The US military has summed up the changes in the operational environment and the characteristics of warfare as the challenge of "anti-access area denial," believing that under such changes, the risk and cost of a frontal confrontation by the US military will be very high, so it is increasingly afraid to confront it head-on.
The mode of operation of the US aircraft carrier formation may have to be changed: it may move to the edge of the adversary's "anti-access area denial" zone, use long-range strikes against selected targets, and then quickly maneuver to the next area of action in radio silence, and then suddenly emerge from somewhere to strike quickly and forcefully.
In the process of the above-mentioned strategic adjustment, the U.S. Marine Corps has rediscovered its position -- from counterterrorism operations in the interior to naval expeditionary operations, returning to its old business of amphibious operations, acting as a supporting force for the forward presence, and deniing adversaries in the confrontation area of the forward defense in depth at sea.
The general implementation steps of the "island-hopping operation" are as follows: The first step is to raid the islands and reefs with a small elite force, land on a new type of landing ship, and seize the airfield; The second step is to use transport aircraft or carrier-based transport *** to deliver the attack system to the islands and reefs, and launch missiles to attack the opponent's ships; the third step, the deployment of anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems; The fourth step is to complete the control of the islands and reefs and the surrounding waters through transportation and replenishment; The fifth step is to use the islands and reefs under its control as the forward base to carry out the next round of "maritime guerrilla warfare."
Will the US Marine Corps be able to create an effective "expeditionary forward base" within the range of the adversary's long-range fire? Will the forces of "distributed operations" be able to gain a foothold, exist and fight? For the U.S. military, it's all a "survival or destruction" question.
Text |Lin Zhiyuan.
In David Berg and Eric MUnder the leadership of Smith's two commanders, according to the "Force Design 2030" plan, the U.S. Marine Corps is undergoing strategic transformation, including upgrading the "island hopping tactics" during World War II, and preparing to fight a "maritime guerrilla warfare" in the new situation in the western Pacific.
Why the U.S. Marine Corps is implementing this transformation, what specific strategies it has, how it will be deployed in the future, and how effective it will be, is worth studying.
American MQ-9 drones at Amari airbase near Tallinn, Estonia (Source**) Xinhua Reuters.
from the sea to the land" to "return to the sea".
"Maritime guerrilla warfare" is a product of serving the US strategy of great power competition and the needs of great power warfare, a "novel" method of warfare that attempts to crack the "anti-access area denial," and an embodiment of the US Marine Corps' desire to demonstrate its own status and role and make contributions to seizing and maintaining sea supremacy.
The emergence of this "novelty" tactic is based on the following background:
First, the United States has made a major readjustment of its national strategy, and all branches of the armed forces are innovating their tactics.
In the past, the U.S. has focused on non-state actors; Now, the United States has to deal with an evenly matched "opponent of the same level." According to the new version of the "** Strategy" released by the United States in October 2022, the United States should make "all-in" efforts, unite allies, combine competition, cooperation and confrontation, and use the "decisive decade" to win the strategic competition with major opponents. The new version of the U.S. National Defense Strategy in 2022 calls for the mobilization of all national power tools and cooperation with allies and partners, seamless integration across operational domains, theaters, and conflict spectrums to implement "integrated deterrence."
The national strategy stipulates what the armed forces are to "do," and the US military's answer to the question of "how to do it" is to put forward a new "concept of joint operations" and transform it into "joint all-domain operations." Guided by the "Joint Operations Concept," all branches of the armed services have innovated the operational concepts of the various services, designed and developed troops, and strengthened exercises and practical applications. The hypothetical enemy targeted by these new concepts is a "high-end adversary" in the Asia-Pacific region, which the U.S. military considers to be a special, growing and determined adversary that is difficult to deal with. The US Marine Corps wants to fight "guerrilla warfare at sea" because it is an innovation in tactics for the purpose of implementing the national defense strategy and the "concept of joint operations."
