February 28, 1972
The Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué was released
On October 20, 1971, Dr. Henry Kissinger came to China again.
This is his second visit to this mysterious eastern power, following his first secret visit to China on July 9. (See for the first time: 49 years ago, the Americans' "secret visit to China").
Kissinger's main purpose in coming is naturally to prepare for the upcoming visit to China by Nixon, but he also has an important task with him this time
It is hoped that when Nixon visits China, China and the United States will issue a "communiqué."
Although Kissinger mentioned this matter during his first visit to China, the Chinese personnel did not include this matter in the reception plan, and they did not expect Kissinger to formally make this request again
Although most of the United States' foreign visits will not issue a "communiqué," but this time Nixon**'s visit to China, many people do not want to see progress in Sino-US relations, if Mr. **'s visit to China is silent, then it may be seen as a joke, and it will not be easy to explain to the country. ”
Kissinger's request was quickly reported to *** and the reply was:
This is a proposal made by the US side, and our side has not prepared it, so the US side can put forward a draft first. ”
During the Sino-US talks on the afternoon of 22 October, Kissinger took out the draft "communique" drafted by the US side.
It stands to reason that since the US side hopes that the two sides will issue the "Communiqué", the content of the "Communique" should give full consideration to China's demands and propositions. But this draft was handed over to ***, and it was immediately voted back:
We cannot accept such a communiqué. ”
As a matter of fact, Kissinger understands the core point of the rejection of the first draft by the Chinese side.
By Kissinger's own admission, the draft was drafted in the very traditional way of writing the Communiqué: emphasizing consensus and blurring or even obscuring differences. However, since the "Communique" is to be issued, there is a difference between China and the United States, which cannot be avoided in any way.
That is the Taiwan issue.
The draft provided by the American side reads like this:
The Chancellor and Nixon also clarified their respective positions on the Taiwan issue.
**The Prime Minister stated that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China and therefore Taiwan's future is China's internal affair.
Nixon stated that the United States recognizes that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China. The United States has taken note of that position and will support efforts to achieve a fair and peaceful settlement of Taiwan's eventual relations with the mainland.
**The Prime Minister said that the People's Republic of China has not chosen to use force as a means of resolving the Taiwan issue. ”
And *** immediately pointed out the crux of the problem after seeing this paragraph:
The US side did not formally recognize China's claims, and did not talk about its own withdrawal from Taiwan, but demanded that China make a commitment not to use force. ”
On October 23, ** brought together the director Ji Pengfei, the special assistant Xiong Xianghui and the director of the Department of Western Europe and North America and Oceans Zhang Wenjin to study this matter - Zhang Wenjin drafted another draft according to the opinions of the Chinese side, ** glanced at it, but was not satisfied.
According to the meaning of ***, don't do anything "Communiqué", but *** explains:
This is what the US side put forward, and they need it, and they will not be difficult to deal with. ”
and ***expressed acceptance of ***'s opinions, and put forward a policy: each has its own say. **The idea is:
Aren't they talking about peace, security, and not seeking hegemony? We must talk about revolution, about liberating the oppressed nations and people of the world, and about how big countries should not bully small countries. If I don't highlight this, I don't think it's so appropriate.
If you don't seek hegemony, your United States has gone from 13 states to 50 states, and it is not the result of expansion and hegemony? Later, he also extended his hand to the world. ”
According to the suggestion of ***, Xiong Xianghui changed it again, the first part is the views and positions of China and the United States on the international situation and major issues; The second part is a joint statement by the two sides clarifying the principles for establishing China-US relations; The third part explains each of its positions and propositions on the Taiwan issue; Part IV sets out specific proposals for improving bilateral relations.
**After reading it, express satisfaction.
On the basis of this draft, China and the United States are ready to start talks.
But this time, it was the turn of the Americans not to accept it.
On October 24, 1971, the first phase of talks between China and the United States began.
