On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Northeast China raided Shenyang. In the face of the menacing Kwantung Army, Zhang Xueliang, who was the commander of the Northeast Army at that time, ordered his subordinates not to resist at the first time, which directly led to the Japanese army successfully occupying Shenyang on the second day and capturing most of the Northeast in more than four months.
In February 1932, the entire territory of Northeast China fell, and in March, Japan established a puppet regime in Manchuria, and the 14-year history of blood and tears of the people of Northeast China began.
In fact, long before the September 18 Incident, Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang had a tendency to not resist Japan, but the enemy had already hit the doorstep, so why did Zhang Xueliang insist on not firing a single shot? Is it really just because of following Chiang Kai-shek's order of "non-resistance"?
On September 6, 1931, Zhang Xueliang said in a telegram to his subordinates: "For the Japanese, no matter how they seek trouble, we must tolerate them in every way, and we must not resist them and cause trouble." ”
It is not difficult to see that long before the incident, Zhang Xueliang had a premonition that the Japanese army would make some moves. However, there was the "Middle East Road Incident" in the past, and the vitality of the Northeast Army was greatly damaged, and in order to prevent the Japanese army from expanding the war, Zhang Xueliang strongly advocated avoiding the war.
Many people still believe that Zhang Xueliang chose not to resist after Chiang Kai-shek's orders during the September 18 Incident, but in fact, Chiang Kai-shek did not explicitly give Zhang Xueliang an order not to resist after the September 18 Incident, and at best he acquiesced in Zhang Xueliang's practice of not resisting the Japanese army.
In addition, Zhang Xueliang's Northeast regime had considerable independence, which meant that if he was interested in resisting the Japanese at that time, even Chiang Kai-shek would not be able to influence his decision.
On the evening of September 20, the third day of the September 18 Incident, Zhang Xueliang met with foreign reporters in the reception room, and he said: "When the news of the Japanese attack came, he immediately ordered the ordnance to be confiscated and no retaliatory action was taken. The first time Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang after the 918 Incident was on the evening of the 19th, and it was obvious that Zhang Xueliang himself was the person who issued the decision not to resist.
Soon after the September 18 Incident, Zhang Xueliang quickly retreated to Jinzhou with the acquiescence of Chiang Kai-shek, and pinned his hopes on the League of Nations, hoping that Japan could stop the invasion under the intervention of the League of Nations.
On October 24, 1931, the League of Nations made a resolution demanding that the Japanese withdraw their troops, but the Japanese army, which had already tasted the sweetness, ignored the warning of the League of Nations and continued to attack the defenders of Nenjiang and Heilongjiang in November.
On November 19, the Japanese army occupied Qiqihar, and Nanjing**, aware of Japan's ambitions, finally could not sit still. On November 25, Minister Gu Weijun sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang on behalf of Nanjing: "The Eastern Province is under all control, and his conspiracy to build a new regime will surely advance again, which has a great bearing on the survival of the Eastern Province." ”
However, at this time, Zhang Xueliang, who had realized that the League of Nations was powerless and was constantly exhausted by the bombardment of the Japanese army's sophisticated ordnance, was being persuaded by the Japanese side. The Japanese side claimed that as long as Zhang Xueliang was willing to withdraw from Jinzhou, the Japanese army would stop at the Daling River. After seeing hope, Zhang Xueliang began to negotiate frequently with the Japanese side, hoping to resolve the Jinzhou issue peacefully, and had plans to withdraw from Jinzhou.
On December 8, Chiang Kai-shek personally telegraphed Zhang Xueliang: "The Jinzhou army must not retreat at this time. Under the strong persuasion of his family and friends and his friends, although Zhang Xueliang still preferred peace talks with Japan in his heart, he was determined to stick to Jinzhou, but the next major event once again shook his mind.
On December 15th, Chiang Kai-shek went into the wilderness, Guangzhou nationals ** entered Nanjing, Sun Ke and others dominated the political situation, and appointed Chen Youren, who was anti-Chiang and Zhang Zili, as the chief of the first month, and took on the heavy responsibility of negotiating with Japan.
At the same time, Sun Ke** also repeatedly called Zhang Xueliang, asking him to stick to Jinzhou, but on the other hand, he has been unable to fulfill his promise to help Jinzhou due to financial problems, which once again aggravated Zhang Xueliang's suspicion of Sun Ke's faction. The disparity in military strength between the two sides was too great, and the people would only send empty checks without giving actual support, and the idea of preserving strength and abandoning Jinzhou gradually gained the upper hand in his heart.
On January 1, 1932, when the Kwantung Army Headquarters issued an order to capture Jinzhou, the main force of the Northeast Army had all withdrawn from the Jinzhou area; On January 3, the Japanese army had a smooth journey, almost no resistance from the Northeast Army, and occupied Jinzhou without bloodshed. On February 5, with the loss of Harbin, the whole of Northeast China fell.
After the 918 Incident, the morale of the Japanese army soared and a large amount of materials were seized from the Northeast, laying a solid foundation for the later full-scale invasion of China, while Zhang Xueliang was criticized by the society for the loss of the Northeast.
In 1990, when 89-year-old Zhang Xueliang was asked again in an interview with a Japanese reporter about his actions in the September 18 Incident, he shook his head helplessly and said: "I misjudged 'September 18'. Then he added: "I don't think Japan can do that, because it's not good for him." If I had known that the Japanese were going to coup d'état, I would have fought with the Japanese at that time. ”
In fact, Zhang Xueliang's thoughts are not incomprehensible, before the 918 incident, Japan was constantly harassing our people in the northeast, Zhang Xueliang has seen and dealt with many similar incidents in the past, and the Japanese have been misleading him, making him think that as long as he does not resist, Japan will not make greater moves in the future.
However, it was precisely because of the September 18 incident that Zhang Xueliang saw the Japanese face clearly, and realized that blindly tolerating would only make Japan gain an inch. After the September 18 Incident, Zhang Xueliang began to strongly advocate the use of force to resist Japan, and also launched the Xi'an Incident to force Chiang to resist Japan, making outstanding contributions to the establishment of the anti-Japanese national united front.