Behind the success of every outstanding person, there is a bitterness that others cannot perceive. However, General Su Yu is one of them, and his life history undoubtedly verifies the truth of this sentence. The story we are going to tell today happened during the War of Liberation, when General Su Yu had to leave the front-line command post for a short time due to a sudden illness.
This incident occurred during the Lunan Campaign from the end of 1946 to the beginning of 1947, when Huaye had just been formed and he personally confirmed that the operational command of the East China Field Army was fully assumed by Su Yu.
Fever is a very common life situation, so I didn't pay much attention to it at first. However, after in-depth comparison of the two biographies about the life and deeds of General Su Yu, I found that this matter is not as simple as it seems.
At present, the more authoritative materials that record the personal history of General Su Yuda's career are generally considered to be the Biography of Su Yu published by the Contemporary China Publishing House in 2019, the Selected Writings of Su Yu published by the Military Science in 2003, the Memoirs of Su Yu republished by the People's Liberation Army Publishing House in 2007, and the Su Yu Annals compiled by the Party History Office of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee in 2006.
When the above-mentioned biographical documents mention the relevant content of the Lunan Campaign, none of them provides the fact that Su Yu left the command post due to fever, and it is generally stated that Su Yu completely presided over and commanded the entire process of the Lunan Campaign.
However, unexpectedly, when consulting the memoirs of the Liberation War by General Chen Shiyu's "Three Years of Turning the Earth Upside Down", I found a remarkable record:
In the middle of the night on January 17, 1947, when the author (referring to Chen Shiyu, the same below, the author's note) had fallen asleep, the ** commander suddenly woke me up and told me that there was an urgent matter to deal with. When I asked about the specific matters, the ** commander frankly said: "Comrade Su Yu is sick. "He asked me to lead the Eighth Division to cooperate with the First Division of the East China Field Army to conquer the Zaozhuang area, so that Su Yu could get enough rest**.
At dawn the next day, I immediately rushed to Zaozhuang to visit Su Yu. At that time, he was bedridden, his body temperature was abnormally high, and his condition was extremely serious. Therefore, I immediately ordered all members of the organization to escort Su Yu back to the headquarters to receive ** and get a proper rest.
According to General Chen's statement, Su Yu did leave his command post, and the operation to capture the Zaozhuang area was entrusted to Chen Shiyu to command.
Two famous generals in China's modern history have completely different views on this incident, how can we distinguish the truth from the false?There are many opinions on the Internet about this matter, some cite the opinion of Su Yu's so-called military secretary, others cite the analysis of other relevant biographies, and most of them hold the position that Su Yu did not contract the disease and never gave up command of the battle.
In addition, some people subjectively speculated that Chen Shiyu deliberately weakened Su Yu's influence and tried to highlight his key role in the command of the campaign, starting from the fact that Admiral Chen Shiyu was easily excited and the relationship with Su Yu was not very harmonious.
Although the truth of the matter is elusive, the general direction is still relatively clear, that is, General Chen Shiyu played a crucial command role in this campaign.
For example, in the course of the attack on Zaozhuang, Chen Shiyu's memoirs recorded in detail the details of various combat progresses, including the composition of the Shandong Eighth Division, Wang Jian'an's unauthorized mobilization of troops, the poor performance of Tao Yong of the 1st Central China Division in attacking Zaozhuang, and the 8th Division's demolition and siege of the city.
Even in Su Yu's biography, which covers so many details, it does not contain such a rich description of the battle. Therefore, we have enough reason to believe in the reliability of Chen Shiyu's memoirs, after all, the battle process cannot be forged, and relevant military history records are indeed preserved in the Huaye army. Moreover, most of the participants at that time were quite healthy and long-lived, and if they dared to lie that Su Yu was ill and could not continue to direct the struggle, it would inevitably attract strong dissatisfaction and accusations from them. Since the People's Liberation Army Publishing House has decided to include General Chen's memoirs in the book, we can naturally trust that the text must have undergone rigorous examination and verification.
However, new questions arise:Why is this happening?
