[Text: Observer Network columnist Cheng Liang].
On January 15, 2024, the Ukrainian Air Force said that the Ukrainian army hit two Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft over the Sea of Azov, one of which is the Il-22M command and communication aircraft, and the other is the Russian army's cutting-edge A50U early warning command and control aircraft.
Coincidentally, at about 11 noon local time on January 24, an Il-76MD transport plane of the Russian army crashed in Yabugnovo Village, Belgorod Region, Western Russia, while carrying out the task of transporting Ukrainian prisoners of war, killing all six crew members on board, three random Russian soldiers and 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war for exchange. The Russian side said that the air defense missile system deployed by the Ukrainian army in the village of Liptysi, Kharkiv Oblast, used two anti-aircraft missiles to shoot down the aircraft.
In just 10 days, the Russian army's large planes have crashed one after another, what factors have caused this situation? In future wars, will there be a problem of declining survivability on the battlefield of strategic electronic jamming aircraft, large transport aircraft, and other high-value combat targets, and how should this dilemma be solved?
In any case, the Russian army has lost a certain number of large aircraft in the past few weeks.
In the first and two cases, the tactics were similar.
Although it has been about ten days, judging from the current examples of the Russian army's Il-22M being seriously injured, the Il-76MD being shot down, and the A50U being suspected of being shot down, the Russian army basically fell into a pit in both cases. First of all, on the night of January 14, the Russian Il-22M was seriously injured and the A-50U was suspected of being shot down, according to open source intelligence information, the Russian army deployed these two strategic-level support aircraft extremely forward, almost close to the coast of the Sea of Azov from Berjiangsk to Mariupol, this area is about 121 kilometers away from the Kuban city controlled by the Ukrainian army, and only 100 kilometers away from the city of Gulepoli.
Considering that the "Bumblebee" early warning command and control system radar equipped with the A50U early warning aircraft has an interception distance of more than 600 kilometers for high-altitude large targets, and for low-altitude typical fighter targets, the interception distance is about 300 kilometers, the Russian army will deploy this early warning aircraft in an area close to the front line, which can give full play to its advantage of a long detection distance for low-altitude targets, and can obtain a defensive depth of 200 kilometers for the front-line Russian army.
However, it is precisely because the Russian army has deployed early warning aircraft and electronic jamming aircraft too close to the front line, in fact, it has also allowed the two aircraft to enter the range of ground-guided fire of the Ukrainian army. Of course, it is still somewhat difficult to threaten these two strategic support aircraft of the Russian army with long-range regional air defense systems such as the S-300PT PS equipped by the Ukrainian army, or the "Beech-M1" and "Frankenstein-SAM" field air defense systems, etc., but the Ukrainian army seems to have come up with its own "trump card", the "Patriot" air defense missile system provided by NATO.
At present, NATO provides the Ukrainian army with two types of "Patriot" air defense missile systems, one of which is two or three sets of "Patriot" provided by Germany, according to the information disclosed by the German side, Germany provides Ukraine with the Patriot-2 ground guidance system, the system has a number of improved models, such as the specialized type against ballistic missiles, the specialized model against cruise missiles, etc., the German army provided to the Ukrainian army, may be the Patriot-2 GEM+ type, that is, the so-called guidance enhancement type. Compared with the basic model, the MIM-104E missile used in the GEM+ model has improved the accuracy of the seeker, updated the fuze system to improve the ability to combine the lead and war, improved the reliability of the whole system, and can be equipped with an AN MPQ-65 phased array radar for target guidance, which improves the multi-target engagement capability.
At the same time, the range of firepower of the system has also been greatly improved, and there are sources from different sources that the Patriot-2 GEM+ type has a maximum launch slant of more than 160 kilometers for high-altitude large targets, and even more than 200 kilometers, which is about 2 times the range of the 5V55R U air defense missiles equipped with old anti-aircraft missiles such as the S-300PS PT of the Ukrainian army, and the S-300PS PT of the Ukrainian army is completely out of reach of the Russian army's early warning aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft more than 100 kilometers away from the contact line, Patriot-2 GEM+The anti-aircraft missile is fully capable of reaching it, not only can it be reached, but it can even be calmly deployed in depth to ensure its own safety.
