From December 12th to 13th, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China paid a state visit to Vietnam upon invitation. During the talks between the General Secretary and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong, the two sides determined the new positioning of the relations between the two parties and two countries between China and Vietnam, and announced that they would work together to build a China-Vietnam community with a shared future of strategic significance on the basis of deepening the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.
As the most important political outcome of this visit, what is the profound meaning of the expression "building a China-Vietnam community with a shared future of strategic significance"?If we look at the actual actions, the China-Laos Railway and the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway have already been opened to traffic, but why has there been no substantive project to promote the China-Vietnam railway cooperation that has been called for many years?China and Vietnam are "connected by mountains and rivers and shared by culture", and what is the real situation of people-to-people interaction?Focusing on related issues, Observer.com interviewed Professor Zhao Weihua, an expert on Vietnam and director of the Center for Relations between China and Neighboring Countries at Fudan University.
Sino-Vietnamese relations. Observer.com: How do you understand the expression "a strategically important China-Vietnam community with a shared future"?
Zhao Weihua: "A strategically significant China-Vietnam community with a shared future" is now a hot entry, and it is being discussed at home and abroad. In fact, this sentence was put forward a long time ago, and it was only during this visit to Vietnam that it was officially written into the Sino-Vietnamese joint statement.
In the past, when the Chinese side mentioned the "China-Vietnam community with a shared future", the Vietnamese side did not react very positively because it had certain concerns about the term "community with a shared future". Differences should not be allowed, but should be emphasized that the two countries have common interests in safeguarding political security and building socialism, that the overall interests of the two countries far outweigh their differences, and that the two countries can cooperate in the overall interests beyond local differences.
Although the Chinese and Vietnamese texts are slightly different, it is important that the Vietnamese side accepts the expression that China and Vietnam are "communities", which transcends the various strategic relations that Vietnam has established with all the West. This is a major shift in Vietnam's attitude towards the concept of "community" and a major breakthrough in China's diplomacy.
**The General Secretary arrived in Hanoi, Vietnam, by special plane. (Figure: CCTV news client).
Observer.com: The General Secretary put forward several suggestions on building a China-Vietnam community with a shared future, such as welcoming Vietnam's eight actions to actively align with high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. In this regard, the construction of the railway from Kunming in Yunnan Province to Haiphong in Vietnam has attracted wide attention. Considering the relationship between China and Vietnam, why is the railway cooperation between China and Vietnam so late compared to China and other Southeast Asian countries such as Laos and Indonesia?Another related question is what are the reasons for the delay in the rollout of the eastern line of the Trans-Asian Railway
Zhao Weihua: There is a practical basis for the railways between China and Vietnam, for example, from Hanoi to Yunnan via Lao Cai and Hekou, and from Hanoi to Guangxi via Dong Deng, but now that the China-Laos Railway and the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway have been completed, the China-Vietnam Railway docking has not yet started. Last year, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong reached a consensus on this issue, but all sectors of Vietnamese society have been discussing and arguing on this issue and have not taken action for a long time.
I've also talked to experts in Vietnam about this, and most of them agree that the first is a security concern. On the one hand, these are related to the fact that China and Vietnam still have differences on certain local issues, and more importantly, they are instigated by certain foreign forces.
The second concern is funding**.
Building high-speed rail is very expensive. As early as 2016, relevant Japanese companies assessed the construction cost of Vietnam's north-south high-speed railway, which was 50 billion US dollars at that time, and Vietnam's GDP was only 200 billion US dollars that year. Spending 1 4 GDP to build a high-speed railway, the Vietnamese National Assembly will definitely not agree.
In November this year, Vietnam's Ministry of Transport gave three more plans, some of which planned to build a high-speed railway with a speed of 350 km/h, and some of which planned to build a high-speed railway with a speed of 250 km/h. The budget assessment of these three plans requires a minimum of US$67.2 billion and a maximum of US$72 billion – although Vietnam's GDP has increased to more than US$400 billion last year, these versions of the budget still exceed 17 of GDP. Moreover, this is only the money for the construction of the high-speed railway, not including the cost of land acquisition along the wayIf you add the land requisition fee, it may be even more difficult for Vietnam to accept. So Vietnam is now trying to enlist as much external support as possible.
Although the Vietnamese leaders also continued to promote the connection of the China-Vietnam railway during their visit to China, so that Vietnamese goods could be exported to China, and at the same time open up the land channel from Vietnam to Europe, the funding gap is indeed a difficult problem to solve.
The third influencing factor is the involvement of major powers.
A few days ago, relations between the United States and Vietnam were upgraded, and Vietnam also took the opportunity to ask the United States to help Vietnam build infrastructure. In fact, as early as 2018, Daniel Kritenbrink, then the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam — who is now Biden's assistant secretary of state for Asia-Pacific affairs — proposed that the United States should use its influence to mobilize Western multinational companies to participate in Vietnam's infrastructure construction and prevent Vietnam from falling into the so-called "debt trap" and "sovereignty trap".
