The starting point is much lower than Nie Shuai, why did Luo Shuai, who had been Nie Shuai's subordinate for many years during the Red Army period and the early stage of the Anti-Japanese War, sit before Nie Shuai, and the vast land came to analyze for Wenyou:
1. Compared with the resumes of Luo and Nie Ershuai during the Red Army period, Luo Shuai is slightly inferior to Nie Shuai;In the early stage of the Anti-Japanese War, Luo Shuai's qualifications were slightly inferior to Nie Shuai's, and after 1938, the qualifications of the second marshal gradually leveled out.
Nie Shuai had the ambition of saving the country through industry when he was young, went to France in 1919 to work and study, transferred to the Department of Chemical Engineering of the Labor University of Charlevoix in Belgium in 1922, joined the Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe in August 1922, was in charge of the Belgian branch with Liu Bojian, changed to the party in 1923, and entered the Eastern University in Moscow in October 1924 to study Xi, and then transferred to the Red Army School of the Soviet Union, returned to China in 1925 as the secretary of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy and political instructor, and later served as the special commissioner of the Military Department of the Guangdong District Committee, and after the start of the Northern Expedition, he served as the special commissioner of the Military Commission, Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Military Commission, in July 1927, he served as the secretary of the Military Commission of the former Committee, participated in the leadership of the Nanchang Uprising, served as the representative of the 11th Army Party, and later participated in the leadership of the Guangzhou Uprising, arrived in Shanghai in May 1930, served as the Chief of Staff of the Military Commission in 1931, and was later transferred to the ** Soviet District, served as the deputy director of the General Political Department and the political commissar of the Red First Army, and began his cooperation career with Mr. Lin. In the anti-encirclement and suppression, the Long March to establish special honors. When the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, he served as the deputy commander and political commissar of the 115th Division. In November 1937, he was appointed commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, and led 3,000 soldiers to establish the first base area behind enemy lines in Wutai Mountain, which developed into a model base area with 72 counties, more than 12 million people, and a main force of 100,000 in 1939.
Luo Shuai only joined the regiment in April 1927 and then transferred to the party, in July to organize peasant armies in Nantong City, in the same year to participate in the Southern Hubei riot as the general representative, the department was incorporated into the ** 2nd Front Army Guard Regiment, as the party representative of the special service company, participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising on Jinggangshan, before and after the Red 1st Army 1st Division 1 Regiment Special Service Company Party Representative, 4th Army 11th Division 31 Regiment Battalion Party Representative, 2nd Column Party Representative, 1929 4th Army Front Committee Member, in August of the following year as Secretary of the Red 4th Army Military Commission, Political commissar, in March 1932, he served as the director of the Political Department of the Red First Army, and became Nie Shuai's main assistant in the politics of the First Army. After four anti-encirclement and suppression, Luo Shuai was affected by his support for the chairman and was reappointed as director of the Political Department of the Jiangxi Military Region. General Political Inspector, in September 1934, he served as the director of the Political Department of the 8th Army Corps, and after the withdrawal, he served as the deputy director of the Red 1st Army Corps during the Long March, and after graduating from Kang University, he served as the director of the rear political department of the Military Commission in January 1937, and the director of the Political Department of the Red 1st Army Corps in July, and the director of the Political Department of the 115th Division during the Anti-Japanese War. In August 1941, he was appointed secretary of the Shandong Military and Political Commission. In the winter of the same year, more than 50,000 Japanese puppet troops swept the base area in Luzhong, and the Shandong Branch and the 115th Division were surrounded in the area of Yishui Liutian. In March 1943, he was appointed commander and political commissar of the Shandong Military Region, political commissar of the 115th Division, acting division commander, and secretary of the Shandong Branch, and became the number one leader of the party, government, and army in Shandong.
In the autumn of 1938, Luo Shuai's position was finally leveled with Nie Shuai. During the Red Army, Luo Shuai's qualifications were inferior to Nie Shuai;During the Anti-Japanese Period, Luo Shuai's military qualifications were first inferior to Nie Shuai, and then he was on an equal footing.
2. During the War of Liberation, the positions of Luo Shuai and Nie Shuai were basically equal.
Nie Shuai served as the military chief of the strategic zone for a long time, first as commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, and later as commander of the North China Military Region.
