The global situation is volatile, with alarming incidents occurring in various places. It is rumored that high-ranking Russian and American officers were wounded on the battlefield, and the Houthis claimed to have shot down the US F22, captured US destroyers, and even attacked US aircraft carriers. More online media broke the news that the Ukrainian army shot down a Russian A50 early warning aircraft in the airspace of the Sea of Azov and damaged an Il-22 electronic warfare aircraft.
The authenticity of these messages remains to be further verified, but judging from the information from both Russia and Ukraine, the Russian army did suffer air losses in the Sea of Azov on January 14, the first time since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
In the past, the losses of Russian aircraft have occurred on the front lines of the exchange of fire (such as the four regions of Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, the northern shore of the Black Sea and the Russian-Ukrainian border), and the area around the Sea of Azov is controlled by Russia, which should have a high safety factor. Now, Russian planes have also been attacked here, which is undoubtedly a wake-up call for Russia.
A50 is the only kind of AWACS aircraft in active service in the Russian army, the number is very rare, only a dozen, and the new A100 has not yet entered service because of research and development delays.
With such a large territory of Russia, relying on such a small number of early warning aircraft to ensure air safety is obviously inadequate, and the loss of one is a huge loss, which will also affect the air situation of the Russian army on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield. What is even more noteworthy is that the Sea of Azov is more than a hundred kilometers or even more away from the Ukrainian-controlled zone, how did the Ukrainian army successfully strike at the Russian aircraft over the Sea of Azov?
At present, there are two possible explanations, one is that the Ukrainian army used long-range anti-aircraft missiles of the Patriot series for ambushes, and the other is that the Ukrainian army sent the F16 fighter jets that it had just received for a surprise attack. Technically, both possibilities exist, but it is not clear whether the F16 of the Ukrainian army is already combat-capable.
The existing Patriot air defense missile systems of the Ukrainian army, including the PAC2 and PAC3, have a maximum range of between 180 and 250 kilometers. The F16 fighter jets that Western countries are providing to the Ukrainian army are about the level of Block 50 52 and are equipped with advanced over-the-horizon air-to-air missiles of the AIM120C7 level, with a maximum range of more than 120 kilometers. Both of these ** pose a real threat to targets over the Sea of Azov.
Some netizens may ridicule the decline in the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, or the weakening of the Russian army, but from the perspective of actual combat, the loss of the Russian army in air defense operations is not a simple matter of technology or combat effectiveness, but has complex political factors.
As we all know, the key to air defense operations is the ability to perceive information, and as long as we know the enemy's position and actions, we already have a great advantage. The information perception of the Ukrainian army comes from NATO, and NATO is not a direct participant in the Russian-Ukrainian war, so NATO's various reconnaissance platforms can collect all kinds of intelligence of the Russian army without threatening, but the Russian army cannot attack them.
With the help of NATO's accurate intelligence, although its own air power is far inferior to that of the Russian army, the Ukrainian army can flexibly choose the opportunity to strike specifically at the weaknesses of the Russian army, so as to obtain certain achievements. On the other hand, the reconnaissance platform of the Russian army is often easy to fall into danger, because although NATO will not directly attack the reconnaissance platform of the Russian army, it can use the Ukrainian army to complete this task. The Ukrainian army relies on NATO's intelligence to sneak attack the Russian army's AWACS aircraft electronic warfare aircraft, and it is impossible for the Russian army to directly retaliate against NATO, right?
Looking back at history, during the Vietnam War, the U.S. military also suffered from this dilemma. At that time, China used its own domestic air defense radar to provide air defense intelligence of US aircraft to the North Vietnamese air force and air defense units, and assisted North Vietnam in organizing territorial air defense operations. Unexpectedly, time has passed, and the same encounter happened to the Russian army again. I'm afraid that the Americans will also laugh and say: Russia, you also have today.
As Western countries continue to provide Ukraine with advanced fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles, coupled with the plug-in supported by NATO intelligence, Russia, which originally occupied the air superiority in the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, will inevitably face increasing challenges and pressures. Especially after the Western fighters represented by F16 joined the battlefield, although the number and performance are not as good as the new fighters of the Russian army, with the help of plug-ins, it can also greatly increase the tactical options of the Ukrainian army and expand the threat range of the Ukrainian air power to the deep targets of the Russian army. Whether the incident in the Sea of Azov is true or not, it is an important warning to the Russian army.
In the absence of a frontal war with NATO, how to effectively deal with the NATO plug-in of the Ukrainian army, improve the defects of its own air defense system, and minimize the losses of this kind of small attack is the primary problem that the Russian army urgently needs to solve, and it is also a useful reference for us to face similar situations in the future.