In December 1996, a delegation led by the then Secretary of Defense, Gen. ***, visited the United States and was received by the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps, Admiral Charles Croillak.
After learning that *** had participated in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Krurak was in awe of him, because his own father Victor Krurak also participated in the Korean War, and served as the deputy commander of the 1st Division of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Battle of Changjin Lake, and *** was a battalion-level commander of the 235th Regiment of the 79th Division of the 27th Army of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army.
Krulak's father told him: "I have fought all my life, and I have never encountered such a powerful army!" Years later, that awe hasn't changed.
Krurak's father, who had paid a heavy price of 11,731 men in the Battle of Changjin Lake, said: "I believe that the ice and snow of Changjin Lake and the ruthless attack of the squadron regardless of ** are a lingering nightmare in the hearts of every marine." ”
Similarly, in the Battle of Changjin Lake, the performances of Truman and Kim Il Sung and others are also very interesting. During the campaign, which took place from November 27 to December 24, 1950, the cold weather and treacherous terrain had a great impact on the combat environment.
Schematic diagram of the Battle of Changjin Lake in the Korean War, on the third day of the battle, the United States ** Truman publicly stated at a press conference: "We have been actively considering the use of atomic bombs on the Korean battlefield. ”
At that time, the top level of the United States obviously underestimated the determination of the Chinese volunteers to resist US aggression and aid Korea. In fact, there is one person who underestimates, and that is Kim Il Sung. On the seventh day of the Battle of Changjin Lake, Kim Il Sung flew directly to Beijing to meet *** and proposed to hand over the command of the Korean People's Army to ***
This raises the question: After the Volunteer Army entered the DPRK, did China and North Korea not have unified command? On September 15, 1950, U.S. troops landed at Incheon, North Korea, and cut off the Korean People's Army.
The Korean People's Army was under attack from the enemy, and it was no longer possible to continue its march southward. On September 28, Kim Il Sung convened an emergency meeting to discuss the military situation at that time.
At the meeting, everyone unanimously agreed that if the "United **" breaks through the 38th parallel, the Korean People's Army is likely to be wiped out. In the end, the Politburo of the DPRK decided that Kim Il Sung would come forward and ask for help from the Soviet Union and China.
Soon, letters of help signed by Kim Il Sung and Park Hyun Young were sent to *** and Stalin. October 1 marks the first anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. **After participating in the National Day Celebration, I returned to Zhongnanhai, and it was already dark.
At this time, North Korean Interior Minister Park Il-woo came to Juxiang Book House with a letter from Kim Il Sung asking for help. In the letter, Kim Il Sung wrote in an anxious tone: "The enemy's landing force has been linked with the troops of the Southern Front, cutting off the connection between our northern and southern forces.
The People's Army on the Southern Front was in an unfavorable environment of being cut off and divided by the enemy, and it could not get the best ammunition, lost contact, and even some of its troops had been scattered and surrounded by the enemy.
If the capital is completely occupied by the enemy, then I estimate that the enemy may continue to attack the area north of the 38th parallel. Without a rapid improvement of our various unfavorable conditions, the enemy's attempts may well be realized.
It is difficult for us to overcome this critical situation on our own. Therefore, we have to ask you to give us special assistance, that is, in the event that the enemy attacks the area north of the 38th parallel, we desperately hope that the Chinese People's Liberation Army will directly send out to assist our army in the battle. ”
Copywriter 1: ** and Kim Il Sung Park Il Woo left not long ago, ** arrived with Stalin's telegram. In the telegram, Stalin proposed a scheme: the Chinese comrades would send troops, and the Soviet side would provide ** and air cover.
As for whether to send troops to North Korea, ** has its own bottom line: "But the 38th parallel, we don't care; If we cross the 38th parallel, we will definitely fight it. "Since the outbreak of the Korean War, we have paid close attention to the situation in North Korea, adjusted the national defense deployment in a timely manner, and established the Northeast Frontier Army with the 13th Corps of Siye as the backbone.
Copywriting 2: After receiving Kim Il Sung's letter for help, he paid close attention to the situation in North Korea, adjusted the national defense deployment in a timely manner, and established the Northeast Frontier Army with the 13th Corps of Siye as the backbone.
In the initial meeting, there was a strong opposition to sending troops to North Korea. However, after ***, who was far away in Xi'an, took a special plane to Beijing, the situation changed. ** expressed full support for ***'s decision to send troops to North Korea.
