Data from the National Bureau of Statistics. In 2014, 79% of the students returned to China, and in 2015, 78% went abroad
According to the data, the average retention rate of talents in China's science and engineering fields has reached 87%, accounting for the world's largest brain drain. What is the reason why these elite talents "have a home and do not return"?
By the end of 2012, the cumulative number of people studying abroad in mainland China had reached 2.64 million, and the number of people who had returned from studying abroad was only 1.09 million, with a "deficit" of more than 1.5 million. By 2013, the loss of Chinese was the largest in the world. (Figure**: Overseas Chinese News 2015-07-14).
Brain drain
This is because China's basic national policy between 1990 and 2015 was to seek an overwhelming advantage in the low- and medium-end basic manufacturing industry.
The main content of this section is to contact, digest, and absorb the existing foreign technology, and graft it onto the ability to lay out the in-depth industrial elements guaranteed by the basis of national ownership, so as to form an overwhelming advantage over all other regions of the world.
First, it will firmly embed itself in the global industrial chain and become a strategic barrier for the survival of the country;
Second, it will lay a realistic foundation for comprehensively catching up with the frontier of technology in all fields, surpassing the Western group in some fields that have path dependence on large infrastructure, and seeking mutual advantages in some cutting-edge manufacturing fields.
Before this, China has not tried to establish a comprehensive basic research institution with reference to the Soviet model, and support a large number of researchers to engage in academic research, but just like the chip industry, the bottleneck of the problem is often not in basic research, but in the fact that even if the principle research has been completed, there is a large-scale, almost powerless missing link in the industry, making it impossible for all kinds of experimental results to land, and can only become high-tech waste paper.
For example, in fact, the technical principle of the lithography machine is not complicated, but if a Chinese Academy of Sciences proposed a new development path of a lithography machine in the 90s, and even completed the theoretical calculation and large-scale simulation, this research is meaningless, because whether it is precision manufacturing technology, fine chemical technology, automation control technology, high-end plant construction technology, etc., the lack of links is enough to make you busy in vain.
Without the basic conditions of technology, without the lessons to make up for industrialization, and without a strong "low-end" industrial capacity, supporting a large number of academic institutions in China is essentially just a waste of strength by vain fame.
This is the background and underlying reason for the general disappointment and pain of Chinese intellectuals between 1990 and 2015.
During this period, it seems that basic research is "rising year by year", but in fact, it is the absolute increase caused by the rapid expansion of China's economic scale, which is completely disproportionate to the scale of training college graduates during the same period.
Before the 90s, it was rare for graduate students in key majors at prestigious universities to be unable to find research jobs and teaching positions – while research institutes and teaching positions actually had a "clear" connotation. With the exception of the departments related to the national defense strategy, the research career at that time was quite "Hanlin Academy".
Older people should remember that the significant expansion of college enrollment in those years was actually synchronized with the abolition of the college graduate allocation system.
As a result, competition for new faculty and academic positions is far more intense than it was before 2000.
To put it mildly, according to the standards of before 1995, the young people who lamented here that "China does not give talents a way out" simply have no qualifications and opportunities to go to university, let alone be admitted to graduate and doctoral students. In that time dimension, you are not a talent at all, and it is impossible to obtain such achievements as you are now that are confident as a talent, and you naturally will not lament that "China does not give talents a chance".
In other words, proportionally, China's academic research has in fact been quietly adjusted in the two decades from 1995 to 2015.
It was the requirements of the times and the state of the world situation at that time that limited China's national strategy to make such adjustments.
In the past 20 years, China needs technicians, engineers and workers who can familiarize themselves with advanced manufacturing processes as soon as possible, high, medium and low-level production managers who are suitable for a large number of small and micro production units, as well as a large number of foreign exchange personnel who have mastered English skills and international knowledge, as well as brave and careful, risk-taking, and entrepreneurial kings.
Without this group of people emerging to generate and create a rich soil for the transformation of academic research results into industry, to generate truly rich and real academic needs, and to provide the equipment required for academic research (such as large deep space telescopes, colliders, fusion simulation devices, ultra-high factor winds, supercomputers, ......).It is an obvious foolishness to unilaterally follow the "ancestral precepts" of "all things are only to study high" to blindly "give high-end talents academic opportunities", and to waste valuable intellectual resources that could have played a greater practical role under extremely tight financial conditions and in an extremely tight development window.
