First of all, there is a recognized reason why Chiang Kai-shek lost, that is, he was good at micro-manipulation, but it was also the fuse of his failure. Historically, Chiang Kai-shek's "micro-manipulation" tactics have brought success in some cases, but they have also caused quite a few problems for his army.
For example, during the Red Army's Long March, Xue Yue was sent to pursue the Red Army, but Chiang Kai-shek thought Xue Yue's progress was slow, so he decided to go out himself. However, Chiang Kai-shek's instructions failed to reach Xue Yue, and eventually the Red Army had already left, and Xue Yue was blamed for it. Although Chiang Kai-shek's micro-manipulation tactics had brought some success, they also brought him the inability of the war situation.
However, Chiang Kai-shek's defeat was by no means the result of micro-manipulation tactics, and the problems at the top could not be ignored. Chiang Kai-shek's frequent use of micromanipulation tactics was due to the fact that he had a declining level of trust in his generals and often felt deceived. Chiang Kai-shek, for example, had believed that Hu Zongnan had captured Yan'an, but in reality it was a false victory. In this case, Chiang Kai-shek had to do it himself, which led to more micro-manipulation. All in all, the irresponsibility and dishonesty of the generals led to Chiang Kai-shek's confusion about the whole situation, which in turn led to the frequent use of micromanipulation tactics.
However, there are deeper reasons for the failure of **, not only at the command level, but also in the training and will to fight of the soldiers. The issue of the "three fears" was raised: night battles, field battles, and white-knuckle battles. The existence of these three problems directly hinders the performance of ** on the battlefield.
* Soldiers' fear of night fighting, field fighting, and white-knuckle combat limits their ability to fight in different situations. The uncertainty of night fighting, the unfamiliarity of the field environment and the fear of close-quarters combat became obstacles in the hearts of the soldiers. These fears not only limit the movement of soldiers, but also create an overall tactical dilemma, which prevents them from performing as well as they should, even with the advantage of equipment and firepower.
During the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, although the equipment and firepower of the first class have improved, the overall strength has not been able to achieve substantial progress. This is because the generals lack the ability to learn and renew themselves. They did not actively assimilate new tactics and could not learn from the war. This leads to the inability to adapt to the changes of the war while repeating the same mistakes over and over again. On the contrary, the PLA is constantly learning from the experience of warfare, constantly adjusting tactics, and translating new knowledge into actual combat capabilities.
Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek's defeat was not the result of a single cause, but the result of a combination of factors. The frequent use of micro-manipulation tactics, the problem of trust at the level of generals, and the dilemma of soldiers' combat ability are all reasons for the rout. Chiang Kai-shek's strategic mistakes, confusion at the command level, and the psychological dilemma of the soldiers made it difficult for the first to win the civil war. These factors were intertwined, laying the groundwork for Chiang Kai-shek's defeat and turning the Kuomintang-Communist civil war toward an irreversible trend.
To sum up, the reason why Chiang Kai-shek failed, in addition to his personal micro-operation tactics, also involved the irresponsibility of the first generals and the will to fight of the soldiers. These deficiencies prevented Chiang Kai-shek from winning the Kuomintang-Communist civil war, which ultimately led to his defeat and the defeat of the Kuomintang.