In 1979, after the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam and the defense of the frontier, the Vietnamese army, fearing that our army would punish it again, vigorously expanded its armaments, especially strengthened the defense forces in the northern border areas. Le Duan clamored that the army should be "built into a regular army like the Soviet army within five years," and the Vietnamese army, with the guiding ideology of "building in accordance with a set of principles of the Soviet army," accepted a large amount of military aid from the Soviet Union on the basis of increasing its troops, and changed the army's establishment and equipment many times, thus bringing about a major change in the situation of the troops compared with before the war.
Proceeding from focusing on "winning on the front line," we should focus on expanding the number of front-line troops. In light of the lessons of the war and the topographical characteristics of the northern region, and proceeding from the fact that the country is small and weak, the Vietnamese army adopted the policy of holding our army back against our army in shallow, near and deep depths for possible re-punishment, in an attempt to "hold on to the front line" and make peace"Win on the line"Therefore, great importance has been attached to strengthening the defense forces on the front line of the border, and while a large number of troops have been increased, the focus has been on expanding the number of front-line troops. The front-line infantry division on the border was increased from three to four infantry regiments, and the divisional artillery regiment was increased from two to three battalions to four battalions.
In addition, one tank battalion, one anti-aircraft missile company, and one anti-tank missile company have been added to the division's directly subordinate units, greatly increasing the strength of the front-line infantry division, from more than 9,000 before the war to more than 12,000. Moreover, artillery firepower, anti-tank firepower, anti-aircraft firepower, assault power, and mobility have also been greatly enhanced, thus enhancing the combat capability of front-line infantry divisions. By the end of 1980, the Vietnamese army had 10 front-line infantry divisions of this establishment.
Strengthen infantry reconnaissance forces and regimental and battalion firepower detachments. After the Vietnamese army abolished the establishment at the division and regimental levels, it believed that infantry reconnaissance would play a huge role in positional offensive and defensive battles, so it strengthened the reconnaissance force of the infantry and expanded the establishment of division and regimental reconnaissance companies, with 86 (or 98) personnel in the division reconnaissance company and 8 detachments under its jurisdiction; The regiment has more than 70 reconnaissance companies and has jurisdiction over 5 reconnaissance detachments.
At the same time, vigorously strengthen the fire detachments of regiments and battalions. The regiment added 1 rocket artillery company, the artillery of the original mortar company was changed from 82 mortars to 120 mortars, and the anti-aircraft machine gun company was changed to 37 anti-aircraft artillery companies or 127 anti-aircraft machine guns were changed to 145 twin anti-aircraft machine guns. battalion fire company of 82 mortars, 82 recoilless guns and 127 anti-aircraft machine guns have been multiplied, from the original 2 (strong) to 4 (strong), plus the infantry light ** has been fully automated, so the combat effectiveness of regiments and battalions to independently attack and defend positions has been greatly improved.
Further increase the number of artillery personnel and improve artillery equipment. After the war, on the basis of systematically increasing the number of artillery at all levels, the Vietnamese army vigorously updated its artillery and constantly equipped its troops with artillery with long-range, high-precision, and powerful artillery in order to improve the quantity and quality of artillery and change its weakness of "weak artillery firepower."
In addition to the first-line infantry division artillery regiment increased to 4 battalions, the reserve artillery brigade (regiment) and the corps artillery regiment also increased to 4 battalions, and 2 battalions were equipped with 12 BM21 guns and 135 to 140 B72 anti-tank missiles.
1. The 105 howitzer battalion of the artillery regiment (brigade) of the military district of the second military region was also converted into a BM13 or BM14 rocket artillery battalion. A front-line infantry division is equipped with 138 guns (228 tubes) of 82 mm or more, and the suppressive firepower is twice as high as before the war.
Reorganization of armored units, addition of tank battalions to infantry divisions. In order to enhance its regular combat capability, the Vietnamese army attached importance to strengthening the study and training of offensive and defensive tactics in positions, and began to regard tanks and armored vehicles as important firepower and main assault force. After the war, the Vietnamese army reorganized its armored corps, and in addition to strengthening the equipment of each independent armored brigade (regiment), the focus was on increasing the establishment of tank battalions in 38 infantry divisions.