The reason is that in fact, this campaign was not carried out according to Su Yu's original strategic plan. If Su Yu had originally considered, the Battle of Lunan would not have happened.
At the end of 1946, the Kuomintang army launched a full-scale offensive, and the two major field armies in Shandong and Central China sparked fierce controversy over the direction of operations.
At this time, Su Yu firmly advocated fighting in Central China and made every effort to ensure that the Jiangsu position was not lost. However, due to the limited number of troops, although they won seven victories and seven defeats in the Soviet-Chinese campaign, they were still unable to reverse the unfavorable situation of being outnumbered by the enemy, and the troops could only be forced to move to the northern region. However, Su Yu was still concerned about the base area in northern Jiangsu, and when he learned that the various armies under the command of Xue Yue were launching an attack on Lianshui, Shuyang and other places, he proposed to ask the Shandong troops to go south to coordinate with the Central China Field Army to jointly defend the last base area in northern Jiangsu.
After the end of the Subei Campaign, in the face of the fierce attack of the enemy in the mountainous area of Lunan and the shortage of troops, Chen Shiyu strongly emphasized that he should concentrate his forces to assist the Shandong Field Army of ** and Su Yu to go to the Lunan battlefield to relieve the crisis in the Shandong base area.
However, the Central China Field Army was not enthusiastic about this suggestion, and still insisted on going south to launch an offensive against Lianshui and Shuyang, striving to defeat the main forces such as the reorganized 74th Division, which had been closely behind.
The situation is becoming more and more serious, and the controversy within our army is becoming more and more intense.
Zhang Yunyi, deputy commander of the Shandong Military Region, who is in charge of the defense of Lunan Province, and others also believe that if Lunan is not rescued, it will face tremendous risks, so they advocate that the two teams of Shandong and Central China launch a large-scale battle in the Lunan area.
In the face of disputes between the two sides, the military command led by ** immediately fell into a dilemma, and who would decide where to attack first became an urgent problem to be solved.
At this time, Chen Shiyu chose to skip the level and ask for instructions from his superiors.
Chen Shiyu and Tang Liang, director of the Shanye Political Department, joined hands to send a telegram to the ** Military Committee, strongly urging that the focus of the operation be shifted to the Lunan battlefield, and that they would rather sacrifice all the cities on the defense line in northern Jiangsu to protect the security of the Lunan base, so as to avoid a fatal blow to the entire strategic layout.
Chen Shiyu gave an explanation for why he had no time to discuss with ** in advance and report to him for approval, worried that the tight time might affect the decision-making process, and he was also worried that his status in **'s mind might not be as good as Su Yu, so he chose to submit an application directly to **.
As a veteran general, Chen Shiyu has enough power and confidence to make such a decision. A revolutionary of the older generation, the right-hand man of the chairman, his duty as chief of staff in Shandong is to be responsible for breaking the siege and helping to stabilize the war situation. Therefore, Chen Shiyu dared to boldly propose such a plan.
After receiving the telegram from Chen Shiyu and others, they took swift action, no longer adhered to the original plan, and instead adopted the suggestions of Chen Shiyu and others, not only giving up the battlefield in northern Jiangsu, but also focusing on the battlefield in southern Lunan.
However, what is shocking is that the ** Military Commission, which has always actively supported Su Yu's views, did not adopt Su Yu's strategy, but chose to adopt Chen Shiyu's suggestion, abandoned the northern Jiangsu battlefield, and instead carried out this military operation with a fierce offensive in the southern Lunan battlefield.
So, what exactly is causing this major shift?Is it really just because Chen Shiyu is the most trusted general of the chairman, or is it due to other factors?The answer is not so simple.
In fact, the reversal of events was due to an unexpected change in the strategic layout of the enemy's forces.
Su Yu actively deployed troops in northern Jiangsu, China, to prepare for the reorganized 74th Division, which was to be encircled and suppressed. In the battle of Lianshui Defense, Zhang Lingfu was hit hard, and the pain continued. According to the soldiers of the 74th Division who were captured by our army in the Battle of Menglianggu later, in the Second Battle of Lianshui, more than two-thirds of the veterans of the Anti-Japanese War and even the backbone of the 74th Division with rich war experience and even below the company level were reorganized.