The highest-level person originally scheduled to attend on the Chinese side was Ji Pengfei, but it was temporarily changed to *** himself. Kissinger made his attitude clear as soon as he came up:
The communiqué is sharply worded and unacceptable. ”
But *** doesn't budge either:
We also can't accept your draft. ”
Kissinger is still sophisticated after all, and he explained in detail to *** the reasons why the American side could not accept it:
We have no objection to each side saying its own point of view, but this is not what we expect if the Communiqué becomes a tool for you to complain about our position. If Nixon returns home after visiting China and says that he was insulted, it will affect not only your relationship with him, but also with his successor. ”
Kissinger also specified some of the Chinese side's wording in detail, such as the opening sentence:
The country's desire for independence, the nation's desire for liberation, and the people's desire for revolution have become an irresistible historical trend ......
Kissinger believes that the United States wants to sign an agreement, and the first sentence of the first paragraph of this agreement is "the people want revolution," and he cannot explain it. The two sides have conducted several rounds of discussions on the word "revolution", and the US side initially proposed to use "the people want justice", but in the end it was changed to "the people want progress" - Kissinger readily agreed.
Kissinger with ***However, in contrast to the adjustment of the terms "revolution" and "progress," the expression of the Taiwan issue in the communiqué is the core and key.
To this end, China and the United States held a total of five rounds of negotiations in three days, and the Chinese side insisted that the US side make each article clear in the communique, recognizing that "Taiwan is a part of China" and "must withdraw its troops from Taiwan." However, the US side has been trying to express itself through various tactful and vague language, and has always only promised to write "gradually reduce the number of troops stationed in the country as tensions ease." ”
Speaking of the end, Kissinger himself admitted:
The problem now is not that we don't understand each other, we understand each other very well, the problem is that we don't agree with what you say. The Prime Minister sought clarity, and I managed to be vague. ”
To this, the answer is:
The Chinese people are not satisfied with the ambiguity of certain things. ”
Kissinger hinted:
If it's too clear, we'll be in trouble ......”
At the end, he reiterated his hole cards to *** again:
We can do more than we can say, but if these substantive things are included in the Communiqué, I am afraid that we will be condemned in the United States for accepting extreme expressions of China's position. In fact, we have accepted 85% of your draft....
Since Kissinger has said everything about this, ** said that he also understands his "limited authority", and is willing to wait for him to go back to report, and wait for Nixon ** to come before deciding.
So Kissinger returned to the United States with this draft.
Although the talks did not reach a final result, the intentions of both sides are infinitely close.
It's just that both sides are mentally prepared: things won't be that simple.
On January 3, 1972, Brigadier General Alexander Haig of the United States arrived in China.
Haig's title at the time was "Deputy Assistant for U.S. Affairs," and the purpose of his visit to China was to make some technical arrangements for Nixon's trip to China.
But it is clear that Brigadier Haig will come to China to do more than just make some conventional technical arrangements. As soon as he arrived in China, he asked to meet with the prime minister because "there is an important message to be transmitted."
Late on the night of January 4, ** met with Haig, who immediately conveyed the message of Nixon and Kissinger, which was divided into three main parts:
First, the Soviet Union was implementing a strategy of encircling China, and the United States expressed concern about China's "survivability" and was willing to help China resist the Soviet threat;
Second, the pro-Soviet, pro-Taiwan, and bureaucratic forces in the United States already know about Nixon's plan to visit China, and they may ask reporters to write reports that do not match the facts. In order to highlight Nixon's image as a "world leader", it is hoped that the "Communiqué" will show more positive aspects;
Third, in view of the obstruction of various forces, it is hoped that the Taiwan part of the "Communiqué" will be further revised.
Haig (right) later became U.S. Secretary of State and famously said after the assassination of Ronald Reagan: "Until Deputy ** returns, I will control the White House!" ”Immediately said that it could not reply, and must ask for instructions***
** Got the information brought by Haig for the first time, and immediately expressed disdain:
Siege of China? Want them to save us? What's the matter? He's worried about us, it's a cat crying mouse! Top back! It's just that Nixon won't come, and if he doesn't come, he won't come! If you don't come in 22 years, wait another 22 years, if Nixon doesn't come, Tuxon, Bricksson will come! ”
**Also particularly disgusted by Nixon's self-proclaimed "world leader":
The Americans are also strange, saying that there are so many forces against him in the country, and he can't even be the leader of the United States, but he still wants to be the leader of the world? ”
To this end, ** specially added an article:
Changing 'the people want progress' back to 'the people want revolution' is because they are afraid of revolution. The more they are afraid, the more we must mention it! ”
On the evening of January 6, ** met with Haig and said straight to the point:
Half a year ago, Nixon called China "one of the five major powers in the world", and now the United States suddenly doubts China's viability and claims to safeguard China's independence and viability, which surprises us. We believe that no country can rely on external forces to maintain its independence and survival, otherwise it can only become a protectorate or colony of others. ”
** In particular, he questioned the use of the word "viability" by the U.S. side, arguing that it generally refers to "the viability of a fetus or infant", and Haig immediately explained that this was a quotation from the military, which may have caused a misunderstanding, and he was willing to bring back the Chinese side's opinion.