Second, the operational environment has changed, and the US military lacks confidence in a head-on confrontation.
The U.S. military believes that the current strategic competition is intensifying, and with the proliferation of advanced sensors and precision, potential adversaries can use the best and tactics to block the U.S. Navy and joint forces from a certain distance, and use the confrontation area as a barrier to coerce the United States and its allies and partners. In the western Pacific, the U.S. military's forward bases in the first island chain are no longer safe, and the maritime combat system with aircraft carrier formations at its core may fail.
The US military has summed up the changes in the operational environment and the characteristics of warfare as the challenge of "anti-access area denial," believing that under such changes, the risk and cost of a frontal confrontation by the US military will be very high, so it is increasingly afraid to confront it head-on.
In the event of a high-end conflict at sea in the future, the US aircraft carrier squadron may have to change its mode of use: it may move to the edge of the opponent's "anti-access area denial" area, use long-range strikes to select targets, and then quickly maneuver to the next action area in a state of radio silence, and then suddenly emerge from somewhere to strike quickly and forcefully. This is also a kind of "guerrilla warfare at sea".
Third, the new mission and new tasks have given birth to the "guerrilla" tactics in the coastal areas.
At present, the US military's maritime strategy is shifting from "moving from the sea to land" to "returning to sea dominance", emphasizing ensuring force projection and sea dominance. In terms of thinking about solving problems, it emphasizes "putting eggs in different baskets", "being more politically feasible, geographically dispersed, and operationally flexible"; In terms of troop deployment, part of the troops were transferred from the first island chain to the second island chain to strengthen the defense of the first island and strengthen the "southern anchor" of Australia (the "northern anchor" is Japan).
Shifting the strategic center of gravity backward does not mean that the US military is "retreating" from the western Pacific; on the contrary, the US military is "locking up the island chain" and carrying out "maritime suppression" in the western Pacific, with the aim of pushing back the opponent's forward forces, and in the event of a conflict, it can drag the opponent back to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, and finally block the opponent in the first island chain.
In the process of the above-mentioned strategic adjustment, the U.S. Marine Corps has rediscovered its position -- from counterterrorism operations in the interior to naval expeditionary operations, returning to its old business of amphibious operations, acting as a supporting force for the forward presence, and deniing adversaries in the confrontation area of the forward defense in depth at sea. In recent years, the US Marine Corps has successively introduced concepts such as "coastal operations in a confrontational environment," "expeditionary forward base operations," "distributed maritime operations," and "interior line troops." "Maritime guerrilla warfare" is the implementation of the above operational concepts at the tactical level.
**Take-off from the USS Nimitz of the US Navy sailing in the Arabian Sea (Source**) Xinhua News Agency AP.
Dynamic use of soldiers, hit and run".
Guided by distributed maritime operations, "maritime guerrilla warfare" adopts such tactics as breaking up the whole into parts, small groups and multiple routes, and over-the-horizon attacks, and conducts "island-hopping operations" along the first island chain in an attempt to break through the gaps in the opponent's "anti-access area denial" defense line from the "inner line" and gain time for reinforcements on the "outer line."
The first is to carry out the first wave of "impulsive" strikes from the "inner line".
"Pulse operations" is one of the purposes of the US military's "joint operations concept" and is a type of "joint all-domain operations," which is characterized by the meticulous use of the strong points of the joint forces in order to generate or exploit superiority over the opponent, and its soul is the guerrilla tactic of "hit and run."
The US military's vision is that the Marine Corps, as an "internal line force," has the characteristics of strong concealment, strong mobility, and affordable equipment (equipped with a large number of unmanned platforms), and can conduct the first wave of "pulse operations" in the forward conflict zone in wartime, seize and control key areas, passages, and straits in the coastal areas, strengthen its control over the forward sea areas, rapidly weaken the opponent's sea, air, and information superiority, delay the opponent's actions, and create opportunities for other troops to enter the theater. US Marine Corps Commander Smith said the unit was able to "open the door from the inside."