Luo Shuai led the 60,000 main forces and 20 key regiments of the Shandong Military Region to the Northeast, and worked with General Lin to build a team, successively serving as the Second Political Commissar of the Northeast People's Autonomous Army, the General Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, and in 1946, he served as the Deputy Secretary of the Northeast Bureau and the Political Commissar of the Dongye.
Luo Shuai has no advantage over Nie Shuai in the army. In terms of military ranks, military officers have a clear advantage over political officers. Then why is Nie Shuai seated after Luo Shuai?(Row.
Seventh, Nie ranked ninth, and there was a Xu Shuai between the two. ）
The main reason is that there is a big difference between the military talents of the two and the military personnel talents of their partners, which directly leads to the level of military merits of the two.
First of all, compared with the military talents of the two, Luo Shuai is slightly better.
During the Anti-Japanese War, Luo Shuai personally commanded the Liutian Breakout, which shows his outstanding military talentLuo Shuai is also remarkable militarily in the Northeast, and the Northeast strategy of "getting out of the city and occupying both sides" has his wisdomHe personally did the formation of the Northeast Second Line Corps;Strongly advocate the first attack on Jinzhou, and its strategic vision is highlighted;In his long-term military career, while Luo Shuai showed his political talent, his military talent was not much inferior, especially after he led his troops to Shandong, his comprehensive military talent should be above Chen Shuai and Nie Shuai!
Nie Shuai's main military assistants, Xiao Ke and Yang Chengwu in the early stage are not at the same level as Luo Shuai's partner Mr. Lin, even if Yang Dezhi, who performed well in the later stage, is inferior to Mr. Lin. Xu Shuai only had a first deputy commander in North China, mainly commanding the First Corps in North China, which was formed by 40,000 local troops from Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan. If Nie Shuai served as the political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and the North China Military Region, Xu Shuai, who was good at large corps operations, would command the military;Or copy the early model of Huaye, with Nie Shuai as the commander and political commissar, and the military command will be handed over to Xu Shuai, and Nie Shuai's position will most likely be moved forward.
According to Nie Shuai's memoirs and the military history of North China, although Nie Shuai was good at political work and base area construction, because he commanded the large corps and had a slightly inferior strategic vision, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and later the North China Field Corps could not compete with the second, third, and fourth field fields, and in the early days, it was even inferior to the Northwest Field Corps, which started with more than 20,000 people from Peng.
Nie Shuai was first intoxicated by the results of the Chongqing negotiations, and arranged for a large number of veterans to be discharged from the military region.
Subsequently, in the battles of Datong, Jining, and Zhangjiakou, he was deceived by Fu Zuoyi twice and suffered a lot. In particular, after the loss of Zhangjiakou, E Yousan led his troops to break into the hinterland of central Hebei and implemented the strategy of burning, killing, and looting, which caused serious damage to the personnel and materials of our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei region, and directly affected the sustainable development of our army in Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei. It was not until Mr. Zhu arrived in North China that he suggested that the ** Military Commission reuse and guide Yang Dezhi and other generals that the passive situation of the Nie Department changed. After the Zhengtai Campaign, the Qingfengdian Campaign, and the Shijiazhuang Campaign, the morale was greatly boosted, but when Nie was in command, there were almost no famous battles in which more than 100,000 enemies were annihilated alone, and the Taiyuan Campaign was commanded by Xu Shuai and Peng, except for the exception. Battle of Pingjin, North China.
The second and third two corps were only to assist in entering the pass. Yang Dezhi's 19th Corps (under the jurisdiction of three armies) and Yang Chengwu's 20th Corps (under the jurisdiction of three armies), the headquarters of Nie in North China, had more than 200,000 people.
Literary friends will say that Nie Bu supported the Northeast too hard. Speaking from the heart, in the early days when Nie was ordered to leave the customs in various strategic areas of our army, he did organize 11 main regiments of the eastern Hebei and central Hebei military regions to go to the eastern part of the country. Later, the Jirecha, Jireliao Military Region, and Jidong Military Region were transferred to the northeast, and there should be reasons for the ineffective operation in North China.