Summary.
In early 2020, Russia's supreme leadership announced the launch of a special military operation targeting the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. The armed conflict has lasted for more than four months now, and there is debate about the understanding of this conflict and the judgment of its nature. In addition to the efforts to choose sides between Russia, Ukraine, Russia and the West, we need to conduct an in-depth and systematic analysis of them from another perspective.
Keywords:Russia-Ukraine conflict;War;Western.
1.Literature review.
Cao Yuanzheng pointed out that unlike the unilateral international order in World War II, which relied on strength competition, the current rules-based international order has historical progress and universal legitimacy, and has brought peace and development dividends to the world for decades. However, the sanctions that followed the Russia-Ukraine conflict have seriously undermined the existing world order, putting the world economy, which has been worse since the I Ching, at great risk. Take a long-term view. Economic globalization may thus be reversed. At the same time, he pointed out that China, as a responsible major country, defends and improves the international multilateral governance system, continues to promote economic globalization, defends and enhances China's national interests, and safeguards the well-being of the people.
Cheng Yawen's order based on existing rules is actually an unjust and unfair order centered on Western countries. For example, since the conflict, the United States has written allies, imposed a large number of sanctions on Russia, and coerced the rest of the world to choose sides, precisely to maintain this center. In the face of the attitude of Western countries to assemble and comprehensively suppress them. In order to promote its own security and development, China must seriously examine the past tradition of multilateralism, adjust the spatial pattern of foreign exchanges, and strengthen cooperation with the countries of the United States, so as to create a new international environment conducive to China's long-term peace and stability.
Zhang Xin analyzes the logic of Russia's behavior from the perspective of cultural politics. After the Cold War, Russia tried to integrate into and jointly reshape Europe's security and economic system, but it was repeatedly frustrated and had to turn to rebuilding a regional political system in the post-Soviet space, and as a result, it was still continuously undermined and oppressed by the world system led by the United States. For this reason, we had to retreat to the traditional geopolitical and territorial logic of the 19th century, and try to construct a historically unified Russian world based on the theory of civilization.
Kong Yuan pointed out that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has given Britain an opportunity to return to the European political arena after Brexit, and on the one hand, Britain maintains the unity of the transatlantic camp in Latin America, Canada and Europe, and at the same time exaggerates the China threat theory in an attempt to drag the world into a bipolar pattern. Through a series of operations, the UK has become a leader in the new security landscape in Europe.
Wei Nanzhi systematically analyzes the fragility within the alliance of Western democracies established by the United States and Europe in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Since World War II, Europe has been freed from U.S. control, its ambitions for strategic governance, its internal Europe,** its fragility in terms of its energy economic capabilities, and its inability to truly break free from its vassal status with the United States. The US-EU alliance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict will pay a huge price in the end, and the most direct danger can only be borne by Europe.
1.The demands of all parties under the strategic game.
1.1. Russia is trying to solve the dilemma of security and development.
It is generally believed that the failure of negotiations between Russia and the United States on security guarantees was the trigger for the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. NATO China is the key contradiction between Russia and the West. However, we need to recognize that security is not the only driving factor in this conflict, and Russia's repositioning of the international order itself and the period of strategic opportunity are also important variables. The hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan has triggered a crisis of confidence among allies, and the lack of coordination between the U.S. and Europe on the Indo-Pacific strategy and the strategy of great power competition have further confirmed Russia's specific judgment on the strategy of a declining West.
In the eyes of the Russians, because of the relative decline in American power, Russia is no longer a competitor on the edge of survival. Russia hopes to change the NATO-centered peace order and build a new multilateral order that will make itself an equal partner. Russia's military campaign aims to end the reckless expansionist behavior and dominance of the United States and other Western countries on the international stage. Most of Russia's elite also thinks. With the end of the era of Western dominance, Russia can use geopolitical actions to regain international respect. Therefore, Russia hopes to reconstruct the order through the special military operation, obtain a geopolitical security buffer in the traditional sense, and enhance its influence and leadership in the post-Soviet space, so that the West and Russia can plan to jointly solve the security dilemma and development dilemma.
