Hundred help plan **Miserable!More than 5,000 soldiers were injured in Israel!One of the stats is revealed!
According to a December 9 report by the Israeli newspaper Novaya Izvestia, the Israeli military has reportedly received more than 5,000 wounded since the Palestinian resistance group launched the "Al-Aqsa flood" military operation on October 7, which is currently being treated in hospitals**. The 5,000 wounded are said to include 2,000 seriously injured, more than 100 of whom are at risk of blindness. At the same time, Israeli hospitals are receiving more than 60 wounded people a day from the reserve forces and other powerful sectors. As for the exact number of wounded in the regular army, this information is still in the possession of the Israeli military and is not available to the outside world.
These figures, disclosed by Israel, are largely a cause for concern and may hint at some problems. For example, the high proportion of the wounded in the Israeli army is seriously wounded. According to the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, in the case of large-scale use of heavy firepower, the rate of serious casualties is usually between 1:5 and 1:7, that is, one in six wounded may be seriously injured. However, the Israeli army allegedly had 2,000 seriously wounded, which raised some questions. A possible explanation is that there were also a large number of lightly wounded on the battlefield.
The ** ratio of the Israeli army is also disputed, and unlike the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the ** ratio of the Israeli army seems to be more unusual. According to the latest reports, the number of wounded in the Israeli army is about 5,000, and it is estimated that the number of wounded may be close to tens of thousands, considering the situation of the reserve units. The total number of killed, according to the Israeli army's own reports, is about 400. This means that the ** ratio of the Israeli army, even with the strictest caliber calculations, reaches the level of 1: 11. If the caliber is broadly calculated, the ratio may even reach 1:25, i.e. one dead soldier corresponds to 25 wounded soldiers.
Such data is incredible, and seems to convey the message that the Israeli army seems to be "possessed by locust armies and invulnerable, and only squadron leaders, squad leaders, and military caoes are immortal." This raises questions about the training of the Israeli army and the security system. At the same time, this also reflects the disparity in the level of field guard service, and the difference in the proportion of the first under different conditions may be as high as two or three times.
Interestingly, in the event of a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip, the ratio of civilians has also reached 1:3, with a whopping 17,000 dead and 54,000 injured. This may be an indication of the impact of the quality of the health service system on the ** ratio, and even in the toughest cases, there is still a two- or three-fold difference between good and poor health services.
The IDF's situation in the Al-Aqsa flood incident is appalling. Despite the Israeli military's attempts to downplay the figures, more than 5,000 wounded have been treated in hospitals, which is undoubtedly terrifying. Unlike the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, the Palestinian resistance group lacks effective means of in-depth interdiction, so that the Israeli army's ** mainly comes from head-on combat, especially the input of infantry units in the battle. It is puzzling that the infantry combat units of the Israeli army actually suffered more than 5000 losses.
Considering that the general size of the Israeli armored infantry battalion is 300-400 people, this means that about 14-15 battalions have suffered a major blow, which is equivalent to 4-5 brigades losing combat effectiveness. In addition, the IDF has so far failed to demonstrate a convincing operation**, and its propaganda has been limited to soldiers shooting indiscriminately into the air, lacking a substantial demonstration of its achievements.
In the past two months of the Al-Aqsa floods, the Israeli army's brutality has exceeded public expectations. Considering that the Palestinian resistance is relatively weak in the arc of resistance, it has even been mentioned in the discussion that the ground engagement may not be able to easily defeat the Houthi Slippers if the Israeli army loses the support of its air force. The emergence of this view has led to a reassessment of the position of the Israeli army in the Middle East, and the once petty tyrant now seems to have been reduced to the belly of a fish.