Chiang's military defeat on the mainland has become a hot topic on the Internet, and it is believed that Chiang's indecision, lack of foresight and wanton intervention in the three major strategic decisive battles of the Liberation War led to many missed opportunities to turn defeat into victory. Wei Lihuang, Du Yuming and others complained at the review meeting after the defeat in Northeast China that Jiang was mediocre in employing people, resulting in no one being able to unify the command. Even Li Zongren said that if Mr. Chiang did not indiscriminately overstep his command, the elite of Chiang's army outside the customs would not be completely lost, and North China would not be wiped out. In addition, after the Chiang clan tore up the Chongqing peace agreement, Wei Lihuang passively avoided the war, and it was not until Chen Cheng was defeated by President Lin that he was reremembered and assigned to go to the northeast to clean up the mess. Wei Lihuang adopted a strategy of focusing on holding large cities in the northeast, intending to rely on strong city defenses to thwart our army's offensive and consume our army's strength, and then take advantage of the situation to attack, regain lost territory, and expand territory. However, Mr. Lin conquered Liaoyang, Anshan, and Siping in less than a month, so that Wei Lihuang had to give up his fantasy of expanding his territory in the Northeast. Lao Jiang's request for reinforcements in the northeast was fruitless, which also made Wei Lihuang work up and down. In the end, in Lin Zong's winter offensive, Wei Lihuang could only order to defend the besieged city, but he was unable to send reinforcements.
At the suggestion of the US military advisers, Lao Chiang began to consider a full-scale retreat from the northeast before the imminent puppet state**, although the idea was only a coping move. However, when the Yan'an side strictly ordered ** to go south to Jinzhou and close the door to fight the dogs, Dongye's main force quickly appeared on the Beining line, which made Lao Jiang panic. He realized that the Yan'an operation was aimed at seizing control of the Northeast, and that the gains and losses of Jinzhou would determine the victory or defeat of Lao Chiang and the Communist Chairman in the Northeast. Lao Jiang urgently asked Wei Lihuang to gradually withdraw the troops stationed in Shenyang and Changchun to Jinzhou, and urgently formed a Hou Jingru corps to support Fan Hanjie in Jinzhou, because he lost the opportunity. However, Wei Lihuang did not agree with Lao Jiang's approach. He had a large army in Shenyang, but he was not in favor of breaking through or supporting. This sparked a fierce argument between him and Lao Jiang, because he not only opposed cooperating with Hou Jingru's corps to attack Jinzhou, but also opposed the Changchun defenders abandoning the city and breaking through and moving closer to Shenyang and Jinzhou. Wei Lihuang's wait-and-see attitude in Shenyang was puzzling, and people began to speculate whether he was saving Chiang's forces or obstructing Chiang's support operations.
* In the original plan, Zheng Dongguo of Changchun and his troops were the targets he wanted to conquer, but due to pressure from Yan'an, ** gave up the prey eaten in the first battle. The defenders of Changchun were besieged by the Dongye troops for more than a month and fell into an unsolvable predicament. However, this also restrained the Dongye troops and relieved the defensive pressure on Shenyang and Jinzhou. Wei Lihuang was far-sighted and saw more clearly than Lao Jiang that it would be more cost-effective for them not to rescue. He knew that even if reinforcements came to the rescue, it would be in vain. Therefore, after the end of the winter offensive that year, more than 70% of the northeast had become liberated areas, and Chiang's army could only stick to Shenyang, Changchun, Jinzhou and other big cities and was on the defensive. Wei Lihuang gave up the defense of the city and chose to stick to Shenyang, which was due to his strategic considerations. He was well aware that once his army got out of the fortified city, wherever it went, it would quickly attract siege or blockade from all directions. Therefore, Wei Lihuang rejected Lao Jiang's plan not to rescue Jinzhou or Changchun, because he had realized that the troops in his hands and the territory he occupied could no longer cope. In contrast, Wei Lihuang's conservative tactics were wiser than Chiang's non-divisive thoughts about Jinzhou and Changchun.