The second is the Patriot-3 CRI directly provided to Ukraine by the United States, compared with the Patriot-2 GEM+, the Patriot-3 anti-aircraft missile is an integral part of the low-altitude interception system at the end of the BMD system of the US military, mainly used to intercept short-range ballistic missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers to ensure the safety of troops in the theater, the missile theoretically has a better ability to hit aerodynamic targets than the Patriot-2 GEM+, but due to the small number of deliveries by the US military to Ukraine, At present, only air defense operations in key areas in the Kyiv region have been confirmed.
The German Patriot-2GEM+ has the same maneuverable launch capability as the S-300.
Therefore, judging from the example of the air defense operation on the evening of January 14, when the Russian Il-22M was seriously injured and the A50U was suspected to be shot down, the most likely air defense tactics of the Ukrainian army are to formulate corresponding strike tactics on the basis of finding out the action laws and routes of the Russian army's strategic-level electronic warfare aircraft through long-term observation and intelligence collection, and send the Patriot-2GEM+ ground guide battalion to secretly go forward and set up an ambush in an electromagnetic silent state. Locking and launching in one go, compared with high-mobility targets such as fighters, it is obvious that large combat aircraft such as early warning aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft have poor mobility, and even if they have a local self-defense system, they play a relatively limited role, so it is not surprising that they were hit by the Ukrainian army.
Compared with the example of the air defense operation carried out by the Ukrainian army on the coast of the Sea of Azov on January 14, the example of the Russian Il-76MD large transport plane shot down in the Belgorod region on January 24 is relatively "boring". According to the Russian army, the Russian army had already informed the Ukrainian side of the route and landing time of the voyage, but even so it was still killed by the Ukrainian army's ground-guided fire. Compared with the example on January 14, the similarity is that the large Russian aircraft recklessly entered the range of the Ukrainian army's ground-guided fire, and they were all ambushed head-on by the Ukrainian army's ground-guided guides, and the protagonists of the attack are most likely the Patriot-2GEM+ anti-aircraft missiles of the Ukrainian army; The difference is that the air defense operation carried out by the Ukrainian army on January 24 may be an attack even though it knows that there are Ukrainian prisoners of war on the plane, which is an unprecedented "crazy criticism" behavior.
Second, the lessons are very profound, and the trend deserves vigilance.
Looking at the incident in which the Russian army was seriously injured on January 14 and the A50U was suspected to be shot down, and the Il-76MD transport plane was shot down on January 24, the lessons for the Russian Aerospace Forces and even the air forces of major military powers are very profound. Judging from the example of the battle on January 14, the Russian army's strategic-level electronic support aircraft has carried out long-term activities over the Sea of Azov before being attacked by the Ukrainian army, with a fixed flight path and a fixed flight plan. And when the activities of the Russian army's strategic support aircraft were thoroughly explored by the Ukrainian army, one foot has actually stepped into the ghost gate. At the same time, the Russian army's use of first-class combat assets such as early warning aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft lacks battlefield awareness, and the use of forces is very sloppy.
At the same time, the level of coordination of the Russian army's multi-arms and multi-aircraft is also relatively poor; according to the key points in the use of early warning aircraft and strategic-level electronic warfare aircraft, when such aircraft are in the air, in addition to the need to deploy escort aircraft, it is also necessary to deploy corresponding air defense suppression teams to suppress sudden ground-guided radars. Judging from the air defense suppression capability of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the use of Su-35S fighters, with the "Hibine-M" electronic countermeasure pod and X-31PM anti-radiation missiles, has a certain air defense suppression capability.
The flight alert route map of the Russian large aircraft released by the Ukrainian army.
