WM's"The fifteenth year of Wanli".
Summary:Wang Xing didn't wait for the car that should belong to him.
For WM, 2020 was an irrelevant year. This year, Weimar had no financial pressure, let alone layoffs and salary cuts. It even completed a record 10 billion Series D financing.
In addition to the spontaneous combustion incident, which has more or less occurred with other new energy vehicle companies, it did not affect WM's sales in the end.
But just like 1587 for Wanli and Daming, 2020 is the "fifteenth year of Wanli" for Weimar.
WM created 26The revenue of 700 million yuan is not bad in the new car-making forces. There is a gap between "Wei Xiaoli", but it is also more than 4 times that of Zero Run.
In 2015, Shen Hui acquired "WM Motor" to establish WM, and stood on the same starting line as "Wei Xiaoli". The start went smoothly, and in the first year of its establishment, it received 3 financings: Series A of $1 billion, 3 billion yuan of debt investment and low-interest loans, and Series A+ financing. $1 billion, equivalent to NIO's Series D, Ideal did not get such a large-scale single financing until it went public.
In 2017, WM received 4 more financings, and well-known investment institutions such as Tencent, Sequoia, etc. invested in olive branches.
With 7 sums of money and 10 billion funds in two years, Weimar has an obvious advantage in the competition of capital and has made a fantastic start. By 2017, WM had built its first car, the EX5. It is a month earlier than NIO's ES8. This year, He Xiaopeng just left Ali, and the ideal is also in the PPT car manufacturing stage.
At the beginning of 2020, in the face of Meituan Wang Xing's prediction that "the ideal will be among the top three new forces in car manufacturing", Shen Hui confidently launched a gamble:
If WM Motor can advance into the top three new car-making forces, I hope that Wang Xing, the founder of Meituan, can act as a takeaway brother and personally deliver a takeaway to the door, and the location will be designated by me; If WM fails to enter the top three, he will send a car to Wang Xing, which can be chosen from all brands, not necessarily WM Motor. ”
At the beginning of this year, WM has two cars, EX5 and EX6, with a three-electric system, an intelligent assistance system, and a technical matrix of interactive intelligent engines for the whole car. Completed about 1With 70,000 units delivered, it ranks second among new EV manufacturers. Revenues 17600 million, which is about the same as Xiaopeng, is 6 times the ideal.
Shen Hui naturally has this confidence.
Li Xiang said this when looking back on the entrepreneurial process:
For enterprises, the most important thing is to give full play to their own strengths ......For example, Tesla's early three-electric system capabilities, such as NIO's user service capabilities, such as Xpeng Motors' intelligent driving capabilities, and Li Auto's product capabilities for family user groups ......”
Shen Hui chose independent manufacturing capabilities.
At the beginning of its establishment, other new forces generally chose OEM. For example, NIO's JAC factory, the ideal Chongqing Lifan Changzhou factory, and Xpeng's Haima Zhengzhou factory ......Only Weimar spent a lot of money to build its own factory. "We are the first electric vehicle manufacturer in China to establish our own production facilities from the very beginning. Weimar prospectus said.
OEM and self-built factories are two sides of the same coin. OEM can save the process of applying for car manufacturing qualifications and part of the cost of building a factory by itself. However, self-built factories can ensure the workmanship of car companies.
Shen Hui said, "Which of the best factories will help you OEM products?" If I had chosen OEM production, I wouldn't have been able to sleep every day." This is the reason why Shen Hui chose to build his own factory.
As a result, in 2016, Weimar, which had just completed two financings, began to build its own factory in Wenzhou, with a production capacity of 100,000 units after the completion of the first phase. Subsequently, the construction of a larger-scale Huanggang plant is expected to produce 150,000 units per year in the first phase.
WM has invested heavily in the establishment of "Industry 40 manufacturing system", equipped with about 200 robots, the main production lines of the stamping, welding and painting shops are 100% automated. The self-built manufacturing system can support C2M, that is, to undertake and execute personalized orders according to the customer's product order requirements.
Regarding the benefits of self-built factories and manufacturing systems, WM said, "It can ensure standardized production, reduce product quality variability, and maximize operational efficiency." ”
But the price to pay for this efficiency is too great. Wenzhou factory, the first phase of the planned total investment of 67400 million yuan, the total investment of Huanggang factory is about 20.2 billion yuan.