1.2. The United States took the opportunity to achieve the goal of controlling Europe by Russia alone.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is generally in line with the need of the United States to redraw the trans-Pacific relationship with the theory of the Russian threat, and to promote the isolation of Russia and control the strategic objectives of Europe. The so-called isolation of Russia means the implementation of economic, financial, scientific and technological warfare, energy warfare, etc., against Russia, and promotes the development of universal anti-war voices in various countries into a systematic anti-Russian movement. Taking advantage of the panic psychology of the people and the hedging needs of corporate entities, the coordination and complementarity of official sanctions and unofficial sanctions have been formed, and then Russia will be decoupled from the world political system, financial system, economic and trade system, cultural system, etc., and Russia's isolation will be its ultimate goal.
To control Europe is to expand political solidarity and military aid to Ukraine, to expand and prolong the conflict in the form of a human war, to take the opportunity to revise the process of strategic mapping transformation that the EU is brewing, and to strengthen the particularity of the alliance of values and the power structure of democratic authority. At the same time, the United States has also stimulated the demand for military shopping in Europe by creating war panics, and promoted the severance of energy dependence between Russia and Europe, providing effective conditions for the US military-industrial complex and peasant enterprises to plunder the strategic market.
1.3. Europe is simultaneously advancing strategic reflection and strategic autonomy.
Europe uses the conflict to rethink and adjust its diplomatic, defense, and energy policies. At the diplomatic level, the conflict not only led to the bankruptcy of the Normandy dialogue model created by the Franco-German axis, but also caused Europe to rethink its policy of engagement with Russia. With the traditional neutral countries Austria and Switzerland, among which sanctions against Russia, Finland and Sweden are actively negotiating to join NATO, and Europe is trying to take the opportunity. Repair the power of Russia, its inadequacy in internal relations, the elimination of neutrality and buffer policy space. At the defense level, Europe has not only cooperated with the United States in highlighting NATO's functions under the regional security framework, the necessity of its open-door policy, and highlighting the special value of the transatlantic alliance, but also some countries have changed their defense policies, adjusted their expenditures to expand the security dimension of Europe's strategic autonomy, and accelerated the discussion on the formation of European armies. For the energy level, Europe will make relevant adjustments based on its own situation, promote the final energy decoupling with Russia, and avoid the European people from becoming the most direct victims of the conflict.
2.The gap between the strategic vision and the reality.
2.1. The negative effects of conflict prolongation are universal.
For Russia, the protracted conflict will boost Ukraine's confidence in waiting for change, stimulate the United States and Europe to continue to increase military assistance, and increase sanctions against Russia. The discussions on Finland and Sweden joining NATO, as well as the adjustment of the defense policies of European countries, show that the prolongation of the conflict will not only cause Russia to bear huge economic costs, but may also make Russia an anti-eastward expansion theory and an incentive for NATO's further eastward expansion. It would be contrary to its original purpose of addressing the security and development dilemma. For Europe, the proposal to establish a special cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO, which established the principle of indivisible security in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement and the Paris Charter, is no longer in line with the needs of reality.
The EU's appeal as a normative power is likely to be influenced by growing geopolitical issues, and the complex linkage with the Nordics will be more prominent. For the United States, although the protracted conflict is in line with its actual strategic goal of controlling Europe, the increasing intensity of the war, the potential risks, and Russia's statement that it does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons will greatly increase the difficulty of the United States in balancing between "seduction and avoidance".
2.2. The contradiction between the strategic coordination of the United States and Europe and the priority of their own countries is still difficult to solve.
If NATO is actively promoting the principle of America First, the cognitive dilemma and policy of transatlantic relations have been hesitant and affected by non-conflict. NATO, the European Union and the collective bloc have achieved a high degree of unity in a short period of time on the issue of supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia, and the logic of decision-making that prioritizes their own countries has passed. For example, Germany and Austria refused to join the United States to save natural gas in Russia advocated by the United States out of their own interests, leaving millions of refugees caused by the conflict, and the United States also refused to participate in European standards to admit them.