This made *** quite emotional, he said: "I am relieved if you say this." Now that the US military has advanced toward the 38th parallel, we must dispatch troops as soon as possible to gain the initiative. The Politburo continues to meet this afternoon, and you present your views. ”
In the afternoon of the same day, he presided over the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, which was the clapstick meeting for sending troops to the DPRK. At the meeting, there were still opinions against sending troops to North Korea, but *** stood up and stated his opinion, saying: "Now that the enemy has reached the doorstep, it is impossible to compromise with them."
It is necessary to send troops to Korea, and if it is defeated, it will be equivalent to a few years of victory in the Liberation War. If the US military is placed on the banks of the Yalu River and Taiwan, it will be able to find an excuse at any time if it wants to launch a war of aggression, and then we will be passive. ”
At the telegraph meeting, an agreement was finally reached on the issue of sending troops to Korea. **Appointed commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army.
On October 8, ** sent a telegram to the North Korean side: 1. We have decided to send volunteers to the territory of the DPRK to support you in your fight against the aggressor; 2. Comrade ** will serve as the commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers; 3. In Manchuria, the logistics work of the Chinese People's Volunteers and other work to assist the DPRK will be handled by Comrade Gao Gang, commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region; 4. Comrade Park Il-woo is requested to immediately go to Shenyang to discuss with Comrades *** and Gao Gang on many issues concerning the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the territory of the DPRK to fight.
Comrades Peng and Gao will depart from Beijing for Shenyang. On the same day, ** came to Shenyang and had a conversation with DPRK Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pak Heon-yong on sending troops to the DPRK and other issues.
Although this was a military meeting, the focus of the discussion between the two sides should be on the issue of how the Korean People's Army should cooperate after the Chinese People's Volunteers entered the DPRK. However, Park Heon-yong only urged China to send troops as soon as possible, and did not mention the issue of coordination and command between the two sides.
According to the observation of Chai Chengwen, counselor of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK at the time, Kim Il Sung asked China for help, and his idea was very simple: China sent troops to help North Korea hold out for a period of time under the fierce attack of the enemy.
Based on this idea, Kim Il Sung believed that the command of the Volunteer Army should be handed over to the Korean People's Army Command.
**Meeting with Kim Il Sung: Kim Il Sung realized that the issue of command was not simple, but he was not reconciled. **A group of 7 people entered the DPRK a few hours ahead of the volunteers, eager to meet Kim Il Sung.
**Meet Kim Il Sung in Daedong, near Daeyu-dong, North Town, North Korea, to introduce the entry of volunteers into Korea and China's next arrangements. Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude and agreed to temporarily set up the headquarters of the Volunteer Army in Daeyudong.
However, when *** proposed that the Chinese and North Korean commands work together, Kim Il Sung was silent, and finally said that he would arrange for Park Ilwoo to stay at the Volunteer Army Headquarters. Kim Il Sung's reluctance to hand over command may be motivated by the dignity of the state, but *** has his own considerations.
First, when Stalin proposed that China send troops, he clearly wrote in his telegram: "[The Volunteer Army] is, of course, under the command of the Chinese commander"; Second, the commanders and fighters of the Korean People's Army (KPA) are worrisome in their military capabilities, and adventurism is emerging one after another.
In a telegram to the Military Commission, he bluntly stated that the problem of conscription in North Korea is particularly serious, with all men between the ages of 16 and 45 being conscripted into the army, and their relatives are not cared for.
** I personally said to Chai Chengwen: "I want to be responsible for the people of China and North Korea and hundreds of thousands of soldiers." "Although when the Volunteer Army first entered North Korea, there were not many wars, and there were few problems with the cooperation of the Chinese and North Korean troops, but after the real fight between the enemy and us, serious problems came one after another, which made *** very worried.
During the first campaign, there was a shocking incident between the Volunteer Army and the Korean troops due to the lack of unity of command. On November 4, the 39th Army of the Volunteer Army besieged the 24th Division of the US Army southeast of Bocheon, but when the final attack was launched, it was suddenly shelled by the tank division of the Korean People's Army attacking Suncheon, and as a result, the enemy escaped.
Similar incidents of accidental injuries are not uncommon, and the situation has become increasingly serious due to weak air defenses, difficulties in supplying supplies, and language barriers and lack of coordination between China and North Korea.
On November 7, ** met with Park Il-woo and asked him to convey to Kim Il Sung the issue of the unified military operations of the two sides. However, Kim Il Sung insisted that at present he could only send operational staff officers to the Volunteer Army Headquarters to be responsible for information exchange and communication and liaison, and did not approve of the joint unified command of the coalition forces.
Seeing that the situation may deteriorate, it is hoped that the Military Commission will solve the problem of the unified command of China and the DPRK. ** After receiving the telegram, well aware of the importance of this issue, taking into account the issue of Kim Il Sung's national dignity, it was decided to take two preparations: first, to invite Stalin to come forward; The second is to let Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung discuss the command of the army again.