The tank battalions under the division are mainly equipped with medium and light tanks and armored vehicles adapted to mountain operations. Vietnamese tanks usually operate in companies and platoons with infantry detachments in the main direction, and in view of the complex terrain of tropical mountains and jungles, they attach importance to the coordination between tanks and various arms, especially infantry and artillery.
Emphasis should be placed on centralized command and the "one-long system" should be implemented. The Vietnamese army believes that the phenomenon of unification of command and overlapping command levels caused by long-term guerrilla warfare is the "regularization" of the country"Therefore, it is emphasized to simplify the command system and strengthen centralized command. As a result, the armed public security forces, which were originally under the dual leadership of the Ministry of the Interior and the General Staff, were reorganized into border defense forces, which were subordinate to the General Staff Headquarters as a branch of the army, and exercised single direct command through the major military regions. The army units, which were originally under the dual leadership of the General Staff Headquarters and the major military regions, should be changed to the unified command of the military regions and become the main force within the military regions, and the first-class detachments that were originally within the establishment of infantry divisions and regiments should be abolished and merged into the first-class units.
At the same time, the Vietnamese army vigorously imitated the Soviet army, implemented the "one-chief system" of military commanders, abolished political commanders at all levels, and changed all cadres from company instructors to political commissars of military regions and armies. For example, the instructor has been changed to a political deputy company commander, and the regimental political commissar has been changed to a political deputy regiment commander, thus weakening the functions and powers of political cadres at the same level, strengthening the power of military commanders to arbitrarily handle various problems, and concentrating the command power of military commanders at all levels in the hands of a single military commander.
As early as December 1976, the Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese Party made a resolution on "Strengthening the Collective Leadership of Party Committees at All Levels and Implementing the Chiefs' Command System at the Same Time," thus making ideological and organizational preparations for the reform of the military system and the gradual transition from the system of collective leadership of party committees and the division of labor and responsibility of chiefs to the system of military chiefs.
In March 1982, the Fifth National Congress of the Vietnamese Party proposed that "it is necessary to reform and improve the party's leadership system over the armed forces, and to learn from the experience of fraternal countries and armies, especially the Soviet Union, and comprehensively implement the one-chief military system." In December of the same year, the Party of Vietnam issued a resolution on "Renewing and Improving the Party's Leadership System for the Vietnamese People's Army and National Defense and Implementing the One-Chief System in the Army", comprehensively implementing the "one-chief system" and abolishing the Party committees of the Central Military Commission and units above the division level and replacing them with political organs. The political commissar system should be abolished, and the military chiefs should be given unified responsibility and have full authority to command and manage the military, political, logistical, and technical work of their units.
Military committees shall be established in the Ministry of National Defence, the various services, arms, military districts and units equivalent to armies, and the chairman of the military committee shall be a military commander; Units at and above the division level implement the system of "one principal and four deputies", that is, military commanders (the highest head of the unit), deputy commanders (concurrently chiefs of staff), deputy military commanders (responsible for military training), deputy logistics commanders (concurrently logistics directors), and technical deputy commanders (concurrently technical directors), and the brigade and regiment levels implement the system of "one principal and five deputies", and in addition to the above four deputy posts, additional political deputy commanders have been added; At the battalion and company levels, the system of "one chief and three deputies" is implemented, with three deputies in charge of military, logistical (including technical), and political work.
The excessive emphasis on the military one-chief system has weakened the role of political work, resulting in varying degrees of chaos and instability within the Vietnamese army, which has directly affected its combat effectiveness. They said that the abolition of the political chief officer and the implementation of the one-chief system in the troops, and the political work was carried out by the political deputy commander, which led to a great weakening of the political and ideological work of the troops, and the original political work cadres did not know what they had to do and what their responsibilities were, and the contingent of several thousand people had no backbone in the face of life and death, like a torch that had lost its lighting in the dark night, and this was a major reason for the failure of the squadron.