Looking through the entire eight-year history of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, almost half of the outstanding achievements were made in the first division. In the eight-year history of the Anti-Japanese War in the first division, there are several very wonderful major dramas.
Each of these plays can be taken out to make wonderful and moving film and television works. For example, the defense of Fuping Dongxizhuang in September 1938, the attack on Dalonghua in May 1939, the Yansuya-Loess Ridge ambush in November, the battle of Jingcheng in August 1940, the Lailing Battle in September, and the summer and autumn counter-sweeps in August and September 1941.
Except for the summer and autumn of 1941, when the counter-sweep was passive, the rest of the major dramas were all taken by the Eighth Route Army of the 1st Division to take the initiative to fight the enemy. But even if it was passively on the stage of history, the 1941 anti-sweep of the First Division was so wonderful and thrilling, and its touching point was far more brilliant than several other major dramas that took the initiative to enter the stage of history.
Therefore, whenever I narrate the anti-sweep of a division in 1941, I always feel that there are endless words and historical stories to tell.
In 1941, it was a turning point of historical significance not only for the 1st Division, but also for the entire Jin-Cha-Ji Anti-Japanese Base Area. As long as there is a fighter plane that can annihilate the enemy, the troops of the 1st Division commanded by Yang Chengwu will never let it go, and they must fight a battle.
After 1941, the situation changed radically. The loss of personnel and ammunition caused by the Eighth Route Army in the 1940 Hundred Regiment War could not be replenished at all. The economic pressure is far more serious than the loss of personnel and ammunition. Because the Japanese puppet army imposed a blockade on the mountainous areas of western Hebei, where materials were scarce and products were barren, the economy of the anti-Japanese base areas in the mountainous areas, especially the food supply, became the most serious problem. The Jin-Cha-Ji Eighth Route Army, including the 1st Division, lost the ability and material basis to take the initiative to attack the enemy.
Because it was impossible to solve the economic difficulties more effectively, the anti-Japanese resistance could only increase the burden on the peasants in the base areas. In 1941, the total population of military and political personnel in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region was 59%, about 590,000 people. According to the minimum standard of 5 stone millet per person per year, the military and administrative expenses of the entire border region will be 2.96 million stone rice. In 1940, the public grain income of the border areas was only 1.6 million stones, which was only slightly more than half of what was needed to solve the Jin-Cha-Ji problem, and the rest of the deficit was nowhere to be made up. In order to overcome the financial difficulties, in 1941 the total number of levies in the border districts** increased by 53 compared with the previous year's actual levies7%, which has no choice but to increase the burden on the people in the base areas.
In 1942, the poor peasants in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area needed to come up with 7 percent of their per capita income34% to be paid; The landlord needs to come up with 6438%。In November 1938, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region began to collect public grain for national salvation, and the original burden was 40-50%; Later, the exemption point was lowered, and the burden was expanded to 60%. The national salvation grain in the border areas is not collected uniformly, but is left in each village and household, and all units can obtain food supplies anytime and anywhere with military food stamps. From 1939 to 1941, the burden on the common people in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region continued to increase. In 1941, the average burden per capita in the border regions increased by 20 per cent compared with 1940. In 1942, the people's incomes were markedly lower than the previous year, and the amount of grain that needed to be paid was further increased.
In addition to the regular burdens, the peasants in the base areas also had to undertake a lot of miscellaneous work, for example, the people in the base areas had to undertake the task of fighting and providing support for the anti-Japanese war troops such as carrying stretchers and making shoes. In April 1941, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region promulgated the "Anti-Japanese War Service Mobilization Measures", stipulating that each person should serve no more than 5 days per month, and the service content included transportation, stretchers, sewing military uniforms, making shoes, and delivering newspapers. At the same time, "stop the payment of expenses, educate the people, and make the masses understand that it is the sacred duty of the masses to serve in war." ”
Notice that there is no: "stop the payment of differential expenses", which means that in the past, there was a remuneration, and in the future, it will only be for nothing. Say that the people in the base area have no opinion? That would distort the nature of the peasantry.
What does the predicament of the Jin-Cha-Ji anti-Japanese base around 1941 show? It shows that the military sweeping measures and economic blockade measures taken by the Japanese army in 1941 were very effective. As far as Japan, which had already entered the socially developed country at that time, undoubtedly had a highly scientific aspect in its war of aggression in China.