For the purpose of balancing China, the United States has tried to instigate and undermine Sino-Vietnamese relations, and Vietnam has been affected by it to a certain extent and has many concerns about China-Vietnam railway cooperationSecond, Vietnam also wants to wait and see, hoping to get a construction plan that is most beneficial to itself.
The fourth influencing factor is the competition between China and Japan.
Both China and Japan have relatively mature high-speed rail technology, and now Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh has invited Japan to participate in the construction of Vietnam's north-south high-speed railway three times. However, the main body of Japan's high-speed rail construction is enterprises, and capital is to make money, while Vietnam's high-speed rail investment is large, and it involves various factors such as demolition and relocation along the way, so it is more cautious about Pham Minh Zheng's invitation.
By a single country or enterprise to undertake the construction of the north-south high-speed railway, Vietnam is not only worried about homeland security, but also worried about follow-up maintenance - when bidding, they may give Vietnam a preferential **, and when the follow-up maintenance is needed, ** is up to one party, and then the maintenance cost may be a bottomless pit.
Therefore, Vietnam now prefers to divide the 1,500-kilometer north-south high-speed railway into several sections, some of which are built by China, and some are responsible for Japanese companies, but no matter which party is built, they need to be in accordance with unified technical standards, so that if there is a problem with the part of Japanese companies in the future, Chinese companies can maintain it, and vice versa.
To put it bluntly, Vietnam does not want the construction of the North-South high-speed railway to be monopolized by one country or enterprise;Choosing between two large countries, it is a small country with limited funds, so it hopes to get the best ** and maximize its benefits.
When talking about the construction of the north-south high-speed railway, Vietnamese experts also mentioned the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway and the China-Laos high-speed railway. They believe that Indonesia's GDP and per capita GDP are higher than Vietnam's, and China has given Indonesia very favorable conditionsChina has also given great preferential treatment to Laos, and the construction of the North-South Railway may refer to the investment model of the China-Laos Railway.
The "Lancang" EMU train leaves Vientiane Station in Laos (Photo Xinhua News Agency).
The total investment of the China-Laos Railway is 5.9 billion US dollars, of which 40% is funded by China and Laos, and the remaining 60% is funded by the Laos-China Railway, a joint venture between China and Laos. Of this 40%, Laos originally needed to invest 7$300 million, in fact, only 2$500 million, the remaining $4US$800 million in concessional loans from China. The establishment of a joint venture between China and Laos is actually a Chinese company that pays for and Laos gives land - Laos not only provides the land for the construction of the China-Laos Railway, but also sets aside 1,500 hectares of land from four provinces and cities along the railway, namely Vang Vieng, Oudomxay Province, Luang Prabang City, and Vientiane City, for the Laos-China Railway Company to carry out infrastructure development, and also grants the joint venture company a 50-year concession right, after which the railway will be handed over to Laos**.
Vietnam hopes that the North-South Railway can be modeled after the investment model of the China-Laos Railway, which means that China will not only provide preferential loans, but also provide free assistance. However, from an objective point of view, there are many differences between Vietnam's north-south high-speed railway and the China-Laos railway.
The China-Laos Railway was originally designed as a high-speed railway, or at least a bullet train, but considering the geological conditions along the way and other practical factors, it was finally designed as a train with a maximum speed of 160 km/h, which is equivalent to China's express express, and the total length of the China-Laos Railway is relatively short. Vietnam's north-south high-speed railway, with a total length of more than 1,500 kilometers, requires an investment of at least US$67.2 billion, which is more than 10 times the total investment of the China-Laos railway, not including land requisition fees and other expenses. If the north-south high-speed railway is built in accordance with the investment model of the China-Laos railway, China's burden will be particularly large, and more importantly, it will be difficult for Vietnam to give China the conditions that Laos will give to China.
The Vietnamese side has now put forward a plan for time-based and sectional construction, that is, from 2025 to 2045, investment and construction in stages. In the absence of sufficient financial resources in Vietnam, it is a good way to invest according to priorities. That way, they don't have to worry about going into a lot of debt.
Observer.com: The talks also talked about the need to increase investment on the basis of public opinion, including "enhancing the feelings between the younger generation and consolidating the foundation of public opinion for China-Vietnam friendship". Because of the development of the Internet and the wide application of social networking such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok, people in many parts of the world, especially the younger generation, have a different understanding of China. As far as you know, what are the differences between the young generation in Vietnam in their perceptions and feelings towards China?
Zhao Weihua: Vietnamese people of different generations may have different feelings towards China.
