This article is excerpted from Manstein's Memoirs of the War, translated by Xiaoice
Military Classics: "The Three Documents of the German Army of World War II" Exclusive Collector's Edition on Cloth - Modian - Discovering New WondersWhen I took over the post of commander of the 11th Army, I found myself facing a new situation that was not just about expanding the scope of command from the army to the group army. When I arrived in Nikolaev, I learned that in addition to commanding the 11th Army, the Romanian 3rd Army was also under my command.
For political reasons, this kind of command relationship in the Eastern Front is not easy to handle.
The supreme command of the combined forces of the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the German 11th army was given to the Romanian head of state, Field Marshal Antonescu. But in terms of operational orders, he was under the orders of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South. To this end, the 11th Army could be said to be the link between Marshal Antonescu and Army Group South Command, responsible for providing operational advice to Marshal Antonescu.
The operational situation of the troops under the command of Manstein in the autumn of 1941.
But by the time I arrived, the situation had changed, and Antonescu commanded only the Romanian 4th Army, with which it attacked Odessa. The Romanian 3rd Army was subordinate to the German 11th Army, which was now under direct command of Army Group South and continued to advance eastward.
In addition to commanding its own group army, the group army headquarters also has to command another independent group army, which is undoubtedly a troublesome matter, but if that group army is a coalition army, it will certainly be more difficult to command. To add insult to injury, the two armies not only differed in terms of organization, training, and command practices (which the coalition forces always faced), but also in terms of combat effectiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to intervene more forcefully in the command of the coalition army group than in the command of its own army group, but on the other hand, we want to maintain good relations with the coalition forces.
Despite these difficulties, we worked well with Romanian command at all levels and their units without major friction, largely due to the loyalty of General Dumitrescu, commander of the Romanian 3rd Army and later promoted to general. We have liaison teams in Romanian divisional and brigade headquarters below, and they have also made an important contribution to the cooperation between the two sides with their ingenuity and, if necessary, through their energy.
But when it comes to the close cooperation between the two sides, we should remember the credit of the Romanian head of state, Marshal Antonescu. Regardless of his historical assessment as a statesman, Marshal Antonescu was undoubtedly a true patriot, a good soldier and our most loyal ally. As a soldier, he tied the fate of his homeland and empire to the end, and did his best to provide us with Romania's military power and war potential until his own downfall. Although he failed to realize his life's ideals, this was caused by the internal conditions of his country and regime. In any case, he has always been loyal to his ally, and I can only be grateful when I think of the close cooperation with him.
Manstein (left) talks to Antonescu.
As for the Romanian army, there are undoubtedly shortcomings that cannot be ignored. Most of the Romanian officers and soldiers were peasants, and although they were simple, capable, and heroic, they were generally poorly educated, so it was difficult to train them to be able to fight independently, let alone to be qualified non-commissioned officers. Some German minorities were eligible, but the national pride of the Romanians was an obstacle to the promotion of these German soldiers. The outdated practice of corporal punishment did not improve the combat effectiveness of the troops, but on the contrary, it only encouraged German-Romanian soldiers to find ways to join the Wehrmacht, and since their superiors forbade it, they simply joined the Waffen-SS. A decisive disadvantage in terms of the strength of the internal structure of the Romanian army is the lack of a corps of non-commissioned officers like ours. Regrettably, we now often forget the tremendous achievements of our excellent team of non-commissioned officers in this regard.
There is also a very important problem, the incompetence of a large part of the middle and senior officers in the Romanian army. In particular, there is a lack of intimacy between their officers and soldiers, which we take for granted here. As for the care of the officers for their subordinates, it can be said that they completely lacked a "Prussian" education.
Manstein (back) and Antonescu stand side by side.
Due to the lack of real combat experience, the combat training of the Romanian army also did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. This resulted in high losses, which in turn affected the morale of the troops.
Their military leadership had been influenced by France since 1918, and their military philosophy was still World War I.
The ** equipment of the Romanian army, which is partially outdated, is either insufficient in number, and even more so anti-tank, so it is difficult to count on them to block the onslaught of the tanks of the Soviet Red Army. It remains to be seen whether the Empire can help more effectively in this regard.
Finally, I would like to say about the mental burden of the Romanians, who had a strong reverence for the Soviets, which seriously affected the effectiveness of the Romanian army on the Eastern Front. In a difficult situation, this situation can easily lead to panic. By the way, during the war against the USSR, all the peoples of South-Eastern Europe had this mental burden to a greater or lesser extent, and the sense of identity of the Bulgarians and Serbs with the Slavic ethnic kinship, was another destabilizing factor.
Another circumstance that must be taken into account in the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Romanian army. Romania has now achieved their original war goal, which is to recover Bessarabia, which the Soviets recently seized. Even Transnistria, which Hitler recognized or imposed on Romania (the region between the Dniester and the Bug rivers), went beyond the Romanians' vision and continued to attack the terrible Soviet heartland, which many Romanians understandably lacked much enthusiasm.
Peter Dumitrescu, then commander of the Romanian 3rd Army.
However, despite all these shortcomings and deficiencies, the Romanian army did its duty to the best of its ability. Most importantly, they have been willingly under the command of the German ** team. Unlike our other allies, they do not prioritize the issue of prestige over actual needs. Marshal Antonescu, with a military mentality, certainly played a crucial role in this.
Specifically, my staff officers assessed the Romanian 3rd Army under the jurisdiction of the army group at that time that as long as they suffered relatively high losses, they could no longer attack, and could only barely protect themselves with the intervention of the "corset" of the German ** team.
In my dealings with Romanian comrades, I have encountered several vignettes that deserve to be mentioned here. In the spring of 1942, I went to inspect the 4th Romanian Mountain Division, which was commanded by General Manoliu, who had been ordered to clear the guerrillas in the Yaila Mountains. At that time we had to commit the entire Romanian Mountain Army, with several small German units engaged in counter-guerrilla warfare. I inspected several units before coming to the division headquarters. Standing in front of a large map, General Manoliu proudly told me the route of his division's march from Romania to the Crimea. He apparently wanted to suggest that the effort might be sufficient. I commented: "Yes, you are halfway to the Caucasus!”
Romanian troops marching in the Odessa region in October 1941.
This sentence certainly does not serve as any motivation. During a visit to the camp, a horn suddenly sounded in front of a new barracks. The sound of the trumpet may be a kind of homage to me, and a reminder to the troops: "Commander is coming!"."A skilled guide led me to a camp, and I walked into the steaming field kitchen to try the soldiers' food, only to surprise me.
The food was hard to eat, the soup was hard to swallow, and the senior commander probably never tasted any of these things!Of course, I then had to go to the division headquarters for dinner. The situation here is completely different!The Romanians did not understand at all that the officers and soldiers had equal food, and the lunch at the division headquarters was rich, but there were also hierarchical divisions. The young officer has one less dish, and the wine next to the division commander is undoubtedly better. Although we provided most of the supplies to the Romanian troops, it was not easy to interfere with their food distribution. Romanian officers believed that most Romanian soldiers were peasants and were Xi to the simplest food, so it was natural for officers to share more. This is even more true of the goods of the commissary of the troops, especially cigarettes and chocolates, which we supplied to them in accordance with the rations of the Romanian troops. However, Romanian officers claimed that ordinary soldiers never bought these luxuries, so most of the cigarettes and chocolates were kept in the officers' canteens. I raised this issue with Marshal Antonescu **, but to no avail. He did look into the matter and then told me that the people at the bottom reported that everything was fine.
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