There are also differences in the positions of the United States and Europe in terms of the amount of offensive assistance. As the color of the change in the mood of Europe's policy towards Russia gradually fades, the dust settles in some countries, and the reflection effect of the people's livelihood plight caused by sanctions against Russia gradually becomes prominent, similar to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's contacts with Russia may rise again. The divergent perceptions of the energy crisis, the food crisis, and the humanitarian crisis between the United States and the European Union may lead to a re-emergence of differences in positions toward Russia within Europe and between the United States and Europe.
3.It is inevitable that the resurgence of the Cold War in the world will be unavoidable.
3.1. The consensus to maintain the current system and order is under stress testing.
In the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the synchronic anti-Russian systematization of the United States and Europe may gradually advance the process of containing Russia. Russia has also emerged as an independent civilizational power, no longer entangled in the European complex, but emphasizing the differences in ideas and theories between them, although the post-war international system is still on the verge of complete collapse. However, its overall vulnerability and local divergence are inevitable. Whether it is suspending Russia's membership in the UN People's Signing Council or expelling it from the UN Security Council, the call of the G20, the world's leading organization, shows that the international order with the United Nations at its core and internationalization as technology will face tremendous pressure. The quasi-evolutionary reorganization marked by the exclusivity of international power and the opposition of security values will lead to more intense debates about returning to Yalta or returning to Vienna to reshape the order, and the cognitive gap between the major powers on the concept of security and order will become more prominent.
3.2 The dualistic identity of democracy and authoritarianism is more radical.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has not only become an opportunity to eliminate the strategic alienation, divergence of interests, and identity in the transatlantic relationship, but it may lead the world to return from the North-South interaction dominated by abnormal development to the East-West struggle. Although the dilemma and decline of the liberal international order still exist, with the rise of international power in the east and the decline in the west, the collective rise of developing countries has been greatly impacted. In the context of the stalemate between China and the United States, the United States will further enhance the global function of regional alliances, strengthen the threat to democracy, and reshape the image of the China-Russia axis as a challenger to the new order, so as to build an identity of the collective West, and make NATO-Indo-Pacific linkage its priority development direction. In addition, the psychological impact of major powers changing the geopolitical status quo through military means will force small and medium-sized countries caught between the big powers to eliminate the gray space, take the initiative to draw ideological lines or choose "group self-preservation".
3.3. The inequality of the game between China, the United States and Russia will intensify.
On the whole, the Russia-Ukraine conflict may indirectly affect the "small rhythm" of the global strategic layout of the United States, but it is difficult to change its "priority direction" to contain China, and under the framework of the tripartite game between China, the United States and Russia, Russia's strategic initiative and operational ability will be weakened simultaneously. At the same time, as the power utility of energy leverage in the Russia-Europe game gradually declines, the space for Russia and the United States to carry out interest swap on an equal footing shrinks, Russia's vision of playing a "key third party" in the Sino-US competition faces a capacity deficit, and its ability to maintain absolute leadership in the "post-Soviet space" may also be questioned and challenged. In addition, the prospect of political and economic "silos" will lead to a significant reduction in Russia's ability to set the global agenda, and its power and discourse space for international multilateral participation will also be severely reduced.
Conclusion. The Russia-Ukraine conflict will lead to the peaceful qualification of global governance exceeding the abnormal development, and the focus on global issues will be forced to return to the value orientation of security first, and the actual need to ensure agricultural security may be forced to change. The frequent emergence of phased goals and postures and threat theories in the global zero-carbon race may lead to a mere formality in the US-Russia strategic dialogue, with Russia holding the rotating presidency of the Arctic Council. Faced with shutdowns and internal challenges, the Arctic climate and environmental governance agenda is difficult to advance. U.S.-Russia-Europe space cooperation, once seen as a model, could be completely cut off by mutual sanctions and opposition to escalation. It can be seen that global issues and cooperation in the governance of new frontiers will be affected by this conflict to varying degrees.