From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet-German battlefield pinned down the main forces of Hitler's Germany.
153 German divisions and 37 divisions of client states, totaling about 5.5 million men, attacked the Soviet Union.
A series of large-scale battles broke out in Belarus and Ukraine, on the Baltic coast and in Moldavia. The Soviet-German battlefield was the decisive battlefield of World War II, both in terms of the scale and brutality of these engagements, and in terms of the number of troops and technical weapons used in these engagements.
While the Soviet Red Army fought alone against the Germans, there was little military action in Western Europe. Originally, Britain and the United States opened a second theater in Europe as the best way for Britain and the United States (which subsequently entered the war) to aid the Soviet Union.
At that time, 75% of the troops of fascist Germany and its vassals were concentrated on the Soviet-German battlefield. On the Western Front, there were only 38 German divisions with disembodied strength. The forces deployed directly on the coasts of France, Belgium and the Netherlands totaled only 19 divisions. All this created good conditions for the opening of a second battlefield. From the outset, however, the Allies took the position of delaying the resolution of the issue as long as possible.
In the summer of 1941, Winston Churchill bitterly denounced the idea of opening a second theater of war as "bizarre theory" and "stupid behavior," arguing that the reason for this proposition was that the Soviets "knew nothing" about military strategy, did not understand "the characteristics of landing campaigns," and did not understand the "insurmountable difficulties" of "landing a large force on the enemy shore."
Of course, the easiest thing would be to wait on the other side of the Ramance Strait, or rather, on the other side of the Atlantic, as the Soviet people waged an arduous struggle against the invaders, shedding rivers of blood, without risking the rapidly growing and powerful British and American armed forces.
Churchill was always in the Chequers room, smoking a cigar and talking about his strategy. The great Georgian poet Sota Rustavili wrote: "Everyone who watches the fire from the other side of the strait considers himself a strategist". Churchill was the kind of strategist who "watched the fire from the other side".
The concept of a "second battlefield".
British and American military men and politicians have painstakingly invented an elusive version of the very concept of the "second battlefield". The Soviets analyzed their accounts and argued that the bombing of Germany by the Allied air forces, the fighting of the German navy by the British and American navies in the Atlantic, and the subsequent Allied campaigns in Africa, the Middle East, and Sicily were not the second theater of war.
According to the Soviet concept, and it is a well-founded concept, the second battlefield is the European theater, more precisely, the theater in northern France, which can contain about 60 divisions of Germany and 20 divisions of its allies, and strategically can become a supplement to the first battlefield. This battlefield should pose a threat to the heart of fascist Germany and put it in an extremely complex strategic posture.
Historical experience has shown that Germany always loses in battles on two fronts. Bismarck, Moltke and Schlieffen were afraid of fighting on two fronts. Hitler followed their legacy and sought to annihilate the enemy individually, and for a long time he did so.
Was it feasible to open a second theater of war in Europe under the circumstances? According to the military-strategic situation of the Soviet-German battlefield, at that time most of Germany's forces had been used on the Eastern Front, and the Soviet Union believed that it was completely achievable to open up a second theater in Western Europe (northern France) and Northern Europe (the Arctic region), which would greatly improve the military situation of the Soviet Union and Britain. As early as July 1941, this view was presented to the British**. The Soviet High Command was well aware of the difficulties of establishing a second theater of war, and estimated that it would require great sacrifices. However, for the sake of the cause of the struggle against the common enemy, for the sake of Britain itself, a second battlefield must be established as soon as possible.
Churchill immediately rejected the Soviet Union's proposal to open a second theater of war as soon as possible, and categorically declared: "The implementation of a heavy landing will inevitably mean bloodshed and defeat."
On September 3, 1941, the Soviet Union again pointed out that it was necessary to establish a second battlefield in that year. "The Germans considered the danger on the Western Front to be a void and were convinced that there would be no battlefield on the Western Front, now and in the future, and that they could transfer their entire forces from the Western Front to the Eastern Front with impunity. ”
Churchill again replied with a letter of refusal, saying that it was impossible to open a second battlefield in such a short time. Great Britain** still refused to assume this obligation in 1942.
On September 13, 1941, the Soviet Union sent a letter to Churchill, again stating that "failure to open a second battlefield will embolden our common enemy."
The British working people insisted that Churchill ** immediately open a second battlefield, and the British Prime Minister was annoyed, saying that it was "pathetic and shameful" to make this demand, and that the person who made such a request was "stupid and **" However, what was really sad and shameful was precisely Churchill's own attitude towards the Allied Soviet Union. The prime minister liked to shout to the Soviet leaders: "continue to fight", "completely eliminate Hitler, these villains", and praised "the heroism and tenacity of the Soviet people" and "the great struggle of the army to defend the territory of the motherland and oppose the Nazi bandits".
Neither the British nor the American ruling circles were in a hurry to open a second theater of war, not because they did not have such a realistic possibility at the time, nor because they were inadequate in military power and equipment. According to de Gaulle, in their secret plans did not want to take risks while the enemy's forces were weakening on the battlefield.
De Gaulle did not say what he really meant: Wen Churchill wanted to weaken his enemy, the Nazis, and his ally, the Soviet Union.
To be continued, this article** comes from the Internet).