The Soviet-German war was one of the most important battles in World War II, and the German army lost the initiative on the battlefield in the blitzkrieg. Many blame the defeat of the Germans on logistics and the length of the front, but this explanation does not seem to fully correspond to the reality. In fact, the German army had always occupied the initiative on the battlefield in the second half of 1941, and its mobile combat capability was far ahead of the Soviet army. However, the Germans lost the initiative on the battlefield in the Battle of Stalingrad, and the Soviets had the upper hand.
After in-depth analysis, it was found that the German army frequently adjusted the direction of operations, which led to the loss of their ability to maneuver quickly, and at the same time, it also allowed the Soviet army to Xi learn from the war and reverse the situation on the battlefield. The Soviet army won the blitzkrieg in the Great Patriotic War mainly by relying on three magic weapons, namely, the confidence to dare to fight and win, the strong war potential, and the fight of a just war. The Soviet Union regarded the Great Patriotic War as a battle of life and death, and all the soldiers who participated in the war had the spirit of dedication and paid the price of 27 million Soviet soldiers and civilians in exchange for the final victory of the war.
In addition, the Soviet army has a strong war potential, and the replenishment of troops and logistics is very rapid, forming a complete set of rapid mobilization mechanisms. At the same time, the Soviets believed that they were fighting a just war, and they held back a large number of the main German forces on the Eastern Front, providing strong support for the Allied victory in other theaters. The German army lost the initiative on the Eastern Front, which was mainly reflected in the frequent adjustment of the direction of operations. Although the Germans performed well in the second half of 1941, from August 1942 onwards, the situation on the battlefield made it difficult for front-line commanders to see the direction.
The Germans shifted from urban warfare to resource-centric battles, and frequently adjusted their playing style, giving the Soviets a respite. The Germans shifted their focus from Moscow to Kiev, allowing the Soviets valuable preparation time in the Moscow defense. In addition, the German army consumed too much strength in the battle for resources on the southern front, resulting in almost 70% of the major battles on the Eastern Front taking place on the southern front, and the German army was ultimately defeated by insufficient resources. Although the Soviet army lagged behind in mobility, it later gained the upper hand. This was due to the fact that the Soviet Union had a solid industrial base, which increased the guarantee of battlefield mobility.
After World War I, the Soviet Union attached great importance to the construction of industrial infrastructure, especially in the development of the military industry, which provided a guarantee for the later mobility of the Soviet army. In addition, the Soviet army learned Xi war in the war, taking the opponent as a teacher. Since the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviets have been looking for an opportunity to take revenge, developing a large number of tank forces to crush the German army's armor superiority. At the same time, the Soviet army had sufficient troops, timely replenishment of equipment, and the total strength reached a rare more than 10 million, and there was an advantage of tanks and artillery several times that of the German army.
In the Soviet-German war, the German army frequently adjusted the direction of operations and consumed strength, so that the Soviet army could learn from the war and Xi the war and reverse the situation on the battlefield. At the same time, the Soviet Union's foundation in industrial and military development, as well as its keen insight into the war and its ability to learn Xi, also provided strong support for the eventual victory. Therefore, the flexible use of capabilities and strategies was crucial, and the war potential and logistical support of the Soviet Union were also important factors in the victory of the war.