On U.S. Foreign Strategy and U.S. Economic Strategy Response to an American scholar
Yu Zhongning, Zhao Yu.
Thank you very much for your interest and comments. The opinion is very correct, this is not a professional **, we are writing according to a current affairs commentary, and it is one of a series of comments. Part 1 of this series is about the Russia-Ukraine war, with a total of 8 articles. Part 2 is about the Israeli-Palestinian war, there are 6 articles, and this article is the 6th of them. We are writing Part 3, which will consist of four articles, building on Huntington's arguments and explaining the new world landscape that emerged after the two wars and the opportunities for China.
Generally speaking, we believe that international strategy is a failed discipline. Because on this basis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and the Afghanistan War, as well as the Russia-Ukraine War and the Palestinian-Israeli War behind the scenes, were all based on wrong strategic judgments and wrong strategic behaviors, and all of them ended in and will end in failure. These failures have been, are, or will tear the United States apart internally. This raises two major historical questions.
First of all, why is the United States' international strategy and national foreign strategy wrong again and again? Blinken's recent speech actually gave the answer, saying that every country is either on the table or on the menu, and he pointed out in short and figurative language that the United States' international strategy and national foreign strategy are actually based on jungleism of the jungle. So where did this strategic positioning of the United States come from? Is it possible that this will change? If nothing changes, what will the future look like for the United States and the world? What if it changes?
Second, the foreign policy of the United States has seriously hurt the national strength of the United States, but the decline of the national strength of the United States is volatile, and the United States can always recover to a certain extent from the damage done one time at a time, which makes the United States unable to recognize the seriousness of this damage. So where did the resilience of the United States come from? Why is the United States able to take on such huge debt risks and international relations risks? What kind of huge insurance mechanism does the U.S. economy provide?
It seems to us that the American theoretical community is full of clichés about these two major issues, and no one has been able to make a profound analysis or establish a theoretical framework.
We were sent to Hong Kong by Wall Street firms. Our experience in the United States has taught us that the gap between the clichés of the American economic profession and the reality of the American economy is extremely large. Hong Kong also provides us with a richer perspective on U.S. international strategy.
In the past 20 years since we arrived in Hong Kong from the United States, the articles published in China and since China have mainly been divided into two parts, one part is to introduce the structure and institutional system of the American economy established from the practice of economic management in the process of correcting mistakes one by one, that is, from the practice of economic management, and we advocate that China should conscientiously study and comprehensively introduce this structure and system, rather than being dominated by the clichés of economics. The other part is to criticize and analyze the positioning of the United States' international strategy and its future direction.
In Part 2, we focus on the analysis from a cultural perspective. This perspective is actually the cultural and historical exposition formed from Weber, Toynbee, through Huntington to Ferguson, especially the ideas and evidence of Westerners systematically expounded by Paber, former director of the Planck Institute, and Reich, director of the Laboratory of Paleoanthropology at Harvard University, but have not been systematically and completely studied in the West.
We believe that the behavior patterns of Westerners today are in the same vein as those of the Yannayas of 5,000 years ago, the Germans of 2,000 years ago, the Anglo-Saxons of 1,000 years, and the Americans of hundreds of years ago. We call it the cultural DNA of the West. Obviously, it is much more reliable to look at human political relations from the perspective of cultural genes, from the perspective of the mode of production, the way of life and the culture that has been formed on the basis of thousands of years, than from the perspective of the so-called strategy of Machiavellian schemism.
Generally speaking, we know that the innovative and cutting-edge nature of the articles we have written does not belong to either the Western or Chinese ideological system, so it is very difficult to be recognized. We do not expect to be recognized by Western or Chinese scholars, and our goal is to gradually form a complete and systematic theoretical framework and leave a small trace in history.
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