The Japanese North China Front prepared for a major encirclement and suppression in North China very early. In its report to the Tokyo Army Base Camp, the North China Front Army said: "As early as the autumn of 1938, the Front Army identified the ** force as the greatest hidden danger to public order in North China. "The current state of law and order in the occupied areas is, in order of superiority and inferiority: Mongolia, the Triangle, the Wuhan region, and North China, with North China being the worst. ”
In 1940, the Eighth Route Army launched the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, which strengthened the implementation of this combat plan by the Japanese North China Front. So, the base camp of the Japanese Army in Tokyo decided: "Consolidate North China in 1941 year." For this reason, the dispatch army dispatched two divisions from Central China to reinforce North China, with a view to thoroughly rectifying public order. In Wuhan, a contractionary reorganization was carried out in the Jiangnan region. ”
Japanese people have always been very meticulous in their work. The army was mobilized to North China, and did not immediately launch a sweep of Jin-Cha-Ji, the Japanese first made some preparations, that is: "According to the annual plan, the front army first carried out the eastern Hebei operation (May 29-July 21) from the end of May to the middle of June, and then carried out the operation in the north-central Hebei from June 6 to July 10, and received the results of a thorough sweep of the border area of Jire and the vicinity of Baiyangdian. ”
The Japanese army made this preparatory work by first carrying out a sweep of eastern Hebei, northern Hebei (that is, the Shishi District and the Baiyangdian area), and the Pingxi Advance Army, so as to avoid "worries" when the Jin-Cha-Ji was swept up later.
In 1941, the Japanese army's sweep of the Jin-Cha-Ji was called the "Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area Suzheng Operation" in the combat operations of the Japanese army. In this battle plan, the Japanese army specifically pointed out: "The western Hebei region of this operation is the central base area of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region. It is located in the northern Taihang Mountains area, which is 300 kilometers north and south and 100 kilometers east and west. There are more than 40,000 people in the region, and the people under his leadership have received full organizational training, and their combat effectiveness should not be underestimated.
In order to consume and trap the communist forces in the area, the front army participated in this operation with the main force, and took the action of completely blockading and eliminating the ** and its base areas. At the same time, in coordination with military operations, it has actively carried out political, economic, and cultural work. ”
In order to deal with the 100-regiment battle launched by the Jin-Cha-Ji Eighth Route Army in 1940, Japan's North China Front Army issued a Suzheng combat order on the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area on July 9, according to the annual plan. In the order, secret instructions were given on the battle plan, the propaganda and reporting plan, and the intelligence gathering plan. ”
Among them, the content of the first division is involved, and it is stipulated in the plan: "The A Corps will enter Liangxiang before X+2, and after Gaobeidian, it will attack the enemy area in the west direction and crush the enemy's collective combat effectiveness." In particular, it is necessary to quickly occupy the Yixian-Laiyuan road in order to cut off the enemy's north-south communications. ”
It should be noted that when the Japanese army formulated this 1941 North China Sweep operation plan, the commander of the Japanese North China Front was still Tada Jun; And when the implementation of this battle plan began, the commander of the Japanese North China Front was replaced by Okamura Ninji, who was called "the most difficult enemy to deal with".
The summer and autumn sweeps of that year, which began in August 1941, were actually divided into two phases.
In the first stage, from late August to mid-to-late September, the Japanese army carefully ascertained the location of the head organs of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, the command organs of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei military sub-districts, and the main forces in accordance with the intelligence they had already gathered, and then carried out a key sneak attack with accurate targets, calling it "decapitation operation" in today's tactical term, in an attempt to disrupt the command system of the Eighth Route Army first. Some of the targets of the first phase of the Japanese army's operations were successful, and some were not.
In the second stage, starting from the end of September, Japan's "iron-walled encirclement" of the Jin-Cha-Ji anti-Japanese base areas was basically completed, and it began to carry out a "dragnet-style sweep" like fishing, and the troops of the Eighth Route Army in a state of hiding in the east were eliminated after the encirclement. The extremely wonderful breakthrough of Langya Mountain in the first division, the cliff jumping of the five heroes, the breakthrough of Yang Chengwu Ladder Ditch, and the tragic killing of the students of Bethune Medical School all occurred at this stage.
Now let's start with that extraordinary day on August 24, 1941.
