Cheng Zihua, a native of Yuncheng, Shanxi, was born in June 1905, graduated from Taiyuan National Normal School, participated in the revolution in 1925, joined the party in 1926, and was admitted to the sixth phase of the Huangpu Military Academy (Wuhan Branch) at the end of the same year. Cheng Zihua joined the party during the Great Revolution, a senior intellectual, graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy, has old qualifications, high academic qualifications, both civil and military, and his roots are red and Miaozheng, and his future in the revolutionary ranks is infinitely bright. However, Chiang Kai-shek's brazen April 12 coup d'état led to the failure of the Great Revolution. Cheng Zihua, like countless revolutionary masses, chose the road of armed confrontation, he picked up the barrel of a gun, launched a bloody battle with the enemy, and finally fought a bloody road in the agrarian revolutionary war, which finally led to the other side of the revolutionary victory and guided Cheng Zihua to a bright future. 
In 1927, Cheng Zihua participated in the Guangzhou Uprising, and after the failure of the uprising, he and his comrades-in-arms retreated to Hailufeng and continued to insist on armed struggle. After the loss of the Hailufeng base area, the rest of the troops went north into the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet region and became an important force in the formation of the Red Fourth Front Army. But Cheng Zihua did not take this road, but accepted the assignment of ** and went to ** to engage in military transportation work. In December 1929, Cheng Zihua participated in the organization of the Daye Rebellion, which greatly strengthened the revolutionary forces in southeastern Hubei Province. The Daye Rebellion was an extremely successful uprising, and was listed as a typical example of military movement work. In 1931, Cheng Zihua was sent to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region, which was facing an extremely grim situation at that time. The main force of the Red Fourth Front Army has been transferred to Sichuan and Shaanxi, and the rest of the army has rebuilt the Red 25th Army under the command of Xu Haidong. In this difficult situation, Cheng Zihua's arrival is undoubtedly a timely rain. Cheng Zihua was a Huangpu student, a high-level intellectual, who participated in the Guangzhou Uprising and the Daye Rebellion, and had a very high reputation in the whole army. As soon as he arrived in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, Xu Haidong, the commander of the Red 25th Army, took the initiative to let Xian and retired to the deputy commander. Xu Haidong was a famous general who had experienced a hundred battles during the Red Army, and his military talent was rarely matched in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region. The Red 25th Army, under the leadership of army commander Cheng Zihua, political commissar Wu Huanxian, and deputy army commander Xu Haidong, carried out a magnificent Long March. The Long March of the Red 25th Army, objectively speaking, was better than that of the three main forces of the Red Army. The Red 26th Army moved to Hubei, Henan, Shaanxi, and Gansu provinces, getting rid of the pursuit of more than 30 regiments along the way, and also established the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi base area on the way. It is worth mentioning that the Red 25th Army had a total of 2,900 people when it set out from Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and increased to 3,400 when it arrived in northern Shaanxi. After the completion of the Long March, the number of troops increased instead of decreasing, which was a military miracle under the conditions at that time. 
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, Cheng Zihua's performance was still very good, he developed tactics such as tunnel warfare, mine warfare, and sparrow warfare in Jizhong, and served as deputy commander and acting commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Base Area, and was in charge of Dongye for a long time, commanding corps-level units in 1947. Cheng Zihua's military achievements are not high, but when he was awarded the title in 1955, he did not receive a military rank. The reason why he did not receive the rank was simple, because at the time of the award, he was no longer in the army. As early as 1949, Cheng Zihua was transferred to Shanxi as secretary of the provincial party committee and left the army, which was the direct reason why he failed to participate in the award. Is there any other reason for that?There is an interesting view that Cheng Zihua left the army in 1949 because of the influence of the Battle of Miyun before the Battle of PingjinLet's first understand the specific process of the Battle of Miyun. In December 1948, after winning the Liaoshen Campaign, Dongye secretly entered the customs and joined forces with the troops of the North China Military Region to launch the Pingjin Campaign. **and*** It was expected at that time that Lao Chiang would abandon Pingjin and transfer troops from North China to the south in order to consolidate the Yangtze River defense line. Therefore, the strategic purpose of our army's entry into the customs this time is to prevent the Fu Zuoyi clique from escaping and to intercept its main force in the Pingjin area and annihilate it. At that time, Lao Jiang and Fu Zuoyi did not know about Dongye's entry into the customs, they believed that Dongye had just finished the Liaoshen Campaign and urgently needed to rest, so he would not enter the customs for the time being. Therefore, Higashino's entry into the customs was extremely secretive. At that time, the Third Corps of the North China Field Army was attacking Zhangjiakou, and in order to relieve the predicament, Fu Zuoyi urgently transferred the 35th Army to aid Zhangjiakou. 