After that, Haig and his entourage went to Shanghai (because Nixon also planned to visit Shanghai). The reception comrades in Shanghai learned about the "cat crying mouse" from some source, and there were some emotional behaviors in the reception. **After knowing about it, I learned that the entourage of the US delegation felt that the toffee candy in Shanghai was very delicious, and immediately instructed the US personnel to give 10 catties per person, which the US side gladly accepted.
With the return of Haig and his entourage, the "wrist wrestling" of the "communiqué" has also come to an end temporarily.
The main drama is about to begin.
On February 21, 1972, Nixon** led US Secretary of State Rogers and Kissinger to visit China officially.
At the same time as Nixon was holding various meetings, the second phase of negotiations on the "communiqué" was also in full swing - this time, the Chinese side was replaced by Vice Minister Qiao Guanhua.
Qiao Guanhua came up and made clear China's attitude
In the eyes of the Americans, the Taiwan issue is only an issue of expression, but in the eyes of the Chinese side it is a substantive issue. ”
The differences between the two sides on the Taiwan issue are mainly reflected in the following points:
First of all, China believes that the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, so it will never promise to "resolve the issue only by peaceful means".
Second, since the US side recognizes that Taiwan belongs to China, it should of course withdraw all US troops stationed in Taiwan, instead of expressing it as "gradually reducing US military strength and facilities".
Third, China's statement is that "Taiwan is a province of China," but the US side only agrees to say that "Taiwan is a part of China." Kissinger said that if the Chinese side is adopted, the United States will think that the United States has completely "handed over Taiwan to China" and that we have "betrayed our friends and put too much pressure." Qiao Guanhua immediately replied:
You go and tell them that Chiang Kai-shek himself said that Taiwan is a province of China. ”
Fourth, "the people want progress" should be changed back to "the people want revolution".
Qiao Guanhua (left) at the United Nations General Assembly with the famous **On these issues, Kissinger and his entourage repeatedly tug-of-war, and finally late at night on the day when Nixon was going to return home, Qiao Guanhua could only throw out the "killer feature":
Dr. Kissinger, you are working for you, and I am working for our Prime Minister. It's getting late, and in a few hours, Nixon will be returning home. **The visit to China is a major victory in itself, a state visit that shakes the whole world, and it doesn't matter if there is a communiqué or not, you can skip the joint communiqué. ”
Kissinger immediately replied
If we do not issue a joint communique, it is okay for China, but not for us, and some people will make irresponsible remarks. ”
In the end, the US side agreed with most of China's statements, but on the issue of "Taiwan is a province of China", it said that according to its own statement, the English version of the US side is "Taiwan is a part of China, and the United States ** does not dispute this".
The Chinese side agreed.
In the early morning of 26 February, China and the United States agreed on the specific contents of the "Communique."
But at the last moment, something happened again.
On the plane to Hangzhou that morning, experts from the United States read the draft of the "Communique."
Their reply was: "Not satisfied!" ”
U.S. Secretary of State Rogers immediately handed Nixon a copy of the material, which involved 15 changes to the content of the "Communiqué", such as "all Chinese" (all Chinese) in "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China" to Chinese"the Chinese"; Another example is the replacement of "that position" with "this" in the phrase "the United States** does not contest this position."
Secretary of State Rogers accompanies Nixon in talks with ***. Rogers was excluded from the core by Nixon for a long time, and was later described by Americans as "the most powerless secretary of state in history."Nixon called Kissinger into his room before the dinner that day and asked for his opinion.