What does the army rely on for warfare?The most important and important thing is the commanding art of the commander, and the second is the overall quality of the grassroots combat backbone.
The art of command determines the upper limit of a team's combat effectiveness, and the quality of grassroots combat backbones is to maintain the stability of combat effectiveness. If we blindly focus on command and ignore the strength foundation of the team, we may not be able to grasp even if there is a good opportunityOn the other hand, if the command is insufficient and the backbone of the unit is still able to hold the position, then there is less likely to be an overturning defeat or confusion.
Zhang Lingfu, as a general with rich experience in actual combat, although on the surface he boasted to Chiang Kai-shek about his exploits and claimed that he was invincible in the world, and the major ** in Nanjing even advocated that ten reorganized 74 divisions could conquer the world, but he clearly knew the seriousness of the damage of the troops, and the troops should not be blindly strong, nor should they be overly aggressive.
Therefore, when he sensed that the East China People's Liberation Army was assembling in the Shuyang area, he instinctively adopted a cautious and prudent strategic measure, and after the friendly forces were assembled, he would advance northward on all fronts in search of a decisive opportunity.
In this context, if the plan for a decisive battle in northern Jiangsu had been resolutely implemented in accordance with Su Yu's previous strategy, if the offensive could not be victorious, the way back would have been cut off by the Kuomintang army, and the enemy would have been exposed to the enemy, and the result would have been unimaginable.
* It was precisely in consideration of this change in enemy intelligence that the Military Commission agreed with the suggestion and repudiated Su Yu's strategy.
At this moment, we do not need to judge which is higher and which is lower, whose vision is long-term and who is short-sighted, and the most important thing is to adjust our strategy in a timely manner in the face of changes in the enemy's situation, which is the long-term truth. Time flies, and many years later, Su Yu, who has the rank of general, recalls this past and never complains that others have a different attitude towards his decisions. For a military strategist like him, it is really normal to adjust his strategy in a timely manner to deal with the situation of the enemy's army.
However, despite Su Yu's modesty and concession, he failed to earn the respect he deserved. In the second phase of the Lunan Campaign, he once again encountered a lot of embarrassment.
The topic of our next article is the Lusu Difference, and the core is the difference between the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army.
Su Yu's troubles are largely due to the differences between the two.
The Shandong troops are good at attacking tough battles, resisting battles with endurance, fighting bravely and resolutely, and having a simple and loyal character. However, they also have some flaws.
For example, after Ye Fei's first column was transferred from Central China to Shandong to participate in the war, because of differences with the concept of the Shandong troops, he proposed several times to change the current tactics of attacking the city and supplementing with reinforcements, but the transport planes worked, and they all faced the dilemma of weak siege and unsatisfactory reinforcements.
On the other hand, the Central China troops showed greater flexibility and mobility, and had a deeper understanding of the strategy advocated by Su Yu to concentrate troops to fight large-scale army battles, and tried to avoid hard-fought battles (of course, this is not absolute, and they are not afraid of sacrifice at critical moments). Due to the superior economic conditions in Central China, they may be slightly inferior to the Shandong troops in terms of living conditions, but when they went north, they were ridiculed, saying that they wore satin clothes, wrapped in satin, and combed their hair with small parts, like children of wealthy families.
The Lunan Campaign can be broken down into two main phases, namely the capture of Yicheng and the siege of Zaozhuang. In the first situation, the progress of the operation was quite smooth. However, it is difficult to give a definitive answer to General Chen Shiyu's claim that he led the military operations at that stage. In fact, although the ** commander personally led the overall situation, he was undoubtedly the decision-maker of this campaign, however, in the actual siege process, Chen Shiyu's influence was undoubtedly more significant.
The joy of winning the first battle did not last long, and difficulties followed. The battle entered a more intense second phase - the siege of Zaozhuang, which was personally led by the advance command led by Su Yu, and the main spearhead of the battle was held by Tao Yong's division of the 1st Division in Central China. After the establishment of Huaye, the 1st Central China Division was reorganized into the fourth column of the East China Field Army.