** Telegraph ordered the Dongye Advance Corps (Commander Cheng Zihua, Political Commissar Huang Kecheng) to quickly go south, march to Huailai and Nankou, and join forces with the First Corps of the North China Military Region (Commander Yang Dezhi and Political Commissar *** to fight Fu Zuoyi by surprise. When the Dongye advance corps passed by Miyun, something went wrong. Miyun is an important stronghold on the Pingcheng Railway, backed by the Chaohe River and the Baihe River, and if our advance corps marches to the Pingsui Line, Miyun is bound to be a hidden danger. At that time, our army learned that there was only one security regiment defending Miyun, with a strength of less than 2,000 people, and thought that attacking Miyun was a fighter plane. On December 2, the 31st Division of the 11th Column of the Dongye Advance Corps, under the command of the division commander Ou Zhifu, launched an attack on Miyun. It's a pity that the plan did not change quickly, and the Miyun garrison only had 2,000 people, but the nearby Gubeikou and Shiqiao were stationed with three regiments of the 13th Army, and when our army attacked Miyun, these three regiments retreated into the city, and the strength of the city increased threefold at once. The 31st Division originally wanted to take Miyun easily, but it was entangled by the enemy, and the battle situation was at a stalemate for a while. After the battle situation was reported to the headquarters of the advance corps, Cheng Zihua ordered the fourth column of the advance corps to enter the customs first, leaving the eleventh column behind, and attacked Miyun County with all its might. After three days of fierce fighting, our army successfully took Miyun, annihilated 6,000 defenders, and won a victory. But the victory did not bring praise to Cheng Zihua, but was criticized. Higashino Noji, the Military Commission, and the Military Commission all criticized Cheng Zihua, believing that the advance corps had missed a major event by attacking Miyun without authorization. It turned out that Fu Zuoyi was alarmed by the 11th column's attack on Miyun, and he accurately judged that the main force of Dongye had entered the pass according to the situation of our army attacking Miyun with a column. Fu Zuoyi was greatly frightened and immediately ordered the 35th Army to withdraw from Zhangjiakou to Beiping. Our army will be able to completely annihilate the 35th Army on the flat line immediately, and if the 35th Army is withdrawn, it will be tantamount to letting the boiled duck fly, and the military situation is urgent!At a critical time, Zheng Weishan of the North China Military Region turned the tide and led his troops to block the 35th Army, so that Fu Zuoyi's plan did not succeed. If it weren't for Zheng Weishan's judgment of the situation and timely replenishment, the Dongye advance force would have attacked Miyun in the first battle, which would have ruined the entire plan for the Pingjin campaign. After the war, Cheng Zihua was severely criticized. At the end of 1949, Cheng Zihua left Siye and was transferred to the secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, and in 1955, Cheng Zihua failed to obtain the rank because he no longer held a position in the army. Cheng Zihua's two important partners Xu Haidong and Huang Kecheng are both founding generals, but Cheng Zihua failed to confer the title, is it really affected by the Battle of Miyun?Before answering this question, let's take a look at whether Cheng Zihua's qualifications are enough for the rank of general. Cheng Zihua, who participated in the revolution in 1925 and joined the party in 1926, graduated from Taiyuan National Normal School and Wuhan Branch of Huangpu Military Academy. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, Cheng Zihua participated in the Guangzhou Uprising and the Daye Rebellion, and served as the commander of the Red 25th Army and the political commissar of the Red 15th ArmyDuring the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Cheng Zihua served as the deputy commander, acting commander and acting political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military RegionDuring the Liberation War, Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the Corps. No matter what period of position, Cheng Zihua is a standard general. 
In terms of qualifications, Cheng Zihua is completely worthy of being a general, and the reason why he was not awarded the title was because he did not hold a military position at that time, and he left the army at the earliest time at the end of 1949, was he affected by the Battle of Miyun?Apparently not. The Battle of Miyun took place at the end of 1948, Cheng Zihua left Siye at the end of 1949, after the Battle of Miyun, Cheng Zihua also participated in the command of the Pingjin Campaign, the Hengbao Campaign, across Hebei, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, and after the Pingjin Campaign, he officially took office as the commander of the 13th Corps of the Siye, how could this be affected by the Battle of Miyun?Judging from Cheng Zihua's position after the Battle of Miyun, Cheng Zihua's promotion was not affected by the Battle of Miyun, and the reason why he left the army was because the liberation of the whole country was a foregone conclusion at that time, and Cheng Zihua was a revolutionary father with both civil and military skills, and was suitable for taking charge of the local government. You must know that the level of the secretary of the provincial party committee is very high, Cheng Zihua was transferred from the commander of the corps to the secretary of the provincial party committee, and to some extent, he was promoted, how could this be affected by the battle of Miyun. Facts have proved that the Battle of Miyun has no impact on Cheng Zihua's promotion, and it has been ten months after the Battle of Miyun that he left the army, and his position has been promoted instead of demotion, so there is no basis for saying that he was affected by the Battle of Miyun. Although Cheng Zihua was unable to participate in the award, his position was not lower than that of a general, look at his position during this period, the secretary of the provincial party committee, the provincial chairman, the commander and political commissar of the provincial military district, this is the proper treatment of a senior officer. Cheng Zihua's departure from the army was just a normal duty transfer.