Kissinger said it was difficult
The text of the "Communiqué" was written by Qiao and I for more than 20 hours in Beijing, and now there are so many places to change that it is almost equivalent to overturning the ...... and starting over”
Nixon was also quite annoyed:
I approved, ** also approved, and now we have to unilaterally propose amendments, am I still the United States**? ”
But anyway, Nixon still asked Kissinger to negotiate with Qiao Guanhua after the dinner.
In front of Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger said euphemistically:
Under normal circumstances, it's fine, but we need to mobilize the public to support our approach ......If Mr. Joe is able to cooperate so that our *** feels that he has also contributed, it will be beneficial to both parties. ”
Qiao Guanhua said bluntly:
Do you mean that you still want to revise the text of the Communiqué? ”
Kissinger nodded sincerely.
Qiao Guanhua immediately interrupted the meeting with Kissinger, reported to ***, and reported to ***.
In the end, the reply from the US side was: China refused to revise it.
In the end, the US side did not insist.
On February 28, 1972, the Sino-US Joint Communiqué was officially issued.
The full text is excerpted below:
The Chinese side declared: "Where there is oppression, there is resistance." The country's desire for independence, the nation's desire for liberation, and the people's desire for revolution have become an irresistible historical trend. All countries, big or small, should be equal, big countries should not bully small countries, and strong countries should not bully weak countries. China will never be a superpower and opposes any hegemonism and power politics.
The Chinese side expressed its resolute support for the struggle of all oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation; The people of all countries have the right to choose their own social system according to their own wishes, to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign teams should be withdrawn to their home countries. The Chinese side expressed its resolute support for the efforts of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to achieve their goals, and resolutely supported the seven-point proposal of the Republican Provisional Revolution in South Vietnam**, as well as the explanation of two key issues in February this year and the joint statement of the Supreme Assembly of the Indochinese People; Resolutely support the eight-point plan for the peaceful reunification of the DPRK put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 April 1971 and the proposal to abolish the "United Nations Commission for the Reunification and Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea"; resolutely oppose the resurgence of Japanese militarism and its external expansion, and resolutely support the aspirations of the Japanese people for the establishment of an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; Strongly advocate that India and Pakistan immediately withdraw all their troops to their own territory and to each side of the Jammu and Kashmir ceasefire line in accordance with the United Nations resolution on India-Pakistan issues, and resolutely support the struggle of Pakistan** and the people of Pakistan to safeguard their independence and sovereignty and the struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for their right to self-determination.
The United States stated: For the sake of peace in Asia and the world, it is necessary to support the people of all countries in the world to achieve individual freedom and social progress without external pressure and interference. The United States trusts efforts to address the underlying causes of the conflict in the context of the tensions that have prevailed. The United States is committed to a just and stable peace. Such a peace is just because it satisfies the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress. This peace is stable because it eliminates the danger of external aggression. The United States is good at connecting countries with different ideologies in order to reduce the risk of confrontation due to accidents, miscalculations or misunderstandings, which can contribute to efforts to reduce tensions. Countries should respect each other and be willing to engage in peaceful competition and let action be the final judge. No country should claim to be right all the time, and all countries should be prepared to re-examine their attitudes for the common good. The United States stresses that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their own destiny without foreign interference; The primary goal of the United States has always been a negotiated settlement; The eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States of America on 27 January 1972 provides the basis for achieving this goal; In the absence of a resolution in the negotiations, the United States expects the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina, consistent with the goal of self-determination for each country in this region. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for South Korea**; The United States will support South Korea's efforts to reduce tensions and increase ties on the Korean Peninsula. The United States values its friendly relations with Japan as highly as possible and will continue to develop the close ties that exist. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolution of 21 December 1971, the United States is in favour of the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces within its territory and to each side of the Jammu and Kashmir ceasefire line; The United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to build their own futures peacefully and without military threats, without making the region the target of great power competition.
There are essential differences between the social systems and foreign policies of China and the United States. However, the two sides agreed that all countries, regardless of their social systems, should handle their relations in accordance with the principles of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, non-aggression against other countries, non-interference in their internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on that basis, without resorting to force or the threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are ready to apply these principles in their mutual relations.
