Project Sword
Author: Forgotten in the rivers and lakes.
Statement: Bing said that the original debut, the whole network has been opened to protect rights, and plagiarism and handling must be investigated
The four-draw battle is the third battle of the four battles and four draws in the Northeast Battlefield.
In this battle, after more than a year of fierce troops and horses in the Siping Defense Battle, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army has long since changed from what it used to be, and both the total strength and the number of artillery have formed a crushing trend against the enemy in some areas.
[Sculpture in front of the Siping Battle Memorial Hall. The Siping Battle Memorial Hall is located on Hero Road, Tiexi District, Siping City. The "four battles and four draws" won the fighters, won the hearts of the people, won the base areas, and won the military strength, opened the prelude to the Liaoshen Campaign, and laid an important foundation for the liberation of Northeast China
Judging from the strength of the offensive and defensive sides, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army has grown from 650,000 increased to 100,000, and intelligence detected enemy troops from 180,000 to 3With 50,000 men, our army has always maintained a threefold advantage, and half of the enemy army is still recruits, miscellaneous troops, security forces and police forces.
Judging from the number of artillery pieces on both sides, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army has 96 mountain artillery and howitzers, and the enemy defenders have only 19 artillery pieces, and the ratio of heavy artillery on both sides is five to one. As everyone knows, a key factor in the strength of our army in the northeast is the strength of the artillery.
Therefore, whether it is the 1st Column and the 7th Column, which are actively engaged in the war, or the East General Staff Office and General Lin himself, they are all determined to win Siping Street. However, our army annihilated the enemy in the Siping Siege 170,000 people, lost 130,000 men, eventually withdrawing before enemy reinforcements.
Three battles and four draws, why did the complacent Mr. Lin fail to attack the city and send reinforcements?
Photo of the meeting of the Northeast Bureau, 101 (left) is presiding over the meeting. After the chairman made the Northeast realize the "unified" leadership, 101 became the "number one" of the Northeast].
Three battles and four draws, Mr. Lin's overall combat idea is "siege and reinforcement".
Taking the siege and reinforcement as the combat goal at the same time reflects Mr. Lin's determination and confidence. In fact, a year later, in the Battle of Jinan, Su Yu adopted the same strategy. This idea was used by Mr. Lin in the Dehui battle.
Three battles and four draws are not the debut of the Northeast Battlefield.
Even if you don't count the first battle to liberate Siping in March 1946, the troops led by Mr. Lin had a tough battle against Dehui in the northeast of Changchun as early as February 1947. In this storm, artillery and tanks were used for the first time.
The Dehui Offensive took place in the south of the Songhua River in Erxia, and was a fortified operation on the periphery of Changchun. Dehui is located in the Northeast Great Plain, the terrain is flat, there is no danger to rely on, the defenders are Sun Liren's new 1st Army, Pan Yukun 50th Division, security regiment and other 7,000 people.
General Lin was determined to raise the full strength of Beimanchu to attack the city and send reinforcements to annihilate the enemy's 2 divisions.
The siege troops were designated as Hong Xuezhi's 6th Column and 2nd Independent Division, with 3 artillery regiments, 1 mountain artillery battalion and 2 artillery companies, with a total of 80 artillery pieces; In addition, 4 tanks were put into service. The reinforcement (Changchun, Jiutai) troops were handed over to Li Tianyou's 1st Column, 2 Independent Divisions, and 6th Vertical and 16th Divisions.
However, for the first time in the northeast, infantry, artillery, and tanks fought together, and finally returned home.
The lessons learned from the defeat of Dehui were reviewed by the East General Assembly after the war.
First of all, it is not resolutely implemented the chairman's guiding ideology of "concentrating superior forces and annihilating the enemy individually", so that 4 divisions 350,000 men attacked the enemy on all sides, like pepper noodles, and did not concentrate their forces to gnaw at a point.
Second, the besieging troops made the same mistake in the use of artillery, distributing 80 guns evenly among the four divisions. After the war, Liu Yalou, chief of staff of the Ye Division, criticized this as "the chief of the secretary of the department issued clothes, one set for each person".