As early as 1939, before the 1941 sweep, Yang Chengwu keenly discovered that the Yilai Highway in Yixian County was actually the dividing line between the two major Japanese fronts in China: south of the Yilai Highway, it was under the jurisdiction of the Japanese North China Front Army in Beiping; To the north of the Yilai Highway and to the west of Yixian County, Laiyuan County is under the jurisdiction of the Zhangjiakou Chahar Mengjiang Front, which is subordinate to the Japanese Kwantung Army. The military actions taken by these two fronts against the Eighth Route Army were often different and not synchronized. Therefore, whenever the North China Front of the Japanese Army took a sweeping operation, as long as the Eighth Route Army of the 1st Division crossed the Yilai Highway, it could watch the devils sweeping Langya Mountain from the sidelines of Pingxi and return empty-handed.
However, Okamura Ninji (perhaps the Japanese officer in charge of the actual charge) discovered this pattern of action that had been used by the 1st Division for many years, so in 1941, he specifically listed in the general sweep operation plan that "in particular, it is necessary to quickly occupy the Yixian-Laiyuan road in order to cut off the enemy's north-south communications." ”
On the night of August 24, 1941, after the enemy had formed an encirclement of the base area of the No. 1 Sub-division of Langya Mountain, Yang Chengwu led the command organ brigade of the No. 1 Sub-division to set out from Zhouzhuang after dark, and marched north overnight, posing as if he wanted to cross the Yilai Highway and enter Pingxi. When approaching the Yilai Highway, Yang Chengwu suddenly ordered a U-turn to the south, and then west, from the Bat Ridge area into Laiyuan County, throwing off the enemy who was trailing behind.
Analyzing Yang Chengwu's night action in August 1941, there are actually many unfathomable questions.
The encirclement of the 1st Division by the Devil Soldiers began on 23 August. On the day of 23 August, on the east and north sides of the base area of the 1st Division, the mobile unit of the 21st Guizi Division (stationed in Baoding) began to "encircle with an iron wall" and arrived at Bauhinia Pass from Xushui and Yixian County.
During the day on the 24th, in the south, the troops of the 110th Division completed the encirclement from Baoding, Wangdu, Wanxian, and Liujiatai. On the same day, Xushui's enemies occupied Jinpo and went to Yuangang and bunk beds. At this point, the anti-Japanese base area centered on Langya Mountain was surrounded by the devil's army on three sides, and only the west side led to Laiyuan and there was still an opening.
The target of the devil soldiers' actions was directly aimed at several villages in Loushan, where the headquarters of the 1st Division had been stationed. On the day of the 23rd, the 1st Regiment, part of the 3rd Regiment and the 25th Regiment defending the vicinity of Loushan had already engaged fire with the enemy and started fighting. The Japanese troops dispatched planes to bomb them, and the troops of these regiments did not withdraw until after dark at night, leaving several villages in Loushan empty, and even the common people were evacuated.
In the front, Yang Chengwu transferred the command organ of the first division, which had been greatly streamlined, to Zhouzhuang, a small village in the southwest. In Zhouzhuang, the personnel were counted again, unnecessary documents and backpacks were cleaned up, and preparations were made for a breakthrough on the evening of the 24th.
On the night of August 24, 1941, Yang Chengwu marched from Zhouzhuang to the east to the north, and then to the south and west, I also had a wrong understanding. It is Yang Chengwu's attempt to give an illusion to the enemy who is following behind, it is Yang Chengwu's genius, and it is the embodiment of Yang Chengwu's outstanding command art. Staff Officer Zhou Ziwei reminded Yang Chengwu: "Commander Yang, I suspect that there are enemy spies in our team. ”
The first phase of Yang Chengwu's sweep in 1041.
During the eight years of the Anti-Japanese War, whenever the devils entered the mountains to sweep, the Eighth Route Army had to be transferred, and the transferred team would always be followed by many ordinary people, which was the reality at that time and the norm. Before August 24, Yang Chengwu led a sub-district organ from Loushan to Zhouzhuang, and many basic people from Loushan came with him.
During the Anti-Japanese War, you people helped the Eighth Route Army, and the devils and traitors knew that they were going to be killed. Therefore, your Eighth Route Army is transferred, and you slap your ass and fly away, and the people follow you to transfer, thinking that it will be safer if the Eighth Route Army is there, that is a trust in you, and what reason do you have to drive the people away. At that time, Liu Bei retreated from Xinye, Henan all the way to Jingzhou, Hubei, and the people who retreated with Liu Bei amounted to hundreds of thousands. Liu Bei can still be like this, why can't the Eighth Route Army? When Yang Chengwu transferred from Zhouzhuang again, there were more ordinary people following behind his buttocks. It is inevitable that there is a secret agent hidden among these ordinary people, who quietly sets up signposts for the enemies who follow behind.