Because Tao Yong's troops lacked actual combat experience in attacking fortified positions, and their skills in using explosive tactics were still insufficient, they suffered many setbacks. In this regard, the ** commander was deeply worried and decided to send Chen Shiyu to lead the 8th Division of Shandong Province (later the Huaye 3rd Column) to participate in the battle, as a support for Su Yu, who was ill and feverish, and at the same time to take over his command position. As for whether Su Yu is really suffering from the disease and the severity of the disease, we don't need to delve into it, at least on the surface, Su Yu has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of configuration.
The turning point in the story came when Chen Shiyu arrived in Zaozhuang, and he almost replaced Su Yu as the commanding position. Then again, why is this happening?Behind the incident lies an embarrassing past. Initially, Su Yu commanded the troops attacking Zaozhuang, including the 9th Shandong Provincial Division with full commitment, as well as a regiment of the 4th Division. However, Wang Jian'an, commander of the Luzhong Military Region, transferred the two units to the Luzhong area without serious consideration. Su Yu could not do anything about this, because during this period, the Luzhong Military Region was independent and did not need to be under Su Yu's direct jurisdiction.
At this moment, asking the Shandong Eighth Division to assist the Central China First Division in attacking Zaozhuang, can Chen Shiyu control the actions of this division?From the point of view of organizational principles and command relations, there seems to be no problem. The soldiers of the Eighth Division would never refuse to obey Su Yu's command, but in times of extreme tension in the war situation, it was sometimes necessary to give way to principled, orderly, and important matters to temporary realities. If unity of command is forced, it is very likely that we will again encounter the dilemma of incoordination. On the contrary, if Chen Shiyu gave way to command and let the Shandong Eighth Division be responsible for the main attack, the Central China First Division would work together to eliminate this strange atmosphere as soon as possible.
Combining these factors, Su Yu is likely to have reached a consensus with **, and skillfully temporarily entrusted the command to Chen Shiyu under the pretext of "illness and fever".
The development process of the battle really proceeded as Su Yu had foreseen, and the Shandong Eighth Column, under the command of Chen Shiyu, quickly broke through Zaozhuang City and completely annihilated the enemy's reorganized 51st Division by virtue of the excellent characteristics of the attack and blasting strategy, and finally captured the enemy's division commander Zhou Yuying.
However, after Chen Shiyu took over the command, he also faced some minor setbacks. Tao Yong, the commander of the 1st Central China Column, was the commander of the various departments of the New Fourth Army who was the most adept at commanding campaigns, and since Chen Shiyu took office, he had withdrawn his troops from combat duty. In this case, Chen Shiyu entrusted Wang Chengcheng, the political commissar of the First Division, to mediate and appease Tao Yong's emotions, which temporarily suppressed Tao Yong's dissatisfaction.
Chen Shiyu initially planned to designate the Shandong Eighth Column as the main direction of attack, but he realized that he could not completely ignore the efforts and contributions made by the Central China First Column, so he decided to order a two-pronged attack tactic - that is, attacking from both the north and the south at the same time. Fortunately, the Shandong Eighth Column used the newly acquired howitzer battery to achieve remarkable results, and first successfully attacked Zaozhuang City, becoming the first hero in this battle.
Soon after the end of the Lunan Campaign, the East China Field Army was officially established, and Su Yu was appointed deputy commander of the army, responsible for operational commandChen Shiyu served as chief of staff. Due to a series of problems caused by the Lunan Campaign, General ** did not leave the special radio station to Chen Shiyu, but put this equipment under the unified custody of the Huaye Command.
Although Su Yu still had to deal with the challenges of Shandong generals such as Chen, Song, Wang, Xu, and others in his operational command, even Wei, who had a background in the New Fourth Army but was actually a member of the old Eighth Route Army, they did not recognize the young Su Yu 100%, especially their Chen Shenzao. However, ** and Su Yu came up with an ingenious solution: to maintain the dignity of Chen Shenzao, and to give full play to his expertise in commanding. With the passage of time, the East China Field Army gradually advanced steadily through the difficult run-in period.