In recent times, the Russian army has advanced in a small area on most fronts, and in addition to finally gnawing the "fortress" of Maryinka, it has also formed a number of areas of tactical advantage, laying the foundation for the next stage of operations.
Throughout the Russian-Ukrainian war, whenever the Ukrainian army is disadvantageous on the main battlefield, it will inevitably get back its "face" elsewhere;Among them, with the support of the Western intelligence and reconnaissance system, "brushing" the achievements of the Russian Black Sea Fleet here is a common means.
For example, after Russia conquered Maryinka on December 25 with high-profile propaganda, the Ukrainian army launched the "Storm Shadow" cruise missile in the early morning of the 26th, killing a 4,000-ton landing ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
In this way, you advertise the capture of Maryinka, and I shout to sink the landing ship, and there is a back and forth on the **.
But we must know that Russia and Ukraine have been mixed together for hundreds of years, and their national character is not completely changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union after the "separation" for 30 years, and there is not much difference between the many styles of the two families - the most typical point is that they have a strong sense of revenge, especially if they can't see each other jumping.
Since the Ukrainian army was able to kill the Russian landing ship with missiles, and the latter's joy in publicizing the battle of Maryinka only lasted for a few hours, then the Russian missiles could also hit the Ukrainian side!
The Ukrainian army now does not have any big ships to "brush" its achievements, but from Lviv to Kharkiv, including the capital Kyiv, there are always quite a few targets that can be hit.
So on December 29, a large-scale hybrid strategic strike by the Russian army came.
According to the Ukrainian side, the Russian army dispatched about 18 strategic bombers to participate in the strike, firing 122 missiles, including the "Dagger" hypersonic missile;In addition, 36 Witness-131 136 UAVs were used.
The Ukrainian army believes that this is the largest long-range strike carried out by Russia since the start of the war between Russia and Ukraine. The peak of the previous strike was in November 2022, when 96 missiles were recorded;Further on March 9, at the beginning of the war, 81 missiles were recorded.
Of course, we understand these two points in time, because at the beginning of the war, the Russian army concentrated long-range strikes** to attack the Ukrainian army, and it is not uncommon for the peak of the use of missiles to appear on March 9 (the Russian army underestimated the resistance of the Ukrainian army when it started the war, so the strongest attack wave did not appear on February 24).
As for the situation in November last year, it is a continuation of the idea of the Russian army's strategic strike since October, when the Russian side envisaged that it would cause structural difficulties in the winter by striking and paralyzing Ukraine's energy infrastructure. However, last winter's general warmth in Europe, coupled with various emergency measures by Ukraine and the West, although the blow at that time weakened Ukraine's war potential, did not achieve the desired effect.
So after that, the Russian army did not continue the large-scale strategic strike, and the Ukrainian capital Kyiv was not even hit again for a long time.
As a result, Ukraine has actually mobilized and restored part of its military-industrial capacity in the rear, while at the same time improving and strengthening its ability to repair war-damaged equipment and produce ammunition.
The Russian army is naturally aware of these situations, but there are also reasons why it has not launched another large-scale and sustained strike.
First: Ukraine has a huge territory, there are too many targets that need to be hit, and coupled with the role of the Western air situation early warning system, the long-range strike efficiency of the Russian army is not particularly high;
Over the years, the effectiveness of air strikes may have been overestimated due to the effects of American-style warfare;Judging from the fighting in Gaza, the Israeli army has launched no less than 20,000 air strikes in a 365-square-kilometer theater of operations, and the bombs have not been dropped without regard for civilians, but the military strike effect achieved is also quite limitedAnd Ukraine's land area is more than 1,000 times that of Gaza, and the Ukrainian army's air defense is not comparable to Hamas).
Second: on the basis of the previous point, the Russian side is more inclined to tilt resources to the manufacture of traditional main battle equipment, drones, and ammunition, which are faster to directly improve the front-line situation, and the Russian side has found that conducting a direct war of attrition is also effective in achieving the ultimate strategic goal.
Therefore, although the Russian army has also launched strikes on Ukrainian targets in depth from time to time this winter, the number of missiles and drones used is not much.
This hybrid missile and drone strike is not so much like the beginning of a new round of strategic strikes, and may be more of a retaliatory action in response to the attack on the landing ship of the Black Sea Fleet.
If the Russian army can maintain this scale, or continue to strike on a slightly smaller scale for a period of time, it can be considered the beginning of a strategic operation.
Of course, at present, it is certain that the scale of the Russian army's strike this time is not small. After all, from Lviv in the far west, Odessa by the sea, to the capital Kyiv and Kharkov in the east, they were all bombed. For a strike of this magnitude, the use of dozens of missiles is certainly indispensable.
But what the Ukrainian army is now saying about the use of 122 missiles by the Russian army is definitely an overestimate.
Because the Russian army's current missile strikes will also use the "decoy bomb" tactic, and according to the practice of the Ukrainian army, it has always been the practice of overreporting the number of Russian missile launches, and then reporting an ultra-high interception rate. Because the standard of "successful interception" of the Ukrainian army is also metaphysics, after all, intercepting with your face, you can say that you can't stop it, right?
This time, the Ukrainian army advertised that it successfully intercepted 87 out of 122 missiles and 27 out of 36 drones, reporting a 72% interception success rate. Compared with the previous ultra-high interception rate of the Ukrainian army, this time it is considered conservative.
Let's look at it the other way around, the Ukrainian army believes that it has not intercepted many Russian missiles and drones, because this at least represents how many Russian missiles and drones the Ukrainian army has recognized and hit the target. Then, on the basis of this most conservative data, a rough estimate of the strike effectiveness of the Russian army.
At least as far as this strategic offensive and defensive battle is concerned, the Ukrainian army believes that there are 35 missiles and 9 drones that have not been intercepted by themselves, what did these things hit, is it worth a 4,000-ton landing ship, I believe that the Ukrainian army must have a bottom in its heart.