The second is to follow the principle of "distributed maritime operations".
Small, dispersed ground and maritime detachments are used primarily to weaken an adversary's ability to concentrate forces from within the "anti-access area denial" circle and impede its freedom of action along key air and sea lines of communication. In the past, the lowest echelon of coordinated combined arms operations was the infantry company; Composite class operational units can now be relegated to squads. The smaller the unit, the more dispersed it can be.
"Distributed maritime operations" are characterized by dispersion, mobility, and integration, which can increase the cost of the opponent's actions, and buy time for their own flexible choice of action plans and the assembly of joint task forces. Second, it can obtain a positional advantage more flexibly and flexibly to carry out surprise attacks, or engage more effectively with direct and indirect firepower; third, it can reduce the lethal effect of the opponent's firepower; Fourth, it can increase the cost of the opponent and create uncertainty; Fifth, it can reduce the action characteristics and avoid being detected by the opponent. In precision strike operations, it is a huge advantage to be the first to perceive and be the first to be the first to perceive.
The third is to adopt the tactic of "island hopping operations."
The "island hopping tactic", also known as the "frog jumping tactic", originated in the late Pacific War of World War II, which used a certain island as an advance base to bypass unnecessary islands and launch targeted attacks on important islands to avoid falling into a situation of island-by-island contention. Since then, the "island hopping tactic" has been further developed and refined.
Today's "expeditionary forward base operation" is essentially an upgraded version of the US military's "island hopping tactics", which is mainly aimed at the Pacific region, focusing on the first island chain, emphasizing the forward deployment of littoral combat teams with strong mobility, low electronic and physical characteristics, and easy support to a series of simple and temporary shore positions in adversarial sea areas to support maritime control operations, carry out maritime denial operations in coastal areas, support maritime domain awareness, and provide forward command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, Target positioning and anti-positioning capabilities and cutting-edge continuous support. The key is to persist in confrontation within the coverage range of the opponent's long-range strike firepower, maintain a sustained offensive posture, undermine the "area denial" system built by the opponent in the forward sea area, and win space and time for the "external troops" to reinforce and launch counterattacks. The core idea is to quickly and covertly deliver, amphibious to seize the island, and "use the island to control the sea".
Judging from the assumptions and the situation of the exercise, the general implementation steps of the "island-hopping operation" are as follows: The first step is to raid the islands and reefs with a small elite force, land on a new type of landing ship, and seize the airport; The second step is to use transport aircraft or carrier-based transport *** to deliver the attack system to the islands and reefs, and launch missiles to attack the opponent's ships; the third step, the deployment of anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems; The fourth step is to complete the control of the islands and reefs and the surrounding waters through transportation and replenishment; The fifth step is to use the islands and reefs under its control as the forward base to carry out the next round of "maritime guerrilla warfare."
expeditionary forward base operations".
On March 23, 2020, then U.S. Marine Corps Commander David Berg launched the "Force Design 2030" concept (an upgraded version is released every year, the latest version will be released in June 2023), planning to form at least three Littoral Combat Regiments in the next ten years to transform the U.S. Marine Corps into a lighter, faster, small-scale island-grabbing force that mainly implements "area denial" operations. The specific design is as follows:
Combat mission: The Littoral Combat Group will carry out "expeditionary forward base operations" in adversarial maritime space; Combat operations are carried out in a variety of systems; coordination of air defense and anti-missile operations; support maritime sensing; support for naval surface warfare; Support information operations.
Organization: The Littoral Combat Regiment has the characteristics of small scale, lightness, and mobility. Each regiment has about 1,800,200 men and consists of four parts, including one command element (regimental headquarters); 1 Littoral Combat Team, 1 infantry battalion and 1 anti-ship missile company; 1 Littoral Air Defense Battalion for air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, forward rearmament and refueling operations; 1 combat logistics battalion, responsible for the resupply of expeditionary forward bases, missile depot management, docking with senior logistics personnel, medical assistance, ammunition and fuel distribution, field maintenance and other tasks.