Self-built factories require qualifications, and Weimar first spent a lot of money 11800 million yuan to acquire Dalian Huanghai to obtain SUV and MPV manufacturing qualifications, and then the acquisition of Zhongshun Automobile to obtain commercial vehicle manufacturing qualifications. And such an independent car-making qualification, NIO will not get it until 2023.
This already requires an investment scale of nearly 30 billion.
It's only explicit. The more hidden factor is that the factory will face depreciation and amortization costs when it is completed, and in 2020, WM's depreciation and amortization costs will be nearly 400 million. Moreover, during the construction of the factory, it will continue to eat up WM's cash flow.
In the three years from 2019 to 2021, Weimar had a net outflow of 81500 million. No amount of financing can be overwhelmed. The most churn among the main competitors.
Sacrificing so much for the sake of efficiency can hardly be called efficiency.
Deliveries of the Wenzhou plant began in 2018, and the first phase of the Huanggang plant is scheduled to reach production in 2020. The two plants can deliver up to 250,000 units a year, and there is no need to worry about production capacity in 2-3 years.
Everything seems to be ready, as long as you drive at full power, Weimar can move forward at full speed.
Throughout 2020, the utilization rate of the Wenzhou plant was 423%, which increased to 71 a year later5%；Only 166 cars were built at the Huanggang plant, and after a year, the utilization rate increased to 162%。
The low utilization rate means that it is difficult for WM to dilute costs by scale, and it needs to increase sales quickly and use scale to reduce the average cost.
WM is priced between 150,000 and 300,000 yuan, calling it "China's mainstream market", which is the largest and fastest-growing segment in the industry, but also the most competitive. From foreign capital to domestic production, from traditional brands to new forces, WM is facing the most direct competition.
Weimar does not have the channel advantage of traditional brands, nor does it have the brand advantage of Wei Xiaoli, so it has chosen a more cost-effective way in sales.
In 2019, WM's total revenue from the top five customers accounted for 406%, of which the largest customer contributed 182%, which is more than the contribution of NIO's top five customers.
Such large customers are called "smart mobility partners and mobility platforms".
WM adopts the "automotive industry practice" and cooperates with partners to sell vehicles and "rapidly expand the sales network in a cost-effective manner".
Direct sales and distribution are not conflicting choices. The direct sales model can better and faster get consumer feedback on the product, which is conducive to improving and upgrading the product, and can also control the ** and profit more effectively. (Li Xiang).
The benefits of distribution are cost savings and increased efficiency. In terms of efficiency, dealers have the best understanding of the local market demand, and the efficiency of channel sinking is higher; In terms of cost, OEMs do not need to invest a lot of manpower in terminal sales and services, so that OEMs can focus more on product research and development. (GAC Aion).
When the time comes to 2023, Xpeng, Zeekr, and NIO's Alps are all open to distribution. WM also said in the 2022 prospectus that it would gradually open directly operated stores to "improve user experience and loyalty, sales conversion efficiency and sales management".
The two models have the same goal. By choosing the distribution model in the early stage, WM could have taken advantage of its cost advantage and its own large financing scale to quickly roll out sales.
However, until 2021, Weimar sold 44,152 units, a year-on-year increase of 101%, which seems to have a significant growth rate.
The story of 2019 should have attracted Shen Hui's attention.
This is the first natural year for Xpeng G3 to start deliveries, and the performance of 12,728 units is almost the same as that of Weimar. Not only did the revenue exceed Weimar, but the loss also decreased by more than 400 million.
Two cars were easily overtaken by one, and WM needed to think about the attractiveness of its own products, but nothing happened in 2020. By the beginning of 2021, after the completion of 10 billion yuan of financing, the price of the new car W6 released by WM is between 19-260,000 yuan, and the new car has not reduced its sales like Nezha Leap.
If sales cannot be driven, Weimar will be particularly dazzling when it reveals problems.
In 2020, WM's revenue will be 26700 million, an increase of 52%. Zero Run grew by 44 times, Ideal increased by 32 times, NIO increased by 1 times, and Xpeng increased by 15 times. WM's growth rate is at the bottom.
For such a growth rate, WM paid a high price.
R&D expenditures WM spent 9900 million, accounting for 37% of revenue, far more than Wei Xiaoli, which is necessary.
Sales & Marketing Expenses9200 million, with an expense ratio of 34%. The distribution model could have improved efficiency and reduced costs, and the sales expense ratio of Weimar was also the highest among Wei Xiaoli. Administrative expenses are even more exaggerated, 17500 million, which is two-thirds of revenue.