Until today, seventy years later, no one knows the route Yang Chengwu was going to take at that time and the plan to dodge, I guess Yang Chengwu did not formulate a plan of action in advance at all, because the enemy's plan of action is not possible, everything has to be based on the commander's intuition to make action decisions on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps, Yang Chengwu originally commanded this team all the way to the north, originally to cross the Yilai Highway to Pingxi, because Yang Chengwu is a man, not a god, he does not have the ability to foresee, he does not know that the Japanese army's battle plan is to cut off the Yilai Highway in advance, and the retreat route to the north to Pingxi is cut off. However, when he approached the Yilai Highway, he had the intuition of commanding the army to save the day for many years, and clearly felt that the atmosphere along the highway was wrong, and the enemy had laid a trap to encircle, so he turned around and headed south in time to avoid being surrounded by the enemy near the Yilai Highway.
Yang Chengwu's course of action on the night of 24 August from north to south once again proved that practice is the only criterion for testing truth.
The devil soldiers, who were also dispatched on the night of August 24, under the guidance of spies who were familiar with the terrain of Yi County, attacked many areas of Yi County at the same time, such as Loushan in the north and south, Songshan, Linquan, vegetable garden, oral, etc., some of them were empty, and some were successful. The two companies of the first battalion in the oral village were attacked by the devils because of their carelessness.
When the devil soldiers attacked Koukou Village before dawn, Yang Chengwu had already led a sub-district command organ brigade to return from the south of Yilai Highway to the Coal Bucket Shop (Coal Bucket Shop is the popular name of the local area, and the local traditional name is "Mo Dou"), which is in the west of Koukou Village, very close to Pocang, more than ten miles away from Koukou Village, and more than a dozen villages in between. Maybe he heard the dense gunfire from the east, or maybe the ghost soldiers who had been following him were approaching again, in short, Yang Chengwu commanded the brigade to the northwest, through Bat Ridge into the Wuhuiling Mountains, and then into a small mountain village called "Wannian Bing" in the south of Yangjiazhuang in Laiyuan County.
In Wannian Bing, a small village on the border of Yi County and Laiyuan County, in this small mountain village with only two households, more than 500 people led by Yang Chengwu waited quietly for more than ten days, completely getting rid of the enemy who was following them all the way. This is a very small and hidden ravine, a regiment of three companies guarded the end of the ditch, the reconnaissance company guarded the front of the ditch, the guard company controlled the local people who followed the retreat of the first division brigade all the way, and found hidden enemy specialties in it.
During the war years, many homes and villages were burned down by the enemy, so such beggars were not conspicuous. But this enemy was exposed by the rice he had begged for himself. The rice that comes from the begging comes from every family, and there is all kinds of grain, like laba rice, mixed together. But the rice that this enemy carried with him was all yellow millet, and there was no begging rice like this.
Later, I was shocked to see the enemy's special deployment plan of the Japanese North China Front, and I planned to write a separate article later.
disposed of the hidden spies, and the devil who had been following him lost the clue and could only go back. For more than half a month after that, Yang Chengwu's brigade has been dormant in the small village for ten thousand years, not moving at all. Until mid-September, Yang Chengwu estimated that the devil should also retreat, so he led the team out of Wannian Bing Village and returned to Yi County. On the way, he met Dong Yongqing, the head of the supply department of the first sub-district who was also hiding from the devils in the small ravine of Laiyuan, and with Dong Yongqing, there was also Li Qi, the magistrate of Laiyuan County at that time.
I guess Yang Chengwu's original intention of returning to Yi County, he originally thought that this sweep of the devils was over, according to the previous law, it was okay for a sweep to last for more than 20 days, and it should be over. But in fact, the sweep that was supposed to end was not actually over, the troops that the devils entered the base area did not withdraw, and the second phase of the more brutal sweep began again. Of course, it was only later that I learned that this time the devil's purge lasted 66 days.
Yang Chengwu, who entered the territory of Yi County, pondered for a while, and then discussed with Huang Shoufa, the chief of staff who was with him, and the leaders of the first division, what is the next step? In fact, they came from the west, and the road to the center of the first division base area to the east was still occupied by the devil's army, and they couldn't go, and the only roads left were north or south.
According to Yang Chengwu's Memoirs, the result of their discussion was to go south to the Huata Mountain area at the junction of Wan County and Tang County, because the location there was remote, and the devils had never been to sweep in the past. And to the north, entering the Pingxi area, they saw that the devils had blocked the Yilai Highway very tightly, so they didn't want to take that risk. As it turned out, they made the wrong choice.