The third point is that our infantry artillery coordinates thunder and rain, and the infantry and tanks coordinate jerky, often the shells run out, and the infantry has not yet begun to attack. The tank did not play its due role as a "sledgehammer", but dragged down the infantry attack.
Fourth, our army's pre-war intelligence reconnaissance and preparation work was not meticulous, the artillery did not deal a fatal blow to the enemy's fortifications, the infantry found that there was a lack of siege equipment when they arrived at the city, and the flat terrain was also a double-edged sword for the attacking troops.
Fifth, the New 1st Army, the enemy's ace main force, was well-trained, well-equipped, and had strong combat effectiveness, and its defensive input and preparation were sufficient, and a tight defensive system was built in the pillboxes, trenches, barbed wire, and light and heavy machine gun positions in Dehui City.
In the end, the reinforcements of Du Yuming's 12 regiments were very timely, and there was a rare lack of passive sabotage.
The enemy's reinforcements were four divisions and advanced in one fell swoop, and Li Tianyou's six divisions were scattered in many places, and there was never a chance to send reinforcements.
After three battles and four draws, Mr. Lin learned the lesson of Dehui's failure to attack the city.
For example, the Siping offensive avoided the problem of Dehui's average strength, and Mr. Lin finally offered the ace Li Tianyou at the bottom of the box to serve as the main attack on Siping Street, and was also equipped with Deng Huaxi's full column (7 columns) and 1 independent division, with a total strength of 70,000 people.
According to intelligence reconnaissance, the 87th Division of the Siping Defenders and the 54th Division of the 13th Army each had 2 regiments, with a strength of about 1About 20,000, counting several security groups, no more than 180,000 people. The strength of our army and the enemy is four ratios.
1. The artillery is five to one, and it will take 3 to 5 days at most to break the city.
This was the first mistake made by Mr. Lin: the intelligence reconnaissance was seriously inaccurate.
In fact, Chen Mingren not only supplemented the 83rd Division, but also strengthened the security regiment, and put the road police and post office police into use, with a total strength of more than 350,000, truly all the people are soldiers. In this way, our army has only 2 times the advantage over the enemy.
After Deng Hua received the information, he asked General Lin to send an additional column or 2 divisions.
At this time, Mr. Lin was careless and did not agree, making a second serious mistake.
On June 11, 1947, the siege troops, like the Dehui Siege, first seized the airfield and cut off the enemy's air supply channel, which was also the regular operation of Huaye's strong attack on Jinan. Three days later, Deng Hua ordered his troops to attack the city.
According to General Lin's deployment, Deng Hua's 7 divisions attacked the city, and 17 divisions sent reinforcements.
The Changchun reinforcements consisted of 3 independent divisions in North Manchuria, 1 independent division in East Manchuria, and 2 cavalry divisionsTo the south, Shenyang was reinforced, consisting of Liu Zhen's 2nd Column, Han Xianchu's 3rd Column, Wu Kehua's 4th Column, Hong Xuezhi's 6th Column (lacking 17th Division) and the 2nd North Manchurian Independent Division.
Compared with the Jinan campaign commanded by Su Yu, it is not difficult to see that the focus of Lin Zong's Siping attack is also to send reinforcements.
However, unlike Wang Yaowu in Jinan, the 71st Army at this time had not lost its fighting spirit. In the face of the ambitious Lin Zong, Chen Mingren, the general of Siping, also showed that he was different from the ordinary generals of the Jiang army, and his defense system was no less than that of Dehui's new 1st army.
As a result, although Li Tianyou's 1st Column made progress, it suffered heavy losses, while Deng Hua's 7th Column made slow progress. At the suggestion of Chief of Staff Su Jing, General Lin transferred Deng Hua to the 6th Vertical and 17th Division, which was good at blasting operations.
Subsequently, the 6th Column, 18th Division, and 16th Division also joined the battle group one after another. But Mr. Lin also made a third serious mistake: adding lamp oil to the army. And at the same time, Du Yuming was not idle, and quickly organizedup 10Divisions reinforced Siping.
Zheng Dongguo, the commander-in-chief of the rescue, first took the Tieling where our army was empty, and then sent the Changchun New 1st Army south to contain our army, and sent Liao Yaoxiang's new 6th Army to directly approach the Yehe Station defense line of the 2nd Division of North Manchuria.