It's as stupid as tightening your belt, buying seeds, and scattering them on the concrete floor.
During these two decades, the "Kochi class" in the traditional sense was very painful.
First, they feel that they are not valued and lack a sense of value in life.
Whether it is from the inheritance of teachers or the personal life expectations of intellectuals, China's senior intellectuals - who can draw the red line between the bachelor's degree in the 90s, the master's degree after 2000, and the doctoral degree after 2010 - have a lingering dignity and arrogance of "Hallym University Scholars".
Engaging in pure academics, abstract thinking, and principled exploration is the "right path" and "natal life".
However, this is not in line with the focus of the times in the hustle and bustle of the past 20 years - the focus has shifted greatly from abstract research to meet the needs of engineering and market, and to the application of technology that I despise in my heart.
This naturally creates a strong sense of "lonely passerby", and every day doubts about one's life choices.
The so-called "unevenness is loud" also.
Second, extreme inadaptability to the rapidly changing academic ecology.
The strategic focus has slipped, and no one knows how to deal with this unprecedented structural change, so it is natural to "encourage exploration and bold innovation", so the value evaluation system of the academic community has come to a hundred schools of thought.
For intellectuals who do not have this clear historical understanding, the answer to this kind of "contention of a hundred schools of thought" is almost doomed - "unorthodox and messy".
The question is, is there such a thing as changing the law that is not chaotic? Is it possible to make it possible for everyone to be satisfied with the results?
It is impossible for "Shang Ying", "Wang Anshi", and "Zhang Juzheng" not to be infamous. It is simply not desirable for the academic community to go through this process without resentment.
This is also the reason why a large number of academic workers have always reaped a sense of powerlessness despite their efforts to "reflect the problem" and "struggle" during this period—the decision-makers have a historical judgment that has been mentally prepared for this issue for a long time, and will not be easily swayed by such emotional reactions.
Scholars, especially those with a high concentration of majors, tend to have a low mental age, and some do not even catch up with their biological age.
And the mental age of politicians, especially those at the helm of a particular country like China, if not by chance, is often well beyond their biological age. In a period of great historical change, the mental age of politicians and elites who have personally experienced and even participated in the creation of history can even far exceed the limit of human biological age.
As much as you have seen the world, there is a high ceiling, and this truth is not mysterious at all.
It is conceivable that there is often a world of difference between the two judgments on the health of the same development process - scholars feel that "there is chaos, the country will not be a country, and there is no hope at all", and it is even difficult to restrain such resentment from not being in class, after tea and dinner, and on the lips of the eyebrows.
On the other hand, there is an old god, and this level of disturbance is completely expected, and it is the proper meaning of the topic, although there are inevitable psychological challenges for the academic community, but in fact, opportunities and crises coexist.
Opportunity always belongs to those who can see the trend of the times clearly, do not waste much energy emotionally, and have the courage to take practical and effective attempts.
One of the main reasons for saying these things is to be wary of the kind of resentment that your own teachers and seniors spread to you after these dinners that are difficult for them to perceive and surpass.
Returning to this topic - the "wave of high-end talent exodus" between 1995 and 2015 is actually more caused by two factors.
One is that the number of graduates with a master's degree or above has increased significantly, far exceeding the supply of domestic academic positions, which will naturally lead to a lot of ** to the industry and overseas.
Those who flow to the industry often need to leave their hometowns to drift in Shanghai and north, and it is inevitable that there will be a difficult experience, which will form scarring memories.
If they find academic opportunities overseas, they will naturally be affected by the differences in conditions between the two sides, resulting in the "domestic no-no-do theory". Those who fail to take root in the academic world abroad will suffer from the fact that the competition for academic opportunities at home has already been overheated, and it will be difficult for them to return to China to gain a foothold.
The other is what we have just explained: the current academic practitioners are at a loss for what to do in the transition period and the chaotic period of the academic system.
