"Every team in the world is bound to go through a similar period of rebuilding at some point. Chelsea have been fortunate to have largely avoided any rebuilding pains over the last two decades, and that's been two decades of good fortune and now it's just finally your turn. ”
It has been almost 20 years since oil king Roman Abramovich bought Chelsea in 2003 to the first team in 2022. It is true that Chelsea have not experienced much of a formal 'rebuild'. In the early days of ownership, there were no restrictions such as FFP, and the strength and cost of buying people at that time were not much lower than those of Grand Paris in recent years. Even if compared to the market price of the transfer market at the time, Chelsea's successive years of buying spree should be better than that of Paris. The rough buying wave and Mourinho's tuning almost "smashed" a top European team backbone from 2003 to 2005, and relied on this backbone to support the team's operation until 2012. In 2012, the veteran years were passing away, and the team was about to face the dilemma of not receiving the green and yellow, but it was fateful to "steal" a Champions League trophy from Bayern, and successfully introduced a new generation of centers led by Hazard in the name of the Champions League champion, and relied on this group of players to play for several years without danger, and it was not until 2018 that the issue of "changing the dynasty" was more officially put on the agenda.
To put it bluntly, the oil king's concept of team management is the nouveau riche tactic, using the most money to buy the most expensive players and hiring the most expensive coach, and with the best materials, you should make the most delicious food, which is simple and rude. Can't make a top-notch meal? The material is high, it must be the chef's problem, fry! Of course, the reality is not as simple as ideal, and even the best players need time to integrate, not to mention that sometimes the players bought back are not integrated into a whole. The boss who fires the coach every two years does not help to establish a stable environment for the team to grow, and by the way, he has developed the unspoken rule of "player" coaching. When a player knows he is likely to outlive the manager, it is naturally more difficult for the manager to manage the dressing room. Do you still remember William's deeds of dropping Conte's face in public on his social accounts?
The reason why this nouveau riche tactic has stood firm for more than ten years is, on the one hand, from the policy of "high quality materials", which also ensures the lower limit of the team to a certain extent. People who buy expensive may not buy the right one, but generally speaking, the quality of the players themselves is not too bad, and it is always a few pounds to be famous in other leagues or other teams.
The squad that won the Champions League in 2021 is a good example. At the back, the back three played to avoid the weaknesses, Kante, Matteo Kovacic, Jorginho chose two of the three, and Timo Werner and Kai Havertz formed a double arrow, all of which were "coming" tactics. In fact, this tactic cannot fully play all the strengths of all the players, everyone is just doing the familiar work in the position that is still familiar, and there will always be a few players who should be qualified to start. But relying on the player's own hardware is good enough, as long as he can come up with a set that is not unbalanced, he can also allow the player to play himself.
A lineup of seven or eighty percent strength can somewhat avoid a sharp decline in competitiveness. Jose Mourinho II's left-back relied on Cesar Azpilicueta's cameo, Conte's big kill relied on finding a "substitute" Victor Moses to play at a super standard, and even the team of the Ancelotti era was strong on the left and weak on the right - even in the heyday of Chelsea, there were many cases of relying on "good materials" to win without a well-thought-out long-term team building idea.
It is true that Chelsea have never seriously 'rebuilt' if the 'rebuild' is broadly understood to mean that the old players start to age, that the younger players are brought in to allow them to grow and replace the older generation, and then that the tactics and signings are adjusted year by year in accordance with the progress of the young players. The only thing that is relatively close is the 2018 oil king's penchant for Sarriball, hoping to reinvent Chelsea from the beginning of his style of play. Maurizio Sarri's reforms were eventually halted early by a serious rift between transfer bans and fans, and the 2019 transfer ban brought out a few Academy players who were at least able to establish themselves in the first team, but once the ban was lifted, the oil king could not resist the desire to buy and returned to the old way of big purchases. After winning the Champions League in 2021, it should have been based on the young players accumulated in the team to further change the dynasty, but under the good fortune of the oil king, he directly challenged the Premier League crown, and missed the first time to solve the problem of age ratio in the team. In this way, the way of doing business in 2018-2022 is not a reconstruction.
Having never tried to rebuild in earnest, and being accustomed to the low competition for most of the past two decades, has led some people to develop the misconception that "it doesn't take time to rebuild" and that "the adaptation period should be worry-free". Of course, the world changes. From 2005 to 2012, the big four was dominant for most of the time, with only Villa briefly challenging Arsenal for a top-four spot before Liverpool fell into a slump and Tottenham Manchester City rose to power. From 2012 to 2018, the Big 4 gradually changed to the Big 6, Chelsea was pulled down from the top four more and more times, Manchester City, Liverpool and other teams are also consolidating their positions under the deep cultivation, and Chelsea's "ready-to-eat" means gradually cannot ensure the competitiveness of the team. Not to mention the blossoming of the top teams in recent years. Winning the Champions League in 2021 is a big element of luck after all, and it doesn't mean that the team will be successful after two years of "rebuilding".
Regardless of the chaotic situation in the first half of 2023, the problems in the team's performance after setting the direction in the second half of 2023 can be traced back to two core reasons - the lack of player experience and the lack of tacit understanding of the team.
The idea of building a team with young people as the banner will inevitably be extremely unstable, no matter how valuable a genius is, he will not become an overnight talent, and he cannot expect everyone to be Haaland. Moreover, a Norwegian robot has 87 Bundesliga and European games of experience before coming to the Premier League, on the other hand, for example, Nicholas Jackson only has 34 La Liga games, and many other players in Chelsea's current squad have similar game experience to Nicholas Jackson, and cannot look at the current Chelsea with Haaland's level.