Taking into account these above-mentioned principles of international relations, the Parties declare:
It is in the interest of all countries to normalize relations between China and the United States;
Both sides want to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
Neither side should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each side opposes the efforts of any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;
Neither party is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party, nor is it prepared to enter into agreements or understandings with the other party with respect to other countries.
Both sides believe that any major power colludes with another major power to oppose other countries, or divides the sphere of interests among major powers in the world, it is against the interests of the peoples of all countries in the world.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing and serious dispute between China and the United States. The Chinese side reiterated its position: the Taiwan issue is a key issue that hinders the normalization of relations between China and the United States; The People's Republic of China** is the only legal ** in China**; Taiwan is a province of China and has long since been returned to the motherland; The liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair, and other countries have no right to interfere; All U.S. armed forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. China** resolutely opposes any attempt to manufacture"***"、"One China, two **"、"***"、"***"and advocacy"Taiwan's status has not yet been determined"activities.
The United States declares: The United States recognizes that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States** does not dispute this position. It reiterates its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate goal of withdrawing all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan. During this period, it will gradually reduce its armed forces and military facilities in Taiwan as tensions in the region ease.
The two sides agreed that it would be desirable to expand understanding between the two peoples. To that end, they discussed specific areas of science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. The parties pledged to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.
The two sides see bilateral relations as another area that can bring mutual benefit, and agree that equal and mutually beneficial economic relations are in the interests of the two peoples. They agreed to facilitate the gradual development of the two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will maintain contacts through different channels, including sending senior U.S. representatives to Beijing from time to time to conduct specific consultations on promoting the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of mutual interest.
The two sides hope that the results of this visit will open up new prospects for bilateral relations. The two sides believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries will not only serve the interests of the Chinese and American peoples, but will also contribute to easing tensions in Asia and the world. ”
Although the road after that has not been smooth and even full of twists and turns, after all, a new page has been opened.
End of this article) Yaqiu said.
That's right, in the past two days, many friends in the background have asked me to talk about Russia and Ukraine.
But I'm not going to say it, and I'm not going to say it in this Aqiu Quality Author List.
Why? The reason is simple: I don't understand.
Things have developed to this point, and with my personal ability, I haven't figured it out or understood, so I'm more willing to watch and listen to what everyone says.
As for the push, I still write an article to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Sino-American "Shanghai Communiqué". In fact, if it were not for this sudden war, today would indeed be the most memorable day. Until now, this "communiqué" still has a lot of reference significance for the current and future international political pattern and games, and looking back at the beginning, how many games and contests at the highest level were behind it.
History sometimes looks back, and it may not be clear to see, let alone standing at an unknown crossroads, how many of us ordinary people can easily see the pros and cons in a word and define the future?
So in the end, I can't help but want to remind a little:
During this time, if you have the kind of source around you who makes people feel that he is Putin's brother-in-law or Biden's second uncle or Zelensky's head teacher, or has a torch-like vision, strategizes and has insight into the history of human civilization for 5,000 years, takes the world as a chess game, and is willing to borrow another 500 years from the sky, the goal is the keyboard hero ...... the sea of stars
Actually, it's nothing, just listen to it.
End of full text).This article mainly refers to **:
1. The First Stage of the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué Negotiations (Zhong Longbiao, Waiting for Chinese History Research, 2011.05).
2. The Second Stage of the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué Negotiations (Zhong Longbiao, "Waiting for Chinese History Research", 2012.01).
3. The Game Behind the Publication of the Shanghai Communiqué (Wu Guangxiang, "Party History", Issue 04, 2013).
4. "The Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué and the Taiwan Question" (Tao Wenzhao, *2012.03).
5. "Commenting on the Negotiation of the Wording of the Taiwan Issue in the Shanghai Communiqué" (Zhu Weibin, Theory Monthly, Issue 01, 2009).
6. "The Negotiation of the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué from the Perspective of the Secret Archives of the United States" (Zheng Hua, Journal of Shanghai Institute of Administration, Issue 05, 2008).
7. "The Record of the Promulgation of the Three Communiqués on Sino-US Relations (1) - The Twists and Turns Behind the Issuance of the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué" (Meng Hong, "Overview of Party History", Issue 02, 2012).