In fact, looking back at this period of history, the reason why Yang Chengwu and the others made this wrong choice is inseparable from a battle that took place at that time. In "Yang Chengwu's Memoirs", there is no mention of this battle, because this battle has no direct relationship with the First Division or Yang Chengwu.
From the end of August to the beginning of September 1941, when Yang Chengwu led the command organ brigade of the first division to hide, the headquarters of the third division in Tang County was also captured by devils.
In January 1939, in accordance with the deployment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, the 1st Division assigned its main force 2nd Regiment to the 3rd Division, and exchanged it with the 10th Brigade of the 3rd Division. The 10 th team of the 3rd Division can be described as full of talents, and the Red Army cadres Chen Zongkun, Lai Qingyao, Guo Yanlin, and others, as well as the Anti-Japanese War cadres Chen Yafu, Xu Xin, Ji Jingxian, and others, who later showed their skills in the 1st Division for many years, all came from this 10 th team.
The second regiment given by Yang Chengwu was formerly the third regiment of the Red First Division with Zeng Baotang as the head and Xiao Feng as the political commissar of the regiment; After the Red First Division was reorganized into an independent regiment, the three regiments were organized into three battalions of the independent regiment, with battalion commander Huang Shoufa, deputy battalion commander Qiu Wei, and instructor Li Shuiqing. In October 1937, the independent regiment was upgraded to an independent division, and the third battalion was reorganized into the second regiment of the independent division, and the regiment commander was Huang Shoufa at first, and then in early November, due to the defection of Wang Tiancun, Duan Rushan, and Li Qingchuan's "dark horse team", Huang Shoufa took into account the overall situation and gave up the position of regiment commander to Wang Tiancun, and the regiment's political commissar Yuan Shengping. The Second Regiment was formed by two Red Army companies (the company of the 2nd Battalion of the former Independent Regiment) and a local anti-Japanese guerrilla detachment and Wang Tiancun's "dark horse team" operating in Yangyuan, Tianzhen, and Yanggao areas.
These two companies, from the 13th Regiment of the former 1st Red Division, are all companies composed of Shaanxi and Gansu people. After being assigned to the 3rd Division, it had a strong relationship with the 1st Division, and participated in the Battle of Loess Ridge in 1939 and the Battle of Lailing in 1940.
In 1941, when the devils were purging him, Zhan Caifang took a fancy to this company from the Red Army company, and the military and political quality was the best, so he kept this company by his side and served as the guard of the command organ of the three divisions.
At the beginning of the sweep, Zhan Caifang chose the path of Yang Chengwu at the beginning, and led the three divisional organs to turn to the Pingxi area. When they approached the Yilai Highway, they did not turn around immediately as soon as they saw that the momentum was not good, like Yang Chengwu, but continued to move forward, only to be surrounded by devils. The 3rd Divisional Brigade had only one company of covering troops, and this company fought desperately to cover the withdrawal of the organ brigade. But the devils were in hot pursuit, and in a mountainous area on the border of Yilai, Zhan Caifang's brigade was finally surrounded by devils, and the situation was not good.
Suddenly, there was a loud burst of gunfire behind the devils, and in an instant, more than a dozen machine guns were fired together, and the devils hurriedly retreated, and the three divisional organ brigades were reborn. Later, I saw that Yang Chengwu led the 1st Divisional Brigade to pass through here, and it happened to save Zhan Caifang's 3rd Divisional Organ, otherwise the consequences would be unimaginable. In "Yang Chengwu's Memoirs", there is no mention of this experience of saving people. However, Yang Chengwu met Zhan Caifang and knew that the road to the north was difficult and unfeasible, so he made up his mind to go south and took refuge in the Huata Mountain area. After the Battle of Loess Ridge in 1939, the devils carried out a retaliatory sweep against the first division, and Yang Chengwu led the first division to hide in Huata Mountain and avoid the enemy.
Later, I looked at the combat report of the Japanese North China Front and talked about the encirclement and suppression of the first division
Due to the smooth progress of the first operation in the Pingxi area and the central Hebei region, the front army decided to start an attack on the western Hebei base area in the Taihang Mountains in the north of the main target on 23 August, and issued an order to attack and implement a blockade on the 18th.