If we look back at the development of the team during the 2022-2023 period, it is not only a strategic misjudgment to overfocus on young players, but also to a certain extent, other mistakes made earlier. The team's arrival here may be due to antecedents left over from earlier, and it has evolved into an inevitable end.
In 2021, he chose to point to the Premier League crown, and the transfer action led by the acquisition of Lukaku set the direction of "instant food" as usual, shelved the deployment of the contract renewal of the players in the team, and also ignored the succession of several aging main players, and finally ushered in the collective departure of Antonio Rudiger, Christensen, Marcos Alonso, Jorginho, Kante, Azpilicueta and others silently aged a year.
According to information later disclosed by Antonio Rudiger, the team did not receive any formal contract extension offer until 2022, when they were sanctioned due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Of course, since this is Antonio Rudiger's version, it is up to you to decide how much to trust. But looking at the importance of Antonio Rudiger to the team at that time, he only took the 90,000 pounds weekly salary when he joined from Roma, and at the same time, the oil king chose to spend a lot of money on Lukaku and did not negotiate a contract extension with him, and the degree of "attention" to him can be imagined. In addition to the fact that even if there is no conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Antonio Rudiger is likely to have made up his mind, but also means that in 2021, he will still choose the "ready-to-eat" approach, in addition to wasting the transfer fees and wages spent on Lukaku, missing the first time point to seriously consider team building and rebuilding is the biggest opportunity cost.
With the arrival of a new owner, Thomas Tuchel has fallen out with his boss and dressing room in a summer, and with the legacy of the Oil King era, the 2022 summer transfer window can be considered largely null and void. The trio of Wesley Fofana, Kalidou Koulibaly and Marc Cucurella are largely dealing with Antonio Rudiger, Andreas Christensen and Marcos Alonso, Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang is dealing with Lukaku's loan and Raheem Sterling replacing Timo Werner. Wesley Fofana and Raheem Sterling had some future considerations, but it was still in the era of Todd Polly's "live-action FM", so they didn't have to think too much about it. The following winter transfer window and the 2023 summer transfer window are the familiar "young player revolution", and they are also the operations after the two sports directors actually take over the team, so let's not mention it for the time being.
Why look back at these transfer windows? Let's review the previous summary - the players are still inexperienced, the team is not tacit enough, and it should not be relied on only young players. In other words, the transition between the old and the new should proceed in a step-by-step manner. Brighton in recent years, or Arsenal with Xhaka's group of players at the beginning a few years ago, can do "bring the old with the new". A look back at Chelsea's history in recent years shows that the loss of 'old' soil has been happening, and the opportunity to bring in 'new' saplings has been missed when there are still old players.
If you don't force the instant results, divide the FSR limit spent on Lukaku to keep Antonio Rudiger or Christensen at least one of them, and leave more room for mistakes for Tammy Abraham to grow and allow Conor Gallagher to stand firm more smoothly, then even in the face of sanctions in 2022, the transfer window that Todd Polly takes over at least does not have to rush to fill the defensive void, and now it will be Tammy Abraham who is the striker, and Conor Gallagher can at least be more experienced than now. It might even be possible to avoid Mason Mount's disgraced departure after the remnant. 2021 should be an opportunity to bring "new" when there is still "old" available, but as soon as the holy decree to buy Lukaku came out, the oil king's eagerness for quick success and quick profit was seen by everyone, and Thomas Tuchel naturally had less room to train slowly. In the same way, in 2022, due to the force majeure of sanctions and change of ownership, it is difficult for even the best saplings to grow in the storm. In addition to the exchange of a bunch of newcomers who need time to adapt, it is also the largest loss of soil, after all, defense is often more tacit and experienced than offense.
In 2023, in addition to large-scale purchases, the two transfer windows also ushered in the departure of many old players. What is frustrating is that looking at the departures in 2023, there are almost no people who can be called "missold". From veterans such as N'Golo Kante, Edouard Mendy and Hakim Ziyech, to younger generations such as Callum Hudson-Odoi, Christian Christian Pulisic and Ruben Loftus-Cheek, the future of the team has come to an end for different reasons. Kalidou Koulibaly and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang have only been available as passers-by, and they have only been in the squad for a short period of time, and they will not be able to be "old-timers". Kepa Arrizabalaga, Mateo Kovacic, Jorginho, Cesar Azpilicueta and others have theoretically made achievements off and off the pitch, but have always been reluctant to force players to stay. And apart from these big brothers, there is really no one else who can be called "soil".
If it weren't for the quick success in 2021 and the force majeure in 2022, perhaps the departed Kai Havertz, Mason Mount, Tammy Abraham, or the still in the squad Conor Gallagher, after two years of relatively stable growth, could become a new generation that is still childish but enough to cope with the transition. But, alas, there is no if, only the result remains.
As for the future, ......The head has been washed, and there is only one way to harden. It would be risky to rely too heavily on the future of young players, but the door to not taking risks was in part closed the moment we won the Champions League in 2021. The "legacy" of the previous dynasty doomed the team to exhaustion, and the most rugged path was chosen in planning, and the current predicament is frankly unsolvable.
So, regardless of what is the perception of Pochettino, the stark reality is that Chelsea can't afford to hire a better manager than him in the summer of 2023, and they can't think of anyone who can face the current situation without facing the same problems, let alone coming to the middle of the season. Since the root cause lies in many structural problems, there is no need to quarrel for a change of leadership. What if you change it, and who can you change?
There is no accident in the world, there is only necessity.