On the evening of February 24, 1979, the 124th Division of the 42nd Army successfully captured Cao Bang City, the capital of Cao Bang Province, Vietnam, and forced the Vietnamese army to Kemano, Bald Head and other places in the mountainous areas north of Cao Bang City. The Vietnamese army was already in a state of rout, and scattered into small groups in an attempt to flee to the mountains for refuge. At 10:30 a.m. the next day, the 42nd Army ordered a unit of the 124th Division to join forces with the 162nd Division of the 54th Army on the right to jointly attack Kemano. In this situation, the commander of the Guhui Division decided that the 372nd Regiment would guard Gaoping, while the 371st Regiment would operate in the direction of Kemano.
The 371st Regiment successfully captured the 385th Heights at 11:58 just 15 minutes after its departure, and quickly advanced northward. Over the next two days, they worked closely together with friendly forces to capture Kemano, and continued to advance northeastward, conquering Panba, Bando, and other places one after another. They continued on until they reached Jingban, Gbagbo, Bald Head and other places.
Gbagbo is located 2 km southwest of Bald Head and is the intersection of the trail leading to Bald Head in Bandor and Gongch. The karst formations typical of this region, with stalagmites, steep peaks, deep ravines, and dense shrubs, make it difficult to observe and combat in this area.
At 13:30 on February 27, the 371st Regiment received an order to set out from the Bando area and advance towards the bald head in the direction of Gongji, Gbagbo, and Daodao. The 3rd Battalion and 9th Company of the regiment were ordered to serve as the spearhead company, and the task was to advance along the regiment's route to the bald head and be responsible for ensuring the safety of the regiment's front.
The 9th Company quickly conveyed the mission to the platoons, by briefly studying the route and possible situations. The 2nd Platoon was designated as the Spearhead Platoon, equipped with 1 heavy machine gun, and was responsible for the search of the flanks in front of the line to ensure the safety of the marching procession, while the 3rd Platoon served as a guard guard. After the company commander clarified the tasks for each platoon, the entire company began to search and advance in the sequence of 2 platoons, company headquarters, and firearms detachments (1 heavy machine gun, 1 82 recoilless gun, 2 platoon of 60 mortars, and 3 platoons).
At 4:40 p.m., as the search team of the 4th squad approached the fork in the road on the south side of Gbagbo, they heard a noise and footsteps coming from 40 meters to the west. Through the gaps in the stalagmites, they saw a Vietnamese army unit, wearing camouflage grass rings, moving in parallel to Gbagbo to the north.
Deputy squad leader Liu Qingbin quickly reported to the squad leader the discovery of the enemy with a liaison signal. The squad leader immediately ordered the whole squad to quickly cross the west side of the road, occupy favorable terrain, and intercept the Vietnamese army head-on, taking advantage of the enemy's unnoticed. At the same time, he reported the situation to the platoon commander Peng Haijian through the 861 command aircraft. When the Vietnamese army reached about 30 meters, the 4th squad shouted in unison** and immediately killed several enemy soldiers.
After the battle broke out, the platoon commander Peng Haijian quickly arrived at the position of the 4th squad, commanded the 5th squad on the right flank, and the 6th squad on the left flank, working together to encircle and annihilate the enemy. The Vietnamese army was caught off guard by the sudden heavy fire, and after losing command, they fled in all directions. The 5th squad took the opportunity to occupy Gbagbo, blocking the direction of the Vietnamese army's flight to the north and guarding against possible enemy reinforcements in the north. Wei Xiji, the deputy instructor of the Sharp Platoon, found that the enemy might escape to the south, and on the one hand, he directed the 2nd Platoon to fight to protect the main force of the company, and on the other hand, he reported the situation to the company commander, and proposed that the 1st Platoon cross the western path from the saddle of the stone mountain on the south side of Gbagbo, cut off the enemy's retreat, and requested the use of 60 mortars to suppress the enemy.
After receiving the report, the company commander quickly formulated the deployment: 1 platoon (missing 2 squads) quickly moved to the west side of the path to cut off the enemy's retreat;The 2nd squad occupied the unnamed heights on the east side of Gbagbo, controlled the commanding heights for vigilance, and ensured the battle of the main force of the company and the safety of the right flank;The 7th squad attacked from the left side of the 6th squad and advanced along the foot of the unnamed heights southwest of Gbagbo, and coordinated with the 2nd platoon, while 60 mortars fired blocking the trail southwest of Gbagbo.
