On the battlefield in Vietnam, the confrontation between the Vietnamese army and the French ** team has always attracted much attention. Among them, an ambush battle that took place in Dongxi has become a good story in the history of warfare. This article will provide an in-depth analysis of the strategic planning behind the Vietnamese army, showing the patience and wisdom of the Vietnamese army in the face of the French ** team.
The Vietnamese army's operation to capture Dong Stream was not unguarded. The French were aware of the build-up of Vietnamese troops before 16 September, and intelligence from all sides indicated that a major offensive was about to be launched along Route 4. However, the commander-in-chief of the French army, General Cabonjie, only issued an order on 16 September for the defenders of the strongholds on Highway 4 (Lang Son, Chi Khe, Dong Kye, Cao Binh) to retreat. On the same day, the Battle of Dongxi broke out and became a fierce showdown.
Kabangje quickly dispatched Colonel Le Barge, who was stationed in Lang Son, to lead reinforcements to Dong Kye, while the 1st French parachute battalion also landed in Cha Creek on the 18th, and Le Barge led three North African infantry battalions to Chi Creek on the 19th. However, as the Vietnamese army had already occupied Dong Kye, the French reinforcements could not arrive at the critical moment.
After the Vietnamese army conquered Dongxi, Gao Ping became an isolated city, and there were still more than 1,600 French troops. Chen Geng judged that it was impossible for the French army to abandon Gaoping, and it was expected that the French army would definitely be reinforced from Qixi. In order to prevent the French from aiding Cao Ping, Chen Geng, after consulting with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, decided to cancel the order of the 308th Division to attack Qixi and continue to set up an ambush and wait for reinforcements. Chen Geng wrote in his diary on September 20: "It was decided to stop Operation Qixi and strike at the enemy advancing north. Two regiments were located in Dongxi, three regiments were located in the southeast mountains of Dongxi, and two battalions were located in the southwest mountains, arranged in a bag-shaped manner, and when the enemy advanced to the south of Dongxi, they would make a pincer attack and annihilate most or part of it. ”
Kabonje and the French commander of the North Vietnamese, Alessandri, were both veterans of World War I and World War II, and they understood that the main force of the Vietnamese army was gathering in the area of Dongxi, so they decided to adopt the strategy of "encircling Wei and saving Zhao". In order to rescue the defenders of Gaoping, it was necessary to transfer the main force of the Vietnamese army away from Dongxi and let the French army of Qixi go north, so that the main force of the Vietnamese army was exposed to the attack range.
The key to encircling Wei and saving Zhao is to attack it and save it. The French army decided to attack Tai Nguyen, the location of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and assembled five battalions of troops to launch an attack on Tai Yen on September 20. However, this ploy was seen through by the Vietnamese army. Chen Geng and Ho Chi Minh decided to abandon the area to join the French army regardless of Taiyuan, believing that the French army would continue to cooperate with the Vietnamese army in an ingenious ambush battle.
By September 23, Ho Chi Minh voluntarily abandoned Taiyuan, but Kabangjie's plan did not achieve its goal. On 30 September, the French could not bear it, and Le Barge received a telegram from General Arisandri, ordering him to occupy Dongxi on 2 October. However, because the main forces of the Vietnamese army at Dongxi did not withdraw, Highway No. 4 was severely damaged, and the air force was unable to support it, and the French army found it extremely difficult to occupy Dongxi. The command gave the order for an urgent departure.
On the evening of September 30, Le Barge led more than 3,000 French troops from Qixi to Dongxi. Aware of the dangers of the trip, he told one of his subordinates: "We will never return." However, due to various reasons, including ambushes and resistance from the Vietnamese army, the French army's plan could not be carried out smoothly.
The Vietnamese 308th Division had been anxiously awaiting reinforcements during the 14-day ambush. They set up in ambush on the hills on both sides of the road, exposed to the sun and rain, and the waiting was unusually long. Chen Geng also wrote in his diary: "This battle is very important, if this battle can annihilate two small regiments (battalions), then there will be no problem in capturing Gaoping." What I am worried about is that Dongxi will scatter the enemy and flee back to Qixi, revealing that my main force is here, and I am afraid that if the enemy does not advance, I will have no battle to fight, which is a nerve-wracking matter. ”
In the course of the confrontation between the Vietnamese army and the French army, the 308th Division of the Vietnamese army found that the French reinforcements had not arrived for a long time, which made the Vietnamese leadership unbearable, and some officers even asked to withdraw. However, under the guidance of Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese army decided to stick to the original plan.
By the morning of October 1, Lebarge had finally stepped into the ambush circle of the 308th Division. However, due to the fact that some units of the Vietnamese army withdrew their positions without the consent of the headquarters due to the lack of food supplies after the ambush, the French army escaped at a critical moment. This turned the planned ambush into a jungle chase.
