimating the enemy's rash advance. And when the enemy began to carefully study our strength, we made the same mistake as they had done before - underestimating the enemy. 
Han Xianchu believes that this phenomenon must be cooled down. On January 4, the 39th Army and the 50th Army of the Volunteer Army entered Seoul successively. However, Han Xianchu did not let his old army, the 40th Army, enter the city together to share the glory of conquering the enemy's capital. A veteran soldier of the 40th Army said: "This shows that the old army commander has a lot in his mind, and he has not annihilated a large number of the enemy's living forces, so why is it fun to seize the empty city?"After the recovery of Seoul, the world was in an uproar, and the People's Republic published an editorial congratulating the occupation of Seoul, and at the same time encouraging the volunteers to "fight to Daejeon, hit Busan, and drive the American invaders into the sea." In front of Seoul, Han Xianchu was very calm. Although he was not a politician, he was keenly aware that the third battle was a political battle, which showed that the "38th Parallel" enemy could pass it, and so could we. At that time, in view of Li Qiwei's "failure to form an army", he originally instructed the right column commanded by Han Xianchu to immediately cross the Beihan River and pursue and annihilate the fleeing enemy. However, Han Xianchu hurriedly telegraphed Zhisi: "Don't chase again, if you advance bravely, I am afraid that the enemy will lure me south." Therefore, Han Xianchu boldly suggested: "Most of the right column is assembled on the north bank of the Han River to rest and wait for the opportunity to move." * is worthy of being a generation of war gods, and soon realized Han Xianchu's intentions, so he happily adopted them. In fact, Li Qiwei really feigned defeat and fled, and set a trap in front of him, just waiting for our army to drill into it. It can be said that Han Xianchu was keenly judged and saved the lives of many volunteer soldiers. In the third battle, Han Xianchu made miraculous achievements, ** made him trust a hundred times, so in the instructions to Han Xianchu, there were often words "specifically deployed by Han". In the first three battles, Han Xianchu's offensive talent was fully demonstrated. And in the fourth battle, Han Xianchu showed his good side again. 
The fourth campaign was the only war provoked by the "United **" in the stage of movement warfare. In mid-January 1951, the "United **" concentrated 250,000 people to "move closer to each other and go hand in hand." The tactics of "fighting steadily and steadily" and in conjunction with the "magnetic tactics" and "sea of fire tactics" were used in an attempt to annihilate the living forces of our army and drive our troops north of the 38th parallel without our troops getting a timely rest. In order to prevent the enemy from attacking, Shiji adopted the "west top and east release" style of play, thus starting the fourth campaign. The attack on the east side was in charge of Deng Hua;The defense of the West is in the hands of Han Xianchu. In the hands of Han Xianchu, there were only the 38th Army, the 50th Army and the First Army of the Korean People's Army, but he was facing more than 200,000 offensive troops of the enemy. Judging from the terrain, it is also very unoptimistic about our army. The main force of our army is mainly located on the south bank of the Han River, and the river water may thaw at any time. If we are not careful, the river in the rear will melt, and our army will face the dilemma of fighting a battle against the water. It can be said that the resistance battle on the south bank of the Han River is extremely dangerous. After the enemy's offensive began, Han Xianchu commanded his subordinate troops to rely on ordinary field fortifications to stubbornly resist and repeatedly fight with the US troops in mountains and rivers, and fought for 14 days and nights in a bloody battle under the condition that the enemy was strong and we were weak, and the enemy only advanced 18 kilometers. Regarding Han Xianchu's command, the enemy had no choice but to comment helplessly: "Very fierce." With the thaw of the Han River, Han Xianchu decisively ordered the 50th Army and the First Korean People's Army to each leave a force to hold the bridgehead on the south bank of the Han River, and the main force was all withdrawn to the north bank to organize defense. The 38th Army stayed on the south bank with the main force, continuing to cover the assembly of Deng Hua's troops in the direction of Hengcheng to ensure the flank safety of the troops when they counterattacked. 
From February 8, the enemy took turns attacking the positions of the 38th Army. The officers and men of the Banzai Army adhered to the principle of "people are in the position", bravely defended under the overwhelming artillery fire of the enemy, blocked the enemy for 9 days, and effectively guaranteed the victory of the Hengcheng counterattack. In 23 days, Han Xianchu commanded his troops to annihilate more than 10,000 enemies, smashed the enemy's attempt to quickly "recover" Seoul, effectively cooperated with Deng Hua's counterattack, and completed the arduous strategic task. It is important to know that in previous battles, our army rarely engaged in positional warfare. The success of this interdiction battle has also allowed our army to sum up a lot of experience in positional warfare. For example, the tactical principle of the allocation of troops, which is light in the front and heavy in the rear, and in the deployment of firepower, has played a miraculous role in our army's future blocking warfare. In the final fifth battle of the movement war, Han Xianchu was ordered to direct the 40th Army, which was responsible for "splitting the gap in the campaign from Jinhua to Gapyeong", and the enemy was divided from east to west, so that it could not reinforce each other. After the battle began, the 40th Army lived up to its expectations and quickly broke through to a depth of 30 kilometers to complete the task of dividing the campaign. After the end of the movement war phase, Han Xianchu served as the commander of the command post on the west coast, and commanded the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 50th armies, as well as the 1st and 4th armies of the Korean People's Army, to prevent the enemy from landing from the sea. Under Han Xianchu's deployment, the troops built strong fortifications and tunnels in the first and second line areas along the coast. Under the command of Han Xianchu, all units built fortifications in their respective defense areas, and in areas that were convenient for US tanks to break through and parachute, the front line strengthened antitank weapons and antiaircraft firearms, thus forming a watertight defense. While doing a good job of defense, Han Xianchu also led the "nail pulling operation" against the North Korean coast. At that time, the US and ROK forces relied on their superiority in the sea and air to entrench thousands of troops on dozens of islands, including Yamato Island and Yamato Island, and set up intelligence stations and radar stations to monitor the movements of our troops day and night. Therefore, Han Xianchu commanded the 50 th Army, with the principle of "fighting from near to far and fighting island by island," and with the support of the Air Force of the Chinese People's Volunteers, it carried out four consecutive amphibious operations, captured 14 islands, and uprooted the enemy's intelligence stations one by one. 
On July 11, 1952, Han Xianchu was transferred to the commander of the 19th Corps, commanding the 63rd, 65th, 40th and 39th armies to assume frontal defense tasks on the Western Front. At the beginning of 1953, Han Xianchu became ill due to overwork and was forced to return to China**. Subsequently, although Han Xianchu repeatedly asked to return to the Korean battlefield, he did not get his wish. In the Korean battlefield, Han Xianchu had a brilliant record. Among the intelligence departments of all hostile countries, among the archives established for Chinese generals, Han Xianchu's one is the thickest among all generals, because Han Xianchu fought a lot of battles and fought strangely, so it is worth filing the most content. Looking back at Han Xianchu's three years in Korea, he commanded his troops to fight one vicious, hardest, and tough battle after another, but he stubbornly deducted one brilliant victory after another from the mouth of the US military, which was armed to the teeth. Not only does he have extraordinary wit and bravery, but he also has a political vision that other generals do not have, and he can take charge of his own affairs. He was deservedly awarded the rank of general in 1955.