At the end of 1950, shortly after the end of the Battle of Changjin Lake, the 88th Division, which belonged to the 26th Army of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese Volunteers, was seriously criticized, the division commander Wu Dalin and the political commissar Gong Jie were dismissed, and a large number of cadres were punished.
The 88th Division was even abolished, and the three regiments under its jurisdiction were also integrated into other units. Then I can't help but ask: what mistakes did the 88th Division make and why was it punished so severely?
The 26th Army of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteers is a people's army with a glorious history, and its predecessor was jointly developed and formed by the troops of the Shandong Column of the Eighth Route Army and the Luzhong Military Region during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Eighth Column of the East China Field Army during the War of Liberation.
In January 1949, Huaye Eighth Column marched to the east of Bengbu, Anhui Province to assemble and rest and stand by, and marched to the south of the Yangtze River.
On February 9 of the same year, it was ordered to be reorganized into the 26th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which was subordinate to the 8th Army of the 3rd Field Army. Zhang Renchu served as the commander of the army, and had three divisions, an artillery regiment, a teaching regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, and a guard battalion.
At the beginning of 1950, the 88th Division of the 30th Army of the former People's Liberation Army was transferred to the 26th Army. In November 1950, the 26th Army participated in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to Defend the Motherland and Defend the Country, and fought with its brother troops from the shore of Changjin Lake to the Hantan River, and successively participated in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
Two, four, five battles.
In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, a large number of heroes emerged from the 26th Army.
However, in the Battle of Changjin Lake, due to the lack of experience in foreign operations, in addition to being unfamiliar with the terrain and enemy conditions, and especially not paying enough attention to fighting under cold weather conditions, the 88th Division of the 26 th Army suffered a large non-combat attrition in the Battle of Changjin Lake, and did not complete the scheduled task of destroying the enemy.
Wu Dalin, commander of the 88th Division, and Gong Jie, political commissar, were dismissed, and the 262nd Regiment under their jurisdiction was transferred to the Army Special Service Regiment, the 263rd Regiment was transferred to the 76th Division, and the 264th Regiment was transferred to the 77th Division. It can be said that the 88th Division has been revoked after the Battle of Changjin Lake.
According to some unconfirmed information, Song Shilun, the commander of the Ninth Corps, even shot a battalion commander of the 88th Division with his own hands.
Why was the 88th Division punished so severely?In addition to the lack of attention to combat in severe cold conditions, which led to large non-combat attrition.
According to records, during the Battle of Changjin Lake, some troops of the 88th Division even feared war. The unit set off more than 10 hours later than the original time of the general attack, so that the fighters were seriously delayed!
At the beginning of the Battle of Changjin Lake, the 26th Army was not the main force. After the battle began, after several days of fierce fighting, the 20th Army and the 27th Army, which were responsible for the main offensive task, lost more than 50% of their troops.
In an extremely critical situation, Song Shilun decided to use the reserve 26th Army to encircle the 1st Marine Division.
At that time, Song Shilun issued a death order to the army commander Zhang Renchu: he must arrive at the designated attack position within two days, and must cooperate with friendly troops to complete the encirclement of the enemy army.
After receiving the task, most of the 26th Army set out on December 2, 1950, and arrived at the designated attack position in the early morning of the 4th, preparing to launch an attack on the US troops on the evening of the 4th.
When the 88th Division received the order, it was already in the early morning of 3 December, and it was located in the northernmost of the four divisions of the 26th Army, 70 kilometers away from the designated attack position. (The distance on the map is 70 km, but in reality you have to take into account the weather and rough mountain roads).
At this time, the temperature in the field of Korea had plummeted to minus 30, the mountains were covered with heavy snow, there was no food, and there was no winter clothing, so all the officers and men of the 88th Division, which had been ordered to insert themselves in the southernmost part, were hungry and frostbitten, and carried out a hopeless pursuit.
Despite this, the division commander Wu Dalin did not complain about grievances, but he made a fatal mistake, that is, he did not lead the whole division to set off immediately.
The 88th Division received the order in the early morning of December 3, and Wu Dalin did not lead the 262nd Regiment and the 263rd Regiment to pursue the south with Political Commissar Gong Jie and Deputy Division Commander Wang Haishan until 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd, and the 264th Regiment and the troops directly under the division then advanced.
Due to the heavy snow and severe cold, the two main regiments lost their way during the advance and lost contact with the rearguard regiment, and the non-combat attrition amounted to more than 2,500 people.
At this time, the U.S. military sent planes to raid and bomb, causing the 88th Division to lose an entire battalion. Wu Dalin, who was the commander of the division, completely lost contact with the troops. Therefore, it was impossible for the 88th Division to reach the designated position on December 4, and delaying the fighters became the first mistake made by the 88th Division.
The second mistake was that the 88th Division was filled with a fear of war, did not complete the tasks assigned by the higher authorities as soon as possible, and chose to retreat in the face of difficulties, which was even worse than delaying the fighters.
According to the recollection of insiders, Wang Haishan, then deputy commander of the 88th Division, hid in an old tank during the march (entered the old tank to avoid the bombing of US planes), causing the troops to run in the wrong direction without a leader.
Even the deputy division commander took the lead in dodging, and there were many lower-level commanders who went up and down, coupled with non-combat attrition, resulting in the 88th Division having basically lost its combat effectiveness.
By the time their three regiments arrived at their predetermined positions and were preparing to encircle the 1st Marine Division, the other side had already withdrawn.
The officers and men of the 88th Division, who were tired, thirsty and cold, could not catch up with the four wheels of the US army at all, thus disrupting the overall plan of Song Shilun and ***.
Therefore, after the Battle of Changjin Lake, the Ninth Corps listed the five major crimes of the 88th Division, one of which was "passive fear of war".
Division commander Wu Dalin and political commissar Gong Jie were removed from their posts together, and deputy division commander Wang Haishan was also dismissed, disciplined (later pardoned), and a large number of regimental and battalion-level cadres were also dealt with. The number of the 88th Division was canceled, and the three main regiments were disrupted and merged into other units.
Objective and rational analysis, is the 88th Division wronged or not by being punished so severely?
There is no one universal answer to this question. Proceeding from the overall perspective of the Changjin Lake Campaign, the 88th Division did not rush to the predetermined location at the first time, thus delaying the fighters and watching the enemy successfully escape.
However, the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army entered the DPRK in a hurry, and the various troops did not prepare enough cotton clothes. After the outbreak of the battle, many soldiers of the Ninth Corps fought bloody battles with the enemy hungry, and the severe cold weather of minus 30 degrees Celsius, coupled with no food or clothing, such a harsh environment has exceeded the limit of human tolerance.
Under such circumstances, it is necessary to completely defeat and annihilate as many American troops armed to the teeth as possible, and the task is arduous and difficult.
So is it too serious for the 88th Division to receive such a punishment?It should be a matter of opinion. However, after receiving the task, division commander Wu Dalin did not immediately lead the troops to set off to the designated position, and this is an inescapable point.
However, during the fifth battle of the Korean War, the 262nd Regiment, which originally belonged to the 88th Division, restored its reputation through a blocking battle and justified its name.
References: 1] Song Yunliang. History of the 26th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army[J].Military History,1987(06):42-43
2] Mei Shichang. Research on the Battle of Changjin Lake[D].Xiangtan University: 2016
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