On November 13, ** sent a telegram to Stalin, hoping that Kim Il Sung and Shtkov (Soviet ambassador to the DPRK) would be stationed at the front, and that Kim Il Sung, Shtkov, and ** would organize a three-person team to decide on military policy, including army building, operations, frontal and rear battlefields, and many existing policies related to operations, so as to seek mutual agreement and facilitate the conduct of the war.
We agree to this proposal and hereby telegraph requesting your instructions. If you think this proposal is feasible, you should make a proposal to Comrade Shtkov and Comrade Kim Il Sung.
On November 15, Kim Il Sung, Shtkov, ** and others took a group photo in front of the bomb shelter. Kim Il-sung and Shtkov went to the headquarters of the Daeyudong Volunteer Army, and Gao Gang also came from Shenyang to participate.
At the beginning of the talks, the straightforward *** pointed out that in order to ensure the victory of the battle, the two armies must be under unified command, otherwise it will bring serious consequences. Gao Gang also added that the Korean Peninsula is a narrow territory and the enemy is strong, and we must have unified command to defeat them.
Shtykov also agreed, although the Korean People's Army was supported by Soviet equipment, but the Chinese People's Volunteers had achieved better results by virtue of inferior equipment, so he supported the unified command of the Chinese comrades.
However, Kim Il Sung had reservations about this, and the meeting reached an impasse for a time. ** To solve this problem, it was proposed to form a three-member team consisting of Kim Il Sung, Shtkov and himself, with overall responsibility for military consultations and unified command.
Unfortunately, however, no consensus could be reached at this meeting. On November 17, **telegram*** said that Stalin had called back, fully supported the unified command of the Chinese comrades, and would soon inform Kim Il Sung and Shtkov.
Now that Stalin is in favor of ***'s proposal, how should Kim Il Sung respond? According to historical records, Kim Il Sung did not finally agree to hand over the command of the Korean People's Army until December 3.
It is worth noting that from November 17 to December 3, there was a whole half a month, and the most important factor in this was the outstanding performance of the volunteers in the war.
In the second campaign, which lasted from November 7 to December 24, 1950, the Volunteer Army, with the cooperation of the Korean People's Army, achieved remarkable results.
MacArthur's arrogant plan was crushed by the Sino-Korean coalition in the second campaign, and the greatest defeat in the history of the U.S. Army was born. Among them, the heroic performance of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army in the Battle of Changjin Lake is even more shocking.
In extremely bad weather conditions, they divided and surrounded the American troops, completed difficult tasks, and left countless touching stories. According to statistics, the volunteers killed more than 36,000 enemies, including more than 24,000 American troops.
In addition, they seized a large amount of supplies and recaptured the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung was deeply shocked by the performance of the volunteers and decided to go to Beijing for help.
So, on the 7th day of the second battle, that is, on December 3, Kim Il Sung secretly came to Beijing and was received by *** and Gao Gang.
During a dialogue between the leaders of China and the DPRK, the Chinese leader put forward a proposal to resolve the issue of unified command of the Chinese and DPRK armed forces as soon as possible. Kim Il Sung said that the command of the Korean People's Army should be handed over to ***, and the Chinese and DPRK leaders finally decided to set up a joint command, with *** as commander and political commissar, Kim Woong as deputy commander, and Pak Il-woo as deputy political commissar.
In order to better coordinate, ** proposed to divide the joint army command into two internal and external organs, namely the headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the general staff of the Korean People's Army, and the two departments should be stationed in one office to facilitate cooperation and problem solving.
In the course of the discussions, ** and *** also drafted a telegram to Stalin, proposing that one person each from China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK form a party group to jointly command.
Stalin agreed to this proposal and said that it should be led by the Chinese comrades.
The Stalin affair had come to this point, and the dispute over the command of the Sino-Korean coalition forces had been satisfactorily resolved. Since the beginning of the third campaign, General **, with the assistance of the Korean People's Army, has won victory after victory hand in hand with the Volunteer Army.
As for the significance of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, ** had a deep insight in the early days of sending troops to Korea, and he clearly pointed out: "If we do not pay attention to the Korean issue, US imperialism will inevitably advance step by step, repeating the mistake of Japan's aggression against China, and even more rampant......We resisted US aggression and aided Korea in order to stop their wishful thinking.
One punch out, a hundred punches are not afraid. "When we resist US aggression and aid Korea, we are defending our homeland. "Although more than 70 years have passed since the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, its impact is still far-reaching.
Here, I would like to pay my deepest respect to the heroic martyrs of the Volunteer Army!