Peace talks after the Battle of Nanjing (4).
Chairman Chiang did not receive practical support from the Brussels meeting, and although he had been mentally prepared beforehand, he was still very disappointed and frustrated. Todman, for his part, tightened his mediation. On November 26 and 28, Tao Deman visited Kong Xiangxi in Wuhan, and the next day, he held talks with Wang Chonghui, the chief minister of China. On December 2, Xu Mo, the political secretary for foreign affairs, accompanied Todman back to Nanjing by boat, asking to see Chiang Kai-shek, who was still in Nanjing. Prior to his meeting with Todman, Chiang convened a meeting of senior military staff attended by Xu Yongchang, Bai Chongxi, Gu Zhutong, Qian Dajun, and others to study how to respond to German mediation. It was agreed that the conditions were not onerous and acceptable. Chiang also believed that the conditions put forward by Japan were not the conditions for the death of the country, and decided to accept German mediation and try to negotiate peace with Japan, which was the first time that the Chinese side agreed to peace talks with a clear intention. After the meeting of senior military staff, Chiang met with Todman at 5 p.m. on the same day and said that China was ready to accept mediation. But Chiang said: "He could not accept the idea that Japan had emerged victorious from this war." Nor can the Japanese ultimatum be accepted. He stressed that (1) China accepts these conditions as a basis for negotiations;(2) The sovereignty and integrity of North China shall not be infringed upon;(3) In the peace negotiations, the treaty between China and a third country shall not be involved;(4) In the peace negotiations, Germany has acted as an intermediary from the very beginning. During the meeting, Todman also explained to Chiang that Germany did not participate in the Brussels meeting because it expected that the meeting would not be fruitful, and it was not because it did not want to help China. Germany believes that ex post facto mediation is more effective than participation in meetings. When Chairman Chiang's reply was sent to the German embassies in Berlin and Tokyo, the German dignitaries from all walks of life were very excited, and in their view, peace was about to come and war was coming to an end. However, this is not the case!
On the day of December 2, Germany also received a telegram from Dixon, which roughly said that the Japanese General Staff Headquarters had the idea of quick peace talks, but some people in the army wanted to fight until the fall of Chiang Kai-shek. On the basis of all the information, Germany considered it necessary to give Japan a written document on the peace negotiations, and a detailed memorandum was handed over to Dixon on December 4. On December 7, Dixon compiled the work done in Germany on the mediation issue into a "historical record of mediation" and submitted it to Hirota. Hirota replied tactfully: It is doubtful whether the content previously drafted can be used as the basis for negotiations in the face of the recent great military victory. A reply will be given after consulting and studying the military department. Presumably, Chiang knew the Japanese better than the Germans, so he reluctantly left Nanking on the 7th.
Chiang Kai-shek left Nanjing at this time for another unknown reason, that is, the Soviet Union refused his request to send troops to aid China.
This is a long and difficult topic to explain in a nutshell. Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on New Year's Day in 1938: "It is especially difficult to deal with the ** problem." The scourge of building the country is hidden and urgent. The Japanese danger is urgent and easy to prevent, and the Russian danger is hidden and unpredictable." There are not many words, but Jiang's heartache has jumped on the page.
The previous book says that Russia and Japan are both tiger and wolf countries, and China is a weak country, so both Russia and Japan have the intention of infringing on China. Japan is brazenly encroaching on China, while the Soviet Union has repeatedly shown weakness in front of Japan in the face of obscurity with obscure tactics, but in fact it is a conspiracy and calculation. In order to gain more time for development and construction and to make adequate preparations for war, the Soviet Union agreed to Manchukuo to set up a consulate in the Soviet Union on the one hand, and sold the Middle Eastern Railway to Japan on the other. It was intended to encourage Japan to continue to invade China in the joy of the success of its continental policy. At the same time, it also encouraged and supported China to gradually build up confidence in resisting Japan. Although Chiang Kai-shek could understand these two hands of the Soviet Union, he could not extricate himself because of the weakness of the country. The signing of the non-aggression pact between China and the Soviet Union actually had their own agendas. Stalin knew that China was incapable of invading the Soviet Union, but he was worried that China would join forces with Japan against the Soviet Union after its defeat in the War of Resistance against Japan. Therefore, when the Soviet Union dealt with the Chinese delegation's trip to Moscow to sign the "Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact", it deliberately created a momentum to put pressure on Japan, so that Japan would compromise with the Soviet Union and guarantee the Soviet Union's cooperation in the Far East As for the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty that Chiang Kai-shek was looking forward to, it was actually a moon in the water that Stalin gave Chiang Kai-shek - it could not be fished.
In order to whet China's appetite, during the visit to Moscow led by Yang Jie, director of education of the Army University, Stalin adopted a strategy of extreme enthusiasm and sketched a big pie of "the Soviet Union will definitely send troops to attack the Japanese army" to convince Yang Jie and China. In order to prevent an armistice and compromise between China and Japan. To achieve this, the Soviets persuaded Yang Jie to agree to exclude the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jiang Tinghuang, from the negotiating group. Because in the report provided by Chiang Tinghuang to the Kuomintang in April 1937, he clearly judged that the Soviet Union would never take the initiative to participate in the war against Japan. The Soviet Union was also well aware of Chiang Tinghuang's political views and firmly believed that the Soviet Union would never take the initiative to send troops to help China resist Japan.
On November 11, 1937, Marshal Voroshilov told Yang Jie in a conversation: "The Soviet Union is currently actively preparing to enter the war, and the period is difficult to determine, but you can tell the monarch that the preparations are coming soon." That night, Yang Jie had a long talk with Stalin for four hours, and Stalin told him: "At present, the time has not yet come for the Soviet Union to go to war with Japan," but "China is now very strong in the war of resistance and has good results, and if China is unfavorable, the Soviet Union can go to war with Japan." ”
Yang Jie quickly relayed the above conversation to Chiang Kai-shek. Although Chiang repeatedly warned Chiang Kai-shek not to trust Yang Jie's report, it was easy for everyone to believe the results they hoped for, and Chiang Kai-shek believed Yang Jie's words. On November 30, when the Japanese army was marching towards the capital, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly sent a personal telegram to Stalin, asking the Soviet Union to fulfill its promise and send troops to attack Japan on the grounds that China's war of resistance was at a critical juncture.
However, at this time, the Soviet Union was no longer worried about the Sino-Japanese conflict directing a local war, so the Soviet Union deliberately showed "anger" at Chiang Kai-shek's request, accusing Yang Jie of distorting the original meaning of the conversation between Stalin and Voroshilov. On December 4, Stalin and Voroshilov sent a joint telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, solemnly stating: "The policy of the Soviet Union: If the Soviet Union does not immediately send troops to Japan because of the Japanese provocation, it may be regarded as an act of aggression and an immediate improvement of Japan's position in the world." "Chiang Kai-shek woke up and was tricked by the Soviet Union. He lamented that "the international situation is gradually falling into an unfavorable state." It is conceivable that Chiang Kai-shek must have been in a terrible mood when he left Nanjing.