Seeing that Mr. Lin was a little in a hurry,Zheng DongguoSortie.
He personally led 2 and a half armies and 7 divisions to the north, and the forward Lu Junquan's 93rd Army quickly forced back Liu Zhen's 2nd column by virtue of its equipment superiority. In the face of Zheng Dongguo's robbery, Mr. Lin had no choice but to dispatch the 6th Vertical and 16th Divisions and Deng Hua's solo division to the south.
As a result, both the Siping offensive troops and the reinforcement troops lost their absolute superiority.
On June 27, 1947, Gongzhuling, Changtu, and Gaojiadian were all lost, Du Yuming's reinforcements were fully pressed to Siping, and Liao Yaoxiang's two divisions occupied Lianhua Street and Gaojiadian. The enemy's 53rd Army made a surprise attack on Bamian City and threatened the eastern flank of Siping.
The battle ended on June 30, Mr. LinAn urgent withdrawal from the Siping battlefield was ordered.
In this 20-day offensive and defensive battle, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army annihilated the enemy70,000 people, self **130,000 people. During the battle, our army emerged with combat heroes such as the demolition hero Li Guangzheng, while Chen Mingren and Liao Jun, the second lieutenant platoon commander of the Fushengquan pot stronghold of "sprinkling beans into soldiers", both won the Order of the Blue Sky and the White Sun awarded by President Jiang.
Dehui andFour draws and battles,It is a rare defeat in Mr. Lin's life.
In particular, Siping attacked and reinforced, but did not achieve the predetermined goals, which also left a psychological shadow on the cautious Mr. Lin in the city. Compared with Dehui's attack and reinforcement operations, Mr. Lin also made several mistakes in the Siping attack and aid operations.
In addition to inaccurate intelligence, carelessness of the enemy, and "adding fuel to the lamp" type of troop increase, the biggest mistake committed by Mr. Lin was to violate the chairman's guiding principle of "concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy individually", which was also the main reason for the poor performance in the first year of Northeast China.
Of course, the four levels are unfavorable, and the coordination of our army's infantry and artillery is not good, and the commanders and fighters do not have a deep understanding of General Lin's "one point and two sides" and "four groups and one team" tactics, and the practice is also lacking a little heat. After the war, Mr. Lin summarized these tactics.
The military quality and on-the-spot command of the defender Chen Mingren, the determination to fight against the water, and the timely reinforcements of Du Yuming and Zheng Dongguo with all their might, also made the attack and defense of Siping stalemate for a while.
After the Battle of Siping, Chen Mingren wore medals on his soldiers. Chen Mingren is a fierce rival that Mr. Lin encountered in the Northeast
Only half a year later, our army fought four battles and drew four. Failure is the mother of success, and this time it was Li Tianyou and Wan Yi who commanded the 1st Column, 7th Column, and 3rd Column. The Siping defenders also have the 71st Army, the 88th Division and the New 1st Army remaining behind90,000 people. However, this time there is no Chen Mingren.
NortheastMeArmyThe total offensive took only 2 days1.90 thousandThe defenders are in ashes, our army00 morepeople, seized a large amount of ** equipment and military suppliesThis time, the enemyNewArmyReinforcements have not yet arrivedSipingAnd it was liberated
[After the Battle of Siping, our army mourned the martyrs. After summarizing the battles of Dehui and Siping and the tempering of the attack on Yixian, General Lin and Dongye have carried out reviews and improvements, and the tactics of attacking fortified cities have made great progress, and the commanders and officers and men of the troops have also swept away the psychological haze of attacking fortified positions, and since then they have swept through the northeast and become the most powerful strategic force of our army
1. "Liberation War", by Wang Shuzeng, People's Literature Publishing House;
2. "Huangpu Famous General Chen Mingren", written by Li Yi, Oriental Publishing House;
3. Historical Materials of Strategic Defense Memories of the Liberation War, People's Liberation Army Publishing House.
[Deeply cultivate the history of war, promote positive energy, welcome contributions, private messages must be replied].