Weimar needs to give rebates to partners and subsidies for store decoration; Due to the higher revenue contribution of the largest customer, WM's price negotiation and concession will also affect revenue and profit. These problems are understandable, but obviously relying on partners, WM's marketing and promotion expenses are still as high as 600 million. It is almost the same as NIO, and more than 2 times as ideal.
Not only that, but a professional service fee is as high as 369370,000 yuan, mainly "marketing and brand strategy consulting fees and market research fees".
WM seems to place a very high value on sales.
By 2021, WM will have 296 sales personnel, and the salary expense will be 15.5 billion, with an average annual salary of 5240 thousand. In comparison, 1,141 R&D personnel spent 27.4 billion, with an average annual salary of 240,000 per capita. Compared with Ideal and NIO, WM's salary is heavily skewed towards salespeople.
This has two effects. When a salesperson is overpaid, there is a need for embankment efficiency issues. When there is a significant gap between the average salary of R&D personnel and their peers, their attractiveness will be affected, which will have a negative impact on technical capabilities in the long run.
The bigger problem is administrative costs. In 2021, the salary of 374 people was as high as 210.6 billion, with an average annual salary of 5.63 million, which was later known as the "founder taking an annual salary of 1.2 billion".
The average salary shows the organizational management problems of WM, at least in terms of salary structure.
A report by Global Tiger Finance mentioned that "WM Motor does not hesitate to spend twice or even triple the salary to poach people frantically, and is also willing to 'raise' old employees with high salaries for those who are not capable." ”
This is certainly not a reasonable phenomenon.
The above money is only part of the cost, and there is a huge manufacturing cost for the car. In 2020, due to the cost of raw materials, the cost of raw materials and consumables will reach 30400 million.
It is noteworthy that the cost of depreciation, amortization and repair reached 5$2.3 billion is 15% of the cost.
Compared to the pitiful revenue, each cost seems to be huge. In 2020, WM lost 50800 million, even after deducting the fair value change, is a loss of 4.2 billion, which is 16 times. On average, you lose 23 per car sold20,000, which is higher than Wei Xiaoli's zero.
In the three years from 2019 to 2021, WM lost 174300 million, without continuous financing, Weimar will be unsustainable.
The epidemic in 2020 can be described as a loss of horses for new energy vehicles.
It has disrupted the first chain, pushed up the raw materials, but also made new energy vehicle companies stand on the wind. Ideal and Xiaopeng were successfully listed in this year. WM's 10 billion financing also benefited from this.
Unlike Wei Xiaoli's landing on the U.S. stock market, Weimar intended to land on the Science and Technology Innovation Board, but in the end it was unsuccessful and lost the opportunity for secondary market financing.
On October 27, 2020, a WM EX5 spontaneously combusted, which was the third spontaneous combustion of WM in half a month.
WM issued a recall report, recalling some EX5 models produced in June and August of that year, a total of 1,282 units.
Subsequently, there was a highly controversial "power lock" incident in Weimar. At the beginning of 2022, the 315 party of Guangdong Province reported on the problem of WM Motor's "power lock". The owner said that after maintenance and upgrading, the car had problems such as reduced battery life and slow charging speed, and it was suspected that it was "locked up".
These episodes will not have a substantial impact on Weimar, but they fall on Weimar like a straw.
In 2021, Weimar raised two sums of money, but the sum of the two sums of money was not as high as the Series A financing in 2016.
In 2022, after the failure of the listing on the Science and Technology Innovation Board, WM switched to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and finally failed. This year, WM did not raise funds. Weimar may not be lucky enough, NIO, which has lost 27.5 billion yuan in three years, has successfully listed in the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which has finally alleviated the predicament, while Weimar, which failed to go public, has gradually dried up.
In the second half of 2022, rumors began to appear in Weimar that were riddled with debt, salary cuts and layoffs, employees begging for salaries, and defaulting on businessmen.
In 2023, the backdoor Apollo travel landing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange will fail again. In October, Weimar filed for bankruptcy reorganization and basically withdrew from the "poker table".
In 2024, WM Motor's restructuring process will be officially launched, and the first creditors' meeting is expected to be held on March 29.
The unilateral bet made at the beginning of 2020 is now decided, and Shen Hui certainly did not have the opportunity to eat the takeaway delivered by Wang Xing, and Wang Xing did not get the car that should belong to him.