I remember that when I accompanied the leaders of our Yunnan school to visit the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences more than 10 years ago, I met an old gentleman who studied Chinese, and he had a deep affection for China. I also know Mr. Nguyen Huy Gui, the former director of the Chinese Institute of Hallym Academy, who is in his 80s and studied in China, and they are all very friendly to China. Today's younger generation's perception of China is clearly diverse.
There are many young people who prefer China, while others prefer the United States. For example, in the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the eyes are full of atrocities committed by the US military, and the exhibition displays many deformed and disabled victims of the biological and chemical poisoning of the US military in Vietnam. Many Vietnamese teenagers visit every day, and the war is so far away and so damaging to Vietnam, but some of the teenagers who visit the museum still can't hide their love for the United States. I consulted experts at the Hanlin Academy in Vietnam about this phenomenon, and they just laughed and said, "Still, they do like the United States." "In general, the thinking of the younger generation in Vietnam is diverse, and different people have different perceptions of China and the United States.
Inside the War Remnants Museum (Photo: Vietnam News Agency).
Vietnamese diplomacy. Observer.com: You just mentioned that the United States and Vietnam upgraded their diplomatic relations in September this year, and the United States ** Biden visited Vietnam and signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" agreement with Nguyen Phu Trong - in Vietnam's diplomatic partnership hierarchy, the "comprehensive strategic partnership" belongs to the highest level, before the United States, Vietnam's "comprehensive strategic partners" are only China, Russia, Japan, India and South Korea. Therefore, many Western people interpret the general secretary's visit to Vietnam as a "check and balance against the United States", what do you think of this analysis?
Zhao Weihua: The West takes it for granted that the Chinese leader's visit to Vietnam is to "counterbalance the United States". It's all their cognitive mindset at work. As friendly neighbors linked by mountains and rivers, the relations between China and Vietnam are already very close, and the exchange of visits by high-level leaders is also very frequent. For example, after General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China last year, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and President Vo Van Thanh of Vietnam visited one after another, and then Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Vietnam in July.
A few days ago, a reporter from Vietnam's "Youth Daily" also shared a little information when interviewing me: In fact, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong sent a formal invitation to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in the first half of the year, and General Secretary also accepted the invitation of the Vietnamese side and decided to visit Vietnam within the year. In other words, even if Biden does not visit Vietnam, even if Vietnam-US diplomatic relations do not escalate, the general secretary's visit to Vietnam will still take place as scheduled. Therefore, there is no need to associate the friendly exchanges between China and Vietnam with the United States excessively.
Observer.com: When you participated in "This is China" a year ago, you clearly mentioned that the best choice for Vietnam is to stand between the two major powers of China and the United States, and compete to make the two major powers of China and the United States curry favor with Vietnam, convey benefits to Vietnam, and maximize Vietnam's interests. You also mentioned this when we first discussed the construction of the North-South high-speed railway. In fact, this is also the strategy of many countries when dealing with Sino-US relations, but in reality, their ideas may not be perfectly realized, for example, India also wants to profit from the competition between China and the United States, but Modi is constantly being "beaten" by the United States and the West. On Vietnam's side, apart from the "carrots" given by the United States, does the United States have any "big sticks" to accompany it?
Zhao Weihua: There must be this. The relationship between Vietnam and the United States is very close, China is Vietnam's largest partner, but we are mainly their commodity side, and the United States is Vietnam's largest commodity export market, Vietnam's annual exports to the United States of goods worth more than 100 billion US dollars, last year's surplus was 94.7 billion US dollars. Under normal circumstances, if the United States feels that its relationship with another country is unbalanced and it has suffered a serious loss, it will take action, just like Trump waged a war against China. In the face of the ** deficit with Vietnam, the United States basically has a tolerant attitude, mainly trying to use Vietnam to contain China.
The Vietnamese are very worried about their country's huge asymmetrical dependence on the United States, and they also know very well that as long as the United States wants to, it can still sanction Vietnam like sanctioning China, and China, as a big country, can withstand this kind of sanctions, while Vietnam is very difficult to survive. In addition, Vietnam has also assessed that in the Sino-US war and the scientific and technological war, the United States occupies the initiative position, and China is the defenderMoreover, unlike the United States, China will not sanction other countries without a bottom line like the United States, as long as it does not touch China's bottom line.
Vietnam is fully aware of its value to China and the United States, and although Vietnam insists on balancing the balance between China and the United States in its attitude toward the United States and toward China, it does not dare to offend the United States because of its heavy dependence on the United States in exports and its understanding of US hegemonic acts.
Therefore, in some highly competitive and strategically important high-tech fields between China and the United States, although China and the United States have their own advantages, and even some areas such as 5G technology, China is far ahead, but in order to avoid being sanctioned by the United States, Vietnam will still choose to cooperate with the United States or its alliesVietnam has only chosen to cooperate with China in some areas that do not involve strategic competition between China and the United States, such as e-commerce, agricultural products**, green energy, etc.