This period has lasted for 20 years, which is enough to form the memory of the times of two generations, and of course it will inertly produce the kind of "persuasion" style that you see now on various domestic ** platforms.
Angry. However, you should have noticed that this point in time has been repeatedly pointed out above - 2015.
What is the special significance of 2015?
On March 12, 2015, the United Kingdom was the first to sign up as an intending founding member of the AIIB. The next day, Switzerland also submitted its intention to apply, and subsequently, developed countries such as France, Italy, and Germany also expressed their intention to follow up. South Korea, Russia and other countries in the region and Brazil have also applied for the first founding member before the application deadline of March 31.
On April 20, 2015, during the visit of Chinese mainland leaders to Pakistan, a total of 51 cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed between China and Pakistan.
On June 18, 2015, the Second Institute of China Railway cooperated with Russian enterprises to prepare for the construction of the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway and officially signed a contract with the Russian Railways, with a total amount of about 2.4 billion yuan and a design speed of up to 400 kilometers per hour.
In 2015, China, Russia and Mongolia announced that they would promote the formulation and negotiation of the Agreement on the Development of International Road Transport between China, Russia and Mongolia.
In early September 2015, China and Thailand signed a framework agreement on Sino-Thai railway cooperation.
On October 16, 2015, a consortium of Chinese enterprises led by China Railway Corporation and a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises led by Indonesia's Vika signed an agreement to form a joint venture company to be responsible for the construction and operation of the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project. On November 13, 2015, China and Laos held a signing ceremony for the railway project, which will build a high-speed railway from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, with a total length of 418 kilometers and a total investment of 40 billion yuan, which is expected to be completed and opened to traffic before 2020, and then it is determined that the Mowan railway in Laos is scheduled to be opened to traffic in December 2021.
In 2015, after consultations between China** and Djibouti**, it was decided that the Chinese People's Liberation Army would build a support base and station necessary military personnel in Djibouti, the capital of the Republic of Djibouti. It mainly provides support for the Chinese People's Liberation Army to participate in escort, peacekeeping, humanitarian rescue and other tasks in Africa and West Asia, and facilitates better implementation of military cooperation, joint exercises and training, emergency rescue, evacuation and protection of overseas Chinese, and works with relevant parties to maintain the security of international strategic corridors.
On March 27, 2015, Su Bo, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, said at the policy briefing that the "Made in China 2025" plan has been reviewed and approved by the executive meeting. On May 8, the plan was announced by *** and issued on May 19.
In 2015, China's national positioning and the needs of the times have changed.
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the annual growth target of total social research funding is greater than 7%, and the five-year cumulative increase should be greater than 40%.
This is the minimum indicator.
You can calculate how many new academic jobs will be created in the future inside and outside the Chinese system.
To put it bluntly - your predecessors sighed and grieved, right or not, after all, there is a basis for them.
If you are studying now, at the crossroads of life, you also learn to sigh and "retreat in response to persuasion", then I am afraid that "49 years to join" to become your own regret.
The fact that the United States intends to decouple from Chinese technology is a great thing for the academic community. That means that you don't need to sigh and give up what the Americans have already made from now on, and if you do it again, there will be funds for you.
If the domestic demand is fiercely competitive, have you considered the needs of the Belt and Road countries?
For example, how to develop the soybean industry in equatorial drought conditions? How to increase soybean production in China, is there still so many people who grow soybeans in Zimbabwe?
For example, how to refine a lot of copper in China, and how many people will grab you for process research in Zambia that does not rely on high-tech conditions for primary ore smelting to greatly reduce the pressure on transportation capacity?
For example, how to build an airstrip at the lowest cost in underdeveloped areas?
For example, the study of Islamic ideology?
For example, Central Asian social studies?
Running more to the embassy may have more surprises than running an academic conference.
Over the past two decades, China's "severe brain drain" has been a half-fake problem – it has been an overabundance, and there is no such thing as a "shortage and outflow".
Over the next two decades, this will become a complete pseudo-problem – not only will the rate of net outflows slow down, but there will also be a flow from the world to China.
You're going to see more and more European and American scholars – not just ethnic Chinese – moving to China.
At that time, the question will not be "brain drain", but what position will be left for you.
Wait and see.