Mei Jiasheng proposed to occupy positions in the mountain pass 10 kilometers south of Dongxi and cut off the rear route of the French army. Tran Geng asked the 308th Division to speed up its return, and Ho Chi Minh called for the annihilation of Le Barge's forces. In this jungle pursuit, the Vietnamese army skillfully used the terrain and ambush tactics to gradually reduce the distance with the French army.
On the morning of October 2, the French army carried out an airdrop in an attempt to strengthen itself. However, this operation turned out to be a fatal mistake for the French army. Soldiers from a separate battalion of the Vietnamese army spotted the French and quickly launched an attack, but the French failed to understand the specific situation of the Vietnamese army, which eventually led to heavy losses for the French army in the area controlled by the Vietnamese army. In the confusion, the French army led by Le Barge failed to assemble smoothly and was flanked by the Vietnamese army.
At the critical moment, Vu Nguyen Gia hesitated, and after Chen Geng consulted with Ho Chi Minh, Ho Chi Minh directly asked Vu Nguyen Gia to annihilate Le Barge's troops. Eventually, the Vietnamese army launched a fierce pursuit battle at Gu Du Mountain, surrounding the French regiments. In this ambush battle, the French army was finally unable to resist the encirclement and suppression of the Vietnamese army, and Le Barge's troops were defeated and retreated under the pursuit of the Vietnamese army.
At the critical moment, Ho Chi Minh personally climbed the mountain, confronted the two armies, and wrote poems to express his support for the Vietnamese army. On the night of 3 October, when the French were no longer able to move north, Le Barge commanded his troops to leave the road and try to penetrate the Vietnamese encirclement from the southwest. However, the Vietnamese army detected the movements of the French army in time and launched a pursuit. By 5 October, the two sides had been engaged in a day of fierce fighting at Gudu Mountain, and finally the Vietnamese army succeeded in cornering the French army.
Chen Geng was full of emotion, and he wrote in his diary that day: "Vietnam and the French Emperor are really a wonderful pair of opponents, and the combat effectiveness of the two sides is comparable. The French Emperor never took the initiative to rush forward, and every time he put on a fight. The sluggishness and inactivity of the Vietnamese troops were beyond my expectations. Therefore, almost every time there is a fight, a stalemate is formed. ”
The Vietnamese army showed patience, wisdom and rich combat experience in this ambush battle. They were adept at using the terrain and adopting flexible tactics to successfully trap the French army. The whole process showed the outstanding performance of the Vietnamese army in strategic planning and tactical execution, and became a legend in the Vietnam War.
This article details a brilliant and strategically in-depth ambush battle in the Vietnam War, and the patience and wisdom of the Vietnamese army in the face of the French ** team are impressive. Throughout the battle, the Vietnamese commanders Tran Geng and Ho Chi Minh gave full play to their strategy and decisiveness, successfully leading the French into an ambush circle, demonstrating the superb tactical level of the Vietnamese army.
First of all, the article describes the accurate analysis and judgment of the Vietnamese army's movements of the French army, as well as the strategy of Kabangjie and Alisandri to encircle Wei and save Zhao. Through careful observation of the actions of the French army and a thorough analysis of the thinking of the French commanders, the Vietnamese army successfully gained insight into the intentions of the French army, which enabled the ambush plan to be effectively implemented.
Secondly, the Vietnamese army showed superb tactical literacy in ambush warfare. The cancellation of the attack plan on Seven Rivers and the choice of setting up an ambush and waiting for reinforcements demonstrated the deep understanding and high decision-making power of Tran Geng and Ho Chi Minh on the battle situation. The Vietnamese army took advantage of the terrain and ambush tactics to skillfully lead the French into the ambush area, giving full play to battlefield flexibility and superior strategic vision.
In the pursuit battle, the Vietnamese army's effective flanking and blocking of the French army showed their rich experience and excellent execution in actual combat. In the face of the French army's airdrops and reinforcements, the Vietnamese army reacted quickly and successfully cut off the French army's rear route, making the French army fall into a passive situation.
At the end of the article, Chen Geng's diary expresses the Vietnamese army's confidence and persistence in this ambush battle. The patience, wisdom and decisiveness of the Vietnamese army not only won the victory in this battle, but also reflected the high level of the overall strategy of the Vietnamese army. This article provides readers with an opportunity to gain insight into the tactics and decision-making processes of the Vietnamese military in the Vietnam War, and is a fascinating historical essay on the war.
In general, through vivid descriptions and detailed narratives, this article successfully shows the superb strategy and excellent execution shown by the Vietnamese army in the face of the French ** team, so that readers can have a deeper understanding of the details of this historical fierce battle and the strategic thinking behind it.
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