The chairman warned that going south was a dead end, but Zhang still insisted on going south.
While writing the series of articles on the four field generals, I noticed red.
The two protagonists of the 1st and 4th Front armies in the grassland separation incident are both called "Chairman". Both chairs are extraordinary personalities with deep experience and qualifications.
The division of the grass actually reflects the difference in views and the pattern of the two chairs. I would like to share some personal thoughts here, and I look forward to discussing, exchanging and criticizing them with my friends.
1) The two chairmen are both capable people, and the reason why Chairman Zhang went to the opposite is that Chairman Zhang has served as the chairman of the Central Executive Committee since the founding of the Soviet Union in November 1931, and since then he has had this title of chairman that has remained unchanged for a lifetime.
In 1931, Chairman Zhang entered the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet District and served as the secretary of the sub-bureau and chairman of the Military CommissionAfter entering the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area in 1932, he served as the chairman of the Northwest Military Commission.
Under Chairman Zhang's leadership, people in the Soviet region were Xi to call him Chairman Zhang. Both chairmen have participated in the great cause of the founding of the party and participated in the First National Congress, but Zhang's starting point is higher: he is a top student of Peking University, a student leader of the May Fourth Movement, a host of the First National Congress, and a member of the organizing committee.
It can be said that Chairman Zhang was also a capable person and capable person at that time. In the process of establishing the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base areas, especially the Sichuan-Shaanxi base areas, the Red Fourth Front Army grew from an army of more than 10,000 people to more than 80,000 in just over two years, which fully proved his organizational ability.
Even during the period of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region, he did not have any major faults except for the purge and indiscriminate killing. However, the expansion of this purge was the "true scripture" that the Soviet Union took back from the Soviet Union, and it existed not only in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui, but also in the Jiangxi Soviet region, and even in western Hunan and Hubei.
Red. Soon after the 1st and 4th Front armies met, contradictions arose between the two armies. The trigger for the incident was that Kaifeng, the head of the Central Propaganda Department, published an article criticizing Zhang in a mimeographed journal of the Red Army, which sparked controversy.
At the Zunyi Conference, only the issue of military line and command was resolved, but not the issue. In terms of propaganda, the Liusu faction still dominated, and their ideas remained popular.
The actual situation is that after Zhang's purge, most of the literate people among the cadres of the Red Fourth Front Army were killed, which was very cruel. Problems that could have been solved through education and guidance, but after the meeting, the Liusu faction still found fault with the cadres of the Red Fourth Front Army in every way, as they did when they first arrived in the Jiangxi Soviet District, accusing them of being "warlords", "bandits", "escapees", and so on.
As a matter of fact, after the division meeting, the most important problem for the two armies to solve is to unite, face the predicament together, find a way out, and other big problems. According to ***'s recollection, after the meeting, the chairman has always advocated unity and demanded that the overall situation be the priority.
However, the unhelpful accusations made by the troops not only aroused the dissatisfaction of the cadres of the Red Fourth Front Army, but also became an excuse for Zhang to provoke trouble.
2) What is the core issue of the dispute?On August 20, 1935, the Maoergai Conference was convened, and the main topic was the issue of strategic direction, and on the basis of the chairman's speech, a decision was formed to advance in the direction of Shaanxi and Gansu.
Mr. Zhu, Chairman Zhang, and others acted with the Left Route Army and did not attend the meeting. Then, the Right Army marched north through the meadows. However, Chairman Zhang refused to carry out the decision, delayed the north, and ordered Chen Changhao to lead the Right Route Army to the south.
In this way, Chen Changhao and many other generals were faced with a very delicate and thorny decision: should they follow the instructions of ** or should they obey Chairman Zhang's orders?
Most of the Liusu factions who were in power at that time were supporters of Wang Ming. During Zhang's time in the Soviet Union, the struggle with Wang Ming was fierce. At the beginning of the meeting, Kaifeng published an article criticizing Zhang, precisely because of their historical grievances.
Zhang was originally dissatisfied with the unrealistic "28 and a half Bolsheviks", but at this time, he happened to borrow Kaifeng's article to determine that there was a problem with the above route, that it was a wrong route, which led to the loss of the Jiangxi Soviet District, not just the military line, and then proposed to solve the route problem.
In fact, he is about to change the leadership. At the Zunyi meeting, the chairman also admitted that there were problems with the route of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression, but first, on the Long March at that time, the first thing to be solved was the problem of survival and the problem of military commandSecond, the route problem is more complex, more extensive, and more difficult to solve, and it is possible to solve it only in a relatively stable environment.
Later, the Yan'an Rectification Movement finally solved this problem. Therefore, from the perspective of the overall interests of the organizational level, it is inappropriate for Zhang to propose to solve the problem of the route at this time.
He himself is not unaware of this. But he had his purpose, which was to take advantage of the strength of the Red Fourth Front Army and take the opportunity to reorganize the leadership in order to gain supreme power. This is the core of the battle between the north and the south.
This battle between the south and the north shows the two leaders' completely different strategic thinking. This can be seen from the following aspects: First, going south means predicament, and going north is hope.
Since the September 18 Incident, Japan's continuous aggression against China has gradually become the main contradiction in China at that time. In order for the Red Army to survive and develop, it must adapt to this situation.
For the Red Army to gain popular support, it had to take the anti-Japanese banner as its banner. Because the Japanese invaders were in the north, the resistance to Japan had to advance north. Therefore, putting forward the strategy and banner of "going north to resist Japan" is also the fundamental reason for insisting on going north.
In the southward movement of the Chuankang region, first, it deviated from the front line of resistance against Japan, second, it was surrounded by mountains, and third, it was an ethnic area, so it could only be divided into one side, and there was no great development.
In the social conditions of the time, there was certainly no way out. This point was made very clear in a telegram sent to Zhu Zhangliu on September 8, 1935. But Zhang was unmoved, insisted on going south, and shouted slogans such as "fight to Chengdu and eat rice".
Therefore, the chairman said to the cadres of the Red Fourth Front Army many times: "Going south is a dilemma, but going north is hope." ”
At the Ningdu Conference in October 1932, the chairman lost command of the Red Army, which he had created. But for the sake of the organization, he endured humiliation and obeyed the organization's decisions.
At the Zunyi Conference, he did not use his advantages to fight for power, but in order to maintain unity, he left the issue of line to be solved in the future. Popular.
After the 1st and 4th Front armies met, he insisted on going north, repeatedly explaining and patiently persuading for the development of the organization and the general interests of the nation.
Even when he had to break up, he still proceeded from maintaining unity, always remained patient, did not do things in the end, and had hope and a way out for the Red Fourth Front.
Zhang, on the other hand, took advantage of the dominant position of the Red Fourth Front army and insisted on going south, on the one hand, to eliminate Wang Ming's power, and on the other hand, for personal ambition.
On October 5, 1935, Zhang held a meeting in Zhuo Mujie, openly set up a separate door, proclaimed himself "temporary chairman", and even expelled Mao, Zhou, Zhang, and Bo from the organization, completely ignoring the interests of the organization.
This is ample evidence that his motives for going south were self-interested, not for the well-being of the organization. In the early morning of September 10, 1935, the chairman led the Red Army to the north first, and he said to Li Te, the chief of education of the Red University: "We will go north to resist Japan, and we will take the first step."
I believe that the Quartet will come later, and we will be united. These two sentences were not only two prophecies, but also fulfilled a year later and less than two years later: the Red Fourth Front Army followed this road to the north, and the Red Army also rushed to the anti-Japanese battlefield and grew stronger, becoming the mainstay of the War of Resistance.