It is said that the Yangtze River is a natural trench, known as a moat, but in the face of an active attack, everything is in vain. After all, the Yangtze River is too long, and the basin area is vast, and if you choose a tributary or break through upstream, you can easily cross the river and fight and strangle the southern regime in the "gentle township".
In 588 AD, in the battle of the Sui to destroy Chen, the Sui army skillfully used the characteristics of the Yangtze River and carefully deployed, and finally set off a large-scale river crossing operation. The first thing the Sui Dynasty did was to depose Xiao Cong, the queen of the Western Liang, and occupy Jiangling (which was governed in today's Jingzhou). Jiangling is located in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and is the central city of the Jianghan Plain. With Jiangling as a base, Bashu can be controlled to the west, and Xianghan can be connected to the north, and the geographical location is not too good. In this way, the Sui Dynasty grasped the crucial step of attacking the Chen Dynasty.
At that time, the Sui army coordinated the eight routes of soldiers and horses, totaling more than 500,000, and marched across the river in the middle and upper reaches and the lower reaches. Among them, Yang Jun commanded the middle and upper reaches of the three roads, from Xiangyang to Tunhankou. This can block the midstream** and support the health of the downstream. At the same time, Yang Su went east from Yong'an (now Fengjie), Liu Renen, the assassin of Jingzhou, went out of Jiangling, and the three-way army finally met Hankou to drive and encircle and annihilate the ** in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yang Guang commanded five routes downstream to attack Jiankang, three of which were from Liuhe, Lujiang (now Hefei), Guangling (now Yangzhou) to besiege Jiankang, and the remaining two routes attacked Jiujiang and Wu County, and penetrated deep into the hinterland of the Chen Dynasty to respond to the main force.
Under such a subtle deployment, the Yangtze River is naturally not a moat, not to mention that Empress Chen relied on the "Yangtze River moat" and neglected defense, and it was inevitable that it would be destroyed by the Sui. There is another important reason for saying that the Yangtze River is not a moat, that is, to guard the river, we must guard the Huai, and to guard the Huai, we must guard Xu. The Huai here does not specifically refer to the Huai River, but the north-south passage between the Jiang and Huai rivers. The hinterland of the Jianghuai River is vast, there are continuous Dabie Mountains to divide the north and south, and the Xiangjiang River is connected with the Huai, the water network is dense, the transportation is very convenient, and the grain and grass and supplies can be transported. This is the place to buffer strategically.
In the land of Jianghuai, Xuzhou, which is located at the intersection of Bianshui and Surabaya, is even more important. The northern and southern regimes are in the Jianghuai tug-of-war, and Xuzhou bears the brunt of the battle and is the target of contention between the two sides. From the perspective of the southern regime, it is necessary to defend the Yangtze River, which can resist the army in the north, or at least the enemy in the Huai River area, so as to reduce the pressure on the defense of the Yangtze River. As far as the northern army heading south is concerned, it can first break through the strongholds in the Lianghuai area, and then concentrate its forces to carry out a large-scale river-crossing operation, and then it will be a matter of course to break the natural barrier of the Yangtze River.
The Huaihai Campaign, one of the three major battles, and the subsequent battle of crossing the river fully illustrate this point. Countless histories have proven that a river and a river can't stop anything. In the face of absolute power, the Yangtze River is naturally not a moat, nor is it a barrier, and it is rarely able to resist attacks from the north.
This article provides an insightful dissection of the underrated side of the Yangtze River in history and its pivotal role in warfare. Through historical events, especially the battle of Sui to destroy Chen in 588 AD, the article vividly shows that the Yangtze River is not a natural and insurmountable barrier. The Sui army made good use of the geographical advantages of the Yangtze River, and through careful deployment and attack, successfully achieved a large-scale river-crossing operation, and finally strangled the southern regime in "Gentle Township".
With a high historical vision, the author pointed out that the key to why the Yangtze River is not a moat lies in its length and the vastness of its basin, which makes everything seem futile in the face of an active attack. This perspective provides useful enlightenment for us to understand the strategic layout and military decision-making of historical wars.
The article describes in detail the strategic deployment of the Sui army, showing their deep understanding of the geographical environment and tactical flexibility of the Yangtze River region. By analyzing the coordinated operations of the Sui commanders Yang Jun, Yang Su, and Yang Guang in the middle and upper reaches, as well as the seizure of strategic places such as Jiankang and Jiangling, they showed their ingenious planning in the war.
The article also emphasized the strategic principle that to defend the Yangtze River must be guarded by Huai, and to defend the Huai River, it must be guarded by Xu. Through an in-depth analysis of the geographical advantages of the Jianghuai hinterland, especially the criticality of the Xuzhou region, the article highlights the important position of this region in the tug-of-war between the North and the South. This kind of strategic layout has not only been verified in historical wars, but also provided useful lessons for us to understand the military decisions made at that time.
Finally, the article summarizes the historical facts, emphasizing that the Yangtze River is not a natural barrier, but is difficult to resist in the face of absolute power. This provides us with inspiration for in-depth thinking about history and geography, and also enlightens us to understand the current world pattern and strategic decision-making.
Overall, this article provides a unique perspective on the position and role of the Yangtze River in historical warfare, providing readers with deeper historical thinking.
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