He knew very well that holding on to Shenyang and holding his troops would avoid the accelerated rout of Chiang's army in the northeast and allow the old Chiang to linger on the mainland for a longer period of time. Although Wei Lihuang's decision was supported by Liao Yaoxiang, commander of Chiang's corps, and others, it was opposed by Hou Jingru's corps, which was assembled in Huludao. Hou Jingru drew a pie for Lao Jiang to attack Jinzhou, forcing Liao Yaoxiang to agree to Lao Chiang's plan to send troops to aid Jinzhou. In the face of Lao Jiang's urging, Wei Lihuang insisted on his own point of view, believing that sending troops from Shenyang was to send them to death. He knew very well that Liao Yaoxiang's corps needed to cross the terrain that was not conducive to the operation of heavy and large corps when it went south to assist Jinzhou, and. Mr. Lin. Forces have been deployed there in preparation for interdiction. Wei Lihuang's prophecy came true, and Liao Yaoxiang's corps was annihilated in the Western Liaoning Corridor. In fact, Wei Lihuang was giving up the small to protect the big and the car to protect the commander, he wanted to protect the many Jiang troops in Shenyang, and the defenders of Changchun and Jinzhou were abandoned. Wei Lihuang made two suggestions to Lao Chiang: first, the troops in Shenyang should remain stationary, and second, when the main forces of Dongye were all empty in Jinzhou and southern Liaoning, rush to Yingkou and withdraw from the northeast by sea. It can be said that Wei Lihuang's suggestion directly points to Mr. Lin's weakness.
Mr. Lin's plan at that time was to capture Jinzhou first, then Jinxi's "Eastern Advance Corps", and finally Shenyang. If Lao Chiang adopted Wei Lihuang's plan, he would be able to open up Yingkou and meet Shenyang by sea, so that Jiang's plan to withdraw from the northeast and his plan to advance from the east and west and attack Jinzhou would be interfered with, confusing Lin Zong, thus firmly attracting the attention of Yan'an and Lin Zong. After the main force of Higashino reacts, it may be too late. Even if they were lucky enough to pursue to Yingkou, it would be difficult to annihilate all the enemy forces in the northeast. Regarding Wei Lihuang's plan, the chairman sent a special letter to Mr. Lin in 1948 to remind him, saying that Jiang Jun was urgently collecting 10,000-ton ships in Tianjin, Tanggu and other places, and was preparing to rush to Yingkou. It can be seen from this that the tens of thousands of Chiang troops stationed in Shenyang still have a great chance of withdrawing from the northeast by sea under Wei Lihuang's plan. It's just that Lao Jiang has been obsessed with his aid plan to ensure the smooth land gateway from the Northeast to North China, but he missed this opportunity to escape. From another point of view, if Lao Jiang accepted Wei Lihuang's plan to hold on to Shenyang, contain President Lin and block North China, he would not have lost so badly in the Northeast. Holding on to Shenyang and holding on to the troops, although it seems to be waiting for death, it can greatly consume the strength of Lin Zong's Dongye troops.
You must know that the vast majority of the tens of thousands of Chiang's troops stationed in Shenyang were the elite of the old Chiang's cronies, including the New First Army, the New Sixth Army, the Third Army, and the Sixth Army. Shenyang's strong fortifications are far from being comparable to Changchun and Jinzhou, and it is unique to attack a large city garrisoned by 10,000 enemy troops. Before going south to attack Jinzhou, Lin Zong was defeated in his two captures of Changchun, and because the city defense was strong and the defenders were tenacious, he had to adopt the time-consuming and labor-intensive method of encircling on all sides and besieging for a long time. The psychological shadow of the bloody battle in Siping may also shake Mr. Lin's determination and will to capture Shenyang. Some people may say that after the occupation of Changchun and Jinzhou, Shenyang became a helpless and isolated city, in a desperate situation surrounded by our army, so will Wei Lihuang and the defenders in the city launch a peaceful uprising and take the initiative to disarm and surrender?Despite this possibility, the chances of realization are not great. It can be seen from Liao Yaoxiang's attitude after being captured that these old Jiang's cronies will definitely not automatically put down their ** and surrender. Hu Lian's corps, especially his Tiger Regiment, was besieged by the combined siege of the Nakano and Huaye troops, and refused to surrender, perhaps a microcosm. Therefore, it seems that although Wei Lihuang's advice is much more clever than that of Lao Jiang, it still cannot save the fate of the Northeast.
If Lao Chiang listened to the advice of sticking to Shenyang, containing **, blocking North China, or choosing to abandon the small to protect the big and flee to Yingkou, he might be able to delay the entry of **, or let tens of thousands of ** in Shenyang withdraw from the northeast, but it still could not save Lao Chiang's fate of military defeat on the mainland and finally fleeing to Taiwan Island.