The offensive on August 23-27 was as follows:
At dawn on the 23rd, the A Corps marched westward in three columns from the vicinity of the Red Coal Plant, Zhuoxian, and Laishui. On the evening of the 23rd, the northern and central columns entered the vicinity of Zhangfang Town in the valley of the North Juma River, and on the 24th, they attacked a force of about 1,000 people commanded by Xiao Ke, and at dawn on the 25th, pressed the enemy to the valley of the Juma River, defeated the enemy, and captured 600 people.
At dawn on the 23rd, the B Corps marched westward in three columns from the vicinity of Dingxing and Fangshun Bridges, and began a siege on a force of about 5,000 men under the command of Yang Chengwu, commander of the First Military Region, which was entrenched in the vicinity of Beilou Mountain in the north of Mancheng. Due to the stubborn resistance of a part of the ** holding a fortified position in the west of Beilou Mountain, our army, with the close cooperation of the air force, launched hand-to-hand combat, severely attacked the enemy, and caused him to flee to the north.
At dawn on the 23rd, the C Corps was divided into three columns from the vicinity of Xinle, Zhengding, and Jingcheng to sweep the ** in each area, attack to the northwest on the other, and then advance north. On the 24th, they captured Fuping in the base area of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area and Chenjiayuan in the base area of western Hebei (about 50 kilometers northwest of Shimen). During the attack on the vicinity of Chen's Courtyard, he was independently mixed.
3. The close cooperation of each part of the 4th Brigade and the defeat of the powerful troops under the command of *** on the 27th near Chenzhuang (about 30 kilometers south of Fuping), where the Anti-Japanese University is located.
The battle from August 28 to September 3 was as follows:
After the 28th, the B Corps pursued the Yang Chengwu Division of the First Army Division near Jiuneng Mountain (about 40 kilometers northwest of Yi County) with its division, and at the same time directed the attack target at the Huang Yongsheng Division of the Third Army Division, and coordinated with the 26th Division and the 1st Division of the Independent Mixed Second Brigade. Siege the ** gathered in the area. Between the 29th and the 2nd of September, repeated sweeps were carried out in the area around the Guanmaguan area.
The Japanese North China Front did not know that Huang Yongsheng of the Third Division was not there, and that it was a unit commanded by Deputy Commander Zhan Caifang. However, the battle report of the Japanese army revealed that Yang Chengwu was indeed with the Third Division and rescued hundreds of Zhan Caifang and his party.
On the way from Yi County to Mancheng County, on September 24, exactly one month after Yang Chengwu broke through Zhouzhuang, in Zhangjiazhuang, Mancheng County, Yang Chengwu heard the news that Qiu Wei and 40,000 soldiers and civilians were besieged on Langya Mountain, so he mobilized the 3rd and 20th regiments nearby, and on the night of the 24th, stormed the devil soldiers of Songshan and Nanguantou Village in the south of Langya Mountain, and transferred the enemy who surrounded the mountain for the trapped army and people on Langya. After the arrangement, without waiting to see the results, due to the critical situation around him, Yang Chengwu immediately led the brigade to continue southward and entered the territory of Wanxian County from Mancheng County. At this time, he didn't know that he had already walked into the encirclement arranged by the devils in the Huata Mountain area.
I have already told the story that happened later, there is a ladder ditch breakthrough in the south, and a breakthrough in the north of Langya Mountain and the cover of the five heroes jumping off the cliff. I have written about it in a special article, so I will not go into detail at this time.
After the war, the Japanese North China Front counted the results of the battle: "The comprehensive results of this operation are as follows: (According to the materials of the 11th O Division, as of October 27, halfway through the operation).
The enemy lost 5,616 corpses. 3,769 prisoners.
The main seizures were: 7 mortars, 14 heavy machine guns, 54 light machine guns, 103 automatic rifles, 784 muskets, 2,413 rifles, 116,777 rounds of ammunition, 444 pistols, 3,707 bayonets and 144,504 grenades. (omitted below).
Our losses 84 killed and 224 wounded. ”
The falsified figures of the Imperial Japanese Army are not credible.
In the inquiry about the prisoners of war of the Eighth Route Army by the Japanese North China Front, a text is worth pondering: "In the first place, in order to win the support of the people, the requirements for military discipline are extremely strict. For example, during the march, pears from trees by the roadside were picked and given to the captives, who refused to accept them, saying that the peasants could not eat whatever they wanted. Another example is that a soldier of the Eighth Route Army who was detained in the Longhua County Public Security Bureau was punished for secretly talking to a woman while camping in a certain village. ”