The coordination of the large fleet and tactical fleet of the Russian army is very uncoordinated Source: Russian Aerospace Forces.
Judging from the example of the battle on January 24, the battlefield awareness of the Russian Aerospace Forces is even more like a disaster, simply thinking that if the flight plan is announced, the Ukrainian army will release the Russian army, completely unexpectedly that there may be a poor channel for the Ukrainian army to send the situation, serious infighting, a large number of people in the post are floating in things, and even simply to shoot down the results of the battle and ignore the situation, in short, "I still think too well about the Ukrainians", since the lower limit of the enemy has not been fully estimated, The downing of the transport plane is the inevitable price to pay.
But even so, the Russian Il-22M was seriously injured, the Il-76MD was shot down, and the A50U was suspected of being shot down, which is enough to arouse our vigilance. In modern warfare, such first-class combat targets, which should have been deployed in the second-line airspace, are by no means "safes", and there are a large number of strike means, which are enough to threaten the safety of such aircraft. For example, in the ground guidance system, the Russian army is equipped with two long-range regional air defense systems, S-300V4 and S-400, the former is equipped with 9M82MD anti-aircraft missiles, and the latter is equipped with 40N6 anti-aircraft missiles, etc., all of which have the ability to hit high-altitude combat targets at a distance of more than 400 kilometers; Considering the maneuverability and radar reflecting surface of early warning aircraft, transport aircraft and other models, it is almost the best target for such systems, and even if they are deployed at a distance of 200 kilometers from the front line, they are not necessarily safe, and they may be attacked by long-range ground guides.
The "strong enemy" is also pushing through the old and looking for new tactics.
Another example is in the air-to-air missile, at present, a number of major military powers are developing and equipping long-range, ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles, such as the AIM-260 air-to-air missile developed by the US military, in the future there is a plan to increase the range to more than 300 kilometers, and the US Navy is also testing the use of F A-18E F fighter jet with the "Standard-6" type air defense missile tactics, such ship-to-air missiles are large in size, rocket engine specific impulse is high, in the case of equipped with boosters, even if the use of air defense ship launch, The range of firepower is as high as more than 300 kilometers, and the range will be further extended when launching with fighters, and the A-launch and B-missile functions between fighters will provide the best technical support for such ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles to attack early warning aircraft thousands of miles away.
At present, the most threatening means of attack against early warning aircraft and strategic-level electronic warfare aircraft is undoubtedly the combination of stealth fighters and long-range air-to-air missiles. Due to the radar wavelength factor used by AWACS aircraft, the detection capability of low-detectability targets is often discounted to a certain extent, resulting in the radar interception distance of the AWACS radar intercepting stealth fighters to a rather dangerous level. If stealth fighters also carry long-range and ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles, it is entirely possible to launch an attack on early warning aircraft and electronic warfare planes outside the interception range of the radar of early warning aircraft. As a matter of fact, judging from the experience of NATO countries in conducting tactical exercises in the air force, stealth fighters have become the most dangerous enemy faced by large aircraft such as early warning aircraft and strategic-grade electronic warfare aircraft.
The system we have, sooner or later the enemy will have.
Third, is it time for some new means of large aircraft defense?
Judging from the current self-defense means of large aircraft and strategic support aircraft such as early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and transport aircraft, most of them still stay in the following principles: First, they should be as far away from the first-line combat airspace as possible, for example, early warning aircraft are often deployed on the second-line campaign in the air campaign, and the distance from the front line of the battle is about 100 or even 200 kilometers, while large transport planes often only land at rear airfields more than 300 kilometers away from the front line of the war, so as to avoid the extremely dangerous first-line airspace to the greatest extent;
Second, it is necessary to equip sufficient escort aircraft, such as the use of accompanying escort formations, the deployment of air defense suppression squads, the deployment of air combat patrol formations in the airspace of front-line combat, the demarcation of ground-guided fire kill zones, and the formation of multi-level and sufficiently deep air campaign depth, so as to wrap early warning aircraft, transport planes, and large electronic warfare planes in the rear of the battle line, so as to form a relatively dense multi-level air defense protection;
Third, it is necessary to equip early warning planes and large transport planes with certain electronic countermeasure equipment, such as airborne radar warning or dual-band missile approach alarms, and infrared jamming missiles or chaff jamming missiles to interfere with missile seekers.