Equipment configuration: There are four main types of systems used by the Littoral Combat Group to fight "sea guerrilla warfare". The first is the "Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interception System." The system launches "Naval Strike Missiles" to attack**, which are mounted on joint light tactical vehicles and can be moved on the ground for denial and control at sea. The second is the MQ-9 "Reaper" UAV. It is a medium-altitude long-endurance UAV, whose main mission is to continuously hunt and kill opponent targets, and can also be used as an intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platform, using sensors to provide real-time data to joint force commanders. In May 2023, the Marine Corps received the first of eight MQ-9 Reaper drones. The third is the AN TPS-80 ground-to-air mission orientation radar. It is an expeditionary multifunctional radar system that was initially deployed in 2018 to improve the Littoral Combat Group's counterattack capabilities and defense against cruise missiles and drones. Fourth, the Navy's medium-sized landing ships. This kind of warship can fill the capability gap between large ships and small short-range landing craft required for large-scale multi-mission amphibious warfare, and is a low-characteristic shore-to-shore beach-grabbing landing ship, with strong sustaining power in the theater, and can operate independently or in conjunction with other surface warships in a confrontation environment.
Force Deployment: On March 3, 2022, the U.S. Marine Corps reorganized the 3rd Marine Regiment into the 3rd Littoral Combat Regiment and deployed it at the Hawaii Marine Corps base. For example, it participated in the "Shoulder to Shoulder" joint military exercise between the United States and the Philippines for two consecutive years, and participated in the "Force Design and Integration" exercise on September 25 and 28, 2023, forming an initial combat capability and is expected to form a comprehensive combat capability within two years. On November 15, 2023, the 12th Marine Regiment was reorganized into the 12th Littoral Combat Regiment and stationed in the Okinawa region (1st island chain). The U.S. military plans to transfer the 4th Marine Regiment from Okinawa to **, reorganizing the regiment into the 4th Littoral Combat Regiment in 2027. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps formed the first MQ-9A Reaper UAV squadron in Hawaii and established the Marine Corps Information Command.
Sea guerrilla warfare" works.
The U.S. Marine Corps has been implementing the transformation program for almost four years and has achieved some initial results in organization, equipment and training. However, "guerrilla warfare at sea" is still very immature, and there are even some fatal problems.
First, there are flaws in the design of the force. Since the introduction of the "Force Design 2030" plan, there have been many controversies within the US military. Among the critics are many retired senior Marine Corps officers and former members of the administration, who question that cutting armor, artillery, and aviation capabilities will undermine the tradition of effective integration of the Marine Corps' various arms and weaken combat effectiveness; The Littoral Combat Group is designed for the island capture war in the Western Pacific, what about other regions; The new operational concept was not confirmed; There is no ...... to solve the problem of logistical support
Second, there are doubts about the support of allies. On the one hand, if "maritime guerrilla warfare" is to be applied to islands and reefs in the western Pacific, it is necessary to ensure that there are no political obstacles for US forces to enter these areas. On the other hand, if the United States were to fight on the islands or bases of its allies, then these countries could be militarily attacked, and their position would be shaken. Therefore, it is doubtful that the United States will be able to truly gain the support of its allies.
Third, the United States does not have the advantage of firepower. The "maritime guerrilla warfare" is mainly fought on the first island chain, and the United States does not have a "geographical" advantage. In this area, will the U.S. Marine Corps be able to establish an effective "expeditionary forward base" within the range of the adversary's long-range fire? Will the forces of "distributed operations" be able to gain a foothold, exist and fight? For the U.S. military, it's all a "survival or destruction" question.
Author's affiliation: Institute of War Studies, Academy of Military Sciences, Chinese People's Liberation Army).