At this time, the Vietnamese army had been divided into two parts by our army, one part of which was fleeing to the southwest, and the other part was stubbornly resisting in the local stalagmites, shrubs and complex terrain. The 2 platoon commander ordered the 4 squad to concentrate its forces to annihilate the recalcitrant enemy who was resisting head-on. Under the cover of fire, the 4th squad took advantage of the terrain to approach the enemy one by one, using grenades and close-range fire for hand-to-hand combat. Light machine gunner Liu Haiquan held a machine gun and fired fiercely at the enemy when it was inconvenient to set up a gun.
In just 25 minutes, the 4 squad solved the battle. They then pushed north, working with Squads 6 and 7 in close coordination. The three units quickly approached the Vietnamese army and used grenades to eliminate the recalcitrant enemy hiding behind stones. When the remnants of the enemy were in a desperate situation, the 2nd platoon took the opportunity to carry out a political offensive and intensified the psychological blow through Cantonese shouting. The 4th squad leader Chen Zhongrong led 3 soldiers to take advantage of the chaos of the Vietnamese army and the chaos of grenades, decisively rushed forward and successfully captured 3 enemies.
The battle ended victoriously at 17:20, the 9th company completely annihilated a platoon of the Vietnamese army, killed 17 enemies, captured 3 (the prisoners confessed, they were the 25th transport company of the 851st Regiment of the 346th Division), captured 5 submachine guns, 1 pistol, more than 1,300 rounds of ammunition, 25 grenades and a batch of other military supplies, and did not receive any **, successfully completed the encounter. The key to the victory in this battle was the resoluteness and courage of the commanders of the 9th Company, who quickly occupied favorable terrain and quickly resolved the battle with hand-to-hand combat, thus demonstrating their outstanding fighting qualities.
Seizing the opportunity was an important strategy adopted by the 9th Company on the march. In the face of the unknown enemy situation and complex terrain, they organized close vigilance in front and on the flanks in an orderly manner. Guided by the concept of the enemy's situation, the elite squad made good use of the terrain and skillfully advanced while searching, and successfully took the lead in reconnoitring the enemy at a distance of 80 meters.
The squad leader decisively directed the team to launch a preemptive action and successfully seized favorable terrain. As soon as the enemy was aware of our presence, the platoon of spearheads was decisive, and through swift action, grenades and close-range fire, they quickly charged and caught the enemy by surprise. This actual combat proved that in an encounter, being able to discover the enemy's situation first, launch an opportunistic action, seize favorable terrain, and take the lead is an important factor in grasping the initiative in battle.
The forward command is also a key factor in successfully seizing the opportunity in this battle. The deputy instructor led the top platoon into battle, and the 2nd platoon commander followed after the top squad, strengthening the command of the top squad, and the company quickly followed after the top squad. When the search team discovered the enemy's situation, the deputy instructor and the 2 platoon commander quickly understood the situation, made a decision, and quickly directed the battle. The company commander promptly dispatched the 1st Platoon to the rear of the enemy's flank and formed an encirclement with the 2nd Platoon, successfully achieving the goal of quickly annihilating the enemy.
The tactics of melee annihilation are also a major feature of this battle. In the sudden encounter with the Vietnamese army, the top soldier squad quickly occupied the favorable terrain, took advantage of the opportunity that the enemy had not yet discovered, and showed its strength with rapid movements, and when the enemy approached to 30 meters, it suddenly **, and then rushed straight over with brave movements. Some of the fighters even rushed to the side of the enemy and engaged in fierce hand-to-hand encounters with the opponents, fighting bravely.
For the stubborn resistance of the Vietnamese army hiding behind stalagmites, our soldiers skillfully used grenades to carry out**. Unable to set up a machine gun, the machine gunner quickly raised the machine gun and opened fire, while the rifleman and submachine gunner successfully cleared the enemy by firing at close range. Chen Zhongrong, the leader of the 4th squad, led the group to take advantage of the opportunity of the grenade** to decisively rush to the front line and successfully captured 3 enemies.