For example, the deployment of early warning aircraft on a ground of about 200 kilometers from the front line of the engagement can provide one's own side with a situational awareness depth of more than 200 kilometers extending to the opponent's control area, but in the face of the firepower range of the new generation of air defense missiles such as the 40N6 air defense missile and the Standard-6 ship-to-air missile, the early warning aircraft is deployed at a depth of 200 kilometers from one's own side, which is too dangerous; And judging from the development trend of surface-to-air missiles, it cannot be ruled out that there will be ground-to-air missiles with a longer range in the future, which will further reduce the safe range of activities of early warning aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft.
For example, the use of escort formations and the deployment of combat patrol formations, although relying on the air force's tactical system can partially ensure the safety of early warning aircraft and large electronic warfare aircraft, it is also necessary to take into account the ability of ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles to strike outside the defense zone, and even more to take into account the ability of stealth fighters and ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles to "break through a net with one needle." It is completely possible to "take the head of the general in the crowd" in the relatively dense air defense system organized by the opponent and shoot down the early warning plane outside the defense zone.
As for the technology of interfering with surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles by relying on electronic countermeasure equipment, missile approach alarms, or commonly used thermal flare bombs and chaff jamming bombs, along with the emergence of phased array radar seeker and thermal imaging infrared seeker, it has huge limitations, and it can almost be said that it is better than nothing, and the use of such defensive means to protect the safety of large aircraft is not even a "last resort" at present.
So, what kind of technological and tactical evolution is likely to occur in the future defense means of AWACS, strategic-class electronic warfare aircraft, large transport aircraft?
From the perspective of early warning aircraft and large electronic warfare aircraft themselves, it is inevitable that the range of the RF system of such equipment will be further refined, such as the use of new GANs and R-based components to increase the RF power. For example, the original situational awareness range of the early warning aircraft was about 400 kilometers, and after increasing the power of the active phased array radar, it can achieve situational awareness of fighter targets at 500 kilometers or even 600 kilometers, so that the early warning aircraft can be deployed in a more far-reaching campaign depth and get out of the enemy's ground guided fire kill zone to the greatest extent.
Another example is that judging from the tactics and combat system of the future air force, how to extend the interception distance of stealth fighters as much as possible in the air campaign and provide early warning for the air force should be an important topic in the air campaign. For this reason, it is not excluded that it is necessary to use drones or even floating balloons. Such UAVs and balloons can carry long-wave radar or infrared photoelectric detection systems that are more specialized and have a long interception distance for stealth fighters, and even if they are shot down, they will not create a valuable AWACS command organization**. In short, for the improvement of aviation tactics, we should try our best to extrapolate the situational awareness range of low-detectable targets, and in the foreseeable future, it will become the focus of protection of high-quality combat targets such as early warning aircraft.
Finally, there is still a relatively high room for improvement in the defensive performance of the existing early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and other strategic-level aircraft. For example, in soft countermeasure equipment, in addition to the conventional infrared chaff jamming bombs, it can be equipped with new towed decoy equipment for jamming surface-to-air missiles, and can also be equipped with directional infrared jamming equipment and other infrared thermal imaging seekers used to interfere with air-to-air missiles; In the long run, it is even possible to consider equipping early warning aircraft, large electronic warfare aircraft, etc. with special interceptor missiles for hard killing of incoming air-to-air missiles and surface-to-air missiles.
All in all, the Russian Il-22M was seriously injured, the Il-76MD was shot down, and the A50U was suspected of being shot down. This also reflects some new characteristics and trends in modern air combat and air defense operations, and it is time to re-understand this trend and improve the use and defense of combat aircraft of high warning and other values.