Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has publicly demonstrated the conflicting interests of stakeholders and brought the region back to the center of attention. Some observers believe that the outcome of the Gaza dispute will shape the global order beyond other current conflicts in Asia or Europe.
Iran's tensions with the United States and Israel are escalating amid the Gaza war and other regional interactions. Tel Aviv is taking advantage of the current turmoil to target Iranians, especially Allah. This is part of Israel's larger plan to position itself as the dominant economic and political power in the Middle East by reshaping the region.
In light of this, Iran is revising its strategy and methods to engage and counter its adversaries. Iran's attitude towards the war in Gaza is based on three key factors. First, its relationship with Hamas and the so-called axis of resistance. Secondly, the internal socio-economic situation, which Iran aims to resolve by de-escalating the situation and rapprochement with its neighbors, was reflected in last year's agreement on Saudi-Iranian relations. Third, its relationship with the United States, because of the fear that if the war continues and expands, Washington will intervene on Israel's side and finally end the Iranian project. Iran is eager to avoid this.
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Iran's view has been that the United States aims to reposition itself as an important actor in the region, given China's growing involvement through its transnational corridors, diplomacy, and partnerships with Gulf states. Iran believes that in order to achieve this goal, Washington and its partners announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor last year, which Tehran sees as a threat to its desire to connect East and West, as well as the Global North and the Global South, through the Economic Corridor.
Some explanations suggest that the October 7 attacks were an attempt to undermine the U.S. project to normalize relations between Israel and the Gulf states. Iran considers this project to be a contempt for Palestinian interests and has opposed it since day one. Thus, observers believe that Iran, through its ** people – in this case, Hamas – has taken a more aggressive and proactive approach to disrupting the US project, completely changing the rules of engagement as understood between actors.
Regardless of the explanation, which is more effective than the other, from Israel's point of view, the main goal of the war in Gaza is to eliminate Hamas. If successful, Iran will suffer significant losses, as it will lose the important levers it uses in regional disputes with the United States and Israel.
In addition, the elimination of Hamas will open the door to more advanced and aggressive actions against other Iranians in Syria and Iraq. With the end of these ** people, Iran's influence and role in the region will end. Iran's forward defense strategy is facing a crisis, Iranians are feeling the heat, and Tehran believes that the fighting may eventually be transferred to its territory. Normally, Iran blames the United States and Israel for this month's Kerman incident, in which nearly 100 people were killed and more than 200 injured. In addition, Iran has demonstrated cyberattacks on gas stations and other critical infrastructure as further evidence of the shift of the fighting to the country.
Iran is grappling with three key challenges: continued support for its people, the aftermath of the Gaza war, and clear warnings from the United States against expanding the conflict. To address these challenges, Iran has adopted a strategy that minimizes risks, maximizes returns, and considers the Arab public**. It aims to prevent the consequences of the war in Gaza from affecting its internal stability, to avoid direct confrontation with the United States or Israel, and to win the sympathy of the Arab world. Its success depends on the adherence of the Iranians to the established rules of engagement. There may be violations, and Iran acknowledges this and is willing to accept retaliation, even harshly, from the United States or Israel. This strategy was shaped by Iran's recognition of its limitations and limitations. It is taking a gradual approach, inflicting multiple small blows on the United States and Israel, rather than risking a costly direct confrontation that could jeopardize the Iranian state and its regional ambitions.
At present, the conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States has entered a new phase. Many of the main commanders and masterminds of the Iranians have been assassinated in recent weeks, and these assassinations and other attacks have been carried out quickly and at short intervals, marking a shift in U.S. and Israeli practices and establishing a new deterrence equation designed to minimize the likelihood of a broader confrontation. At the same time, it opens the door for dialogue between the United States and Iran on key issues.
According to this new equation, Iran's response is measured, reflecting its limitations. Moreover, at home, Iran's political currents are divided over whether the country should engage in a multi-front regional war. Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Ali Khamenei issued instructions to commanders, urging them to exercise restraint and avoid direct military confrontation. Russia's and China's focus on other theaters of war, as well as U.S. efforts to isolate them in the region, could further narrow Iran's options and responses in the future. If the U.S. succeeds in repelling Russia and China, Iran will be in a bind with little support, especially if it gets deeper into the war in Gaza or works to expand its reach.
By analyzing Nasrallah's statement, Allah and Iran seem to be coordinating to prevent a large-scale confrontation. The limited conflict in the border areas between Lebanon and Israel demonstrates Allah's willingness to engage in negotiations, particularly on border demarcation and issues that remain unresolved since 2006. By analyzing Iran's strategic mentality and reviewing Tehran's previous actions in similar situations, it becomes clear that the conditions for the current confrontation between Iran and Israel are unfavorable. Israel's recent qualitative actions have been largely aimed at the support that Iran has provided to Hamas through its ** people. These actions are not aimed at directly attacking Iranian projects, nor at Allah's top leaders or military councils — whose positions are far from the targeted areas — despite Israel's ability to do so.
The current situation suggests that the region will undergo significant changes after the war in Gaza. The previous balance established over the past decade no longer exists, and the Iranian regime faces an existential threat if it continues to obstruct the U.S.-Israel project. Despite the bleak outlook for the regime, it still has various levers that it can use to make ends meet. These measures include the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the targeting of strategic sea routes, of which the Red Sea crisis is an example. It could also advance its nuclear program to create a deterrent against major threats, attack tankers to influence global oil prices, or expand the scope of the Middle East confrontation by targeting Israeli interests inside and outside the occupied territories. Another option is to activate Iranian cells in Europe and around the world in order to undermine global security and stability.
Finally, given the war in Gaza, its aftermath, and Iran's adaptation of its methods and strategies to respond to new challenges, the most likely scenario is that Israel outlines the pattern of the 2006 war and its aftermath to such an extent that the cost of the war prevents Hamas and other Iranians from attacking it again. However, this goal of Israel does not contradict Iran's overall ambitions, since Iran's ** people will continue to operate and play a role throughout the region in accordance with Tehran's goals.