- Do you know our team? （124）
Editor-in-Chief: Cui Xiaohan Editor-in-Chief: Xu Yan Consultant: At the end of Mao Xinyu's battle to cross the river, the People's Liberation Army, in accordance with the deployment of the ** Military Commission, pursued and annihilated the fleeing enemy with the autumn wind sweeping away the leaves. When destroying the remaining Kuomintang troops in the central and southwestern regions, why did the ** Military Commission propose that "the policy of a great detour and a great encirclement should be adopted"?
In the spring of 1949, after fleeing Nanjing, the Kuomintang moved south to Guangzhou, and the remaining 1.5 million troops were entrenched in Taiwan, Fujian, and several provinces in the south-central, southwest, and northwest. In order to liberate the central and southwestern regions, the ** Military Commission ordered the deployment on May 23, 1949, requiring the Second Field Army to be located along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, ready to cooperate with the Third Field Army to deal with possible armed intervention by imperialist countries, and after this possibility is reduced, it will march into the southwest, and with the cooperation of the First Field Army, liberate and operate the provinces of Sichuan, Kang, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Tibet; and prepare for the liberation of Taiwan; The Fourth Field Army marched into central and southern China to liberate and operate the provinces of Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guizhou. 
In the course of chasing and destroying the remnants of the enemy, the Central Military Commission formulated different operational guidelines and put forward different operational requirements in light of different enemy situations and geographical conditions. At that time, in the southeast, there was not much room for the Kuomintang troops to retreat, only in the direction of southern Fujian and the islands along the southeast coast, with the aim of shielding Taiwan by controlling the southeast coastal areas and offshore islands. In the northwest direction, due to the sparse population and poor land and inconvenient transportation, Qinghai Ma Bufang and Ningxia Ma Hongkui Group had nowhere to escape, so they could only stick to their nests and resist to the end. In the south-central and southwestern directions, the main forces of the Kuomintang army, the Bai Chongxi clique and the Hu Zongnan clique, tried to put up a stubborn resistance, and at the same time were ready to retreat or flee the country at any time. In dealing with them, if they are pursued head-on and fiercely attacked, one can be caught, and most of them will inevitably flee to remote areas or abroad. The method of intercepting and annihilating the remaining enemy within the territory of the country became a major problem in pursuit operations.
In light of the above-mentioned situation, the Central Military Commission proposed that the enemy in the south-central and southwestern regions should adopt the principle of a large-scale detour and a large-scale encirclement, that is, regardless of any temporary deployment of the enemy, boldly detour from the flanks with the main force to the enemy's far-reaching rear and cut off his retreat, and then fight back, and pursue and attack the enemy in the east and northwest regions of China with all its might, supplemented by the operational policy of encirclement in a small roundabout. The Fourth Field Army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Corps, which is temporarily under the command of the Fourth Field Army, launched an operation to liberate the central and southern provinces in July. At that time, because Bai Chongxi, the main force of the Kuomintang army in Central China, tried to avoid a decisive battle with the PLA, the deployment of Siye's close-range roundabout encirclement failed to work. At the same time, because most of the troops had just arrived in the south, they were not familiar with the characteristics of water network rice fields and mountain operations, and the water and soil were not suitable, although they annihilated one part of the enemy and liberated western Hubei, northern Hunan, and northern Jiangxi, they did not achieve the intended goal of destroying the enemy. After Bai Chongxi retreated to the Hengyang and Baoqing areas in southern Hunan, he formed a joint defense line in Hunan and Guangdong with Yu Hanmou in the east and Song Xilian in the west to prevent the PLA from advancing southward. On July 16, **telegram to Siye**, Xiao Ke and Erye*** Zhang Jichun and Li Da issued an order to "adopt a long-distance encirclement and roundabout method to pursue and annihilate Bai Chongxi's department", specifically pointing out: "The white bandits have small capital and are extremely clever, and they will never fight with me unless they have to." Therefore, in fighting this enemy, "we should not adopt the roundabout method of encirclement at close range, but the roundabout method of encirclement at a distance, so as to grasp the initiative, that is, to completely ignore the temporary deployment of the white department, but to overtake him far away, occupy his rear, and force him to finally have to fight with us." "At that time, the political commissar of Siye *** had an image evaluation of the Gui army. "These soldiers in shorts and straw sandals are tenacious in battle, and they are good at climbing mountains, and they run like they have rubbed oil, and it is difficult to catch them. In particular, Gui Jun is very superstitious about Bai Chongxi, and has the so-called 'Xiao Zhuge is here, ** what can I do'. The troops, especially the commanders, must be prepared, and they must have a clear understanding in their hearts, and they may have to pay a certain price. "In accordance with the instructions of **, the commander of the Fourth Field Army decided to divide the troops into three routes: eastern, central and western, and the 13th Corps of the West Route Army went straight to Guangxi through Xiangxi, cutting off the road for Bai Chongxi's troops to retreat to Yunnan and Guizhou; The 15th and 4th Corps of the East Route Army first annihilated the enemy in Guangdong and liberated Guangzhou, and then the 4th Corps detoured from Guangdong to Guangxi, forming a large pincer encirclement with the West Route Army. During the scorching heat, the troops rested and began a full-scale attack in the cool autumn. The Western Route Army captured Zhijiang and other places, and first cut off the road for Bai Chongxi's troops to retreat to Guizhou. In October, the Central Route Army, with the cooperation of the Western Route Army, launched an attack on Bai Chongxi's troops in the Hengyang and Baoqing areas. The 135th Division of the 45th Army took advantage of the situation to penetrate behind enemy lines and fought bravely in depth, effectively delaying the enemy's retreat. The 15th Corps of the Fourth Field Army, the 4th Corps of the Second Field Army, and the Liangguang Column on the East Road attacked northern Guangdong by multiple routes, breaking through Bai Chongxi's "Hunan-Guangdong Joint Defense Line" from the left and right flanks. At dawn on October 9, the four divisions of Bai Chongxi's main force of the Gui family were annihilated in the area north of Qiyang, and the Battle of Hengbao ended. At the same time, the southward Eastern Route Army launched the Guangdong Campaign, comprehensively defeated the Yu Hanmou group, and liberated Guangzhou on the 14th. After Bai Chongxi led the remnants of his troops to retreat into Guangxi, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Guangxi and launched the Guangxi Campaign on 6 November. By December 14, a total of 17 enemies had been destroyed30,000 people, liberating the whole territory of Guangxi. 
To liberate the southwest, it was Eryehe who still used the "great detour" to undertake the task of marching into the southwest.
1. One of the four fields, under the command of ***, annihilated the southern Huzong and Sichuan Kuomintang warlords entrenched in the southwest. ** The Military Commission made an analysis based on the geographical situation in the southwest, and believed that the local Kuomintang troops would avoid a decisive battle and would flee to Xikang, Yunnan, Taiwan or abroad when the situation was unfavorable, so it made a series of instructions on the operational policy and deployment of the southwest, pointing out: "Hu Zongnan's whole army is retreating to Sichuan, and there is news of retreat to Kunming, Chiang Kai-shek, He Yingqin and the Gui family are dreaming of building the capital of Chongqing and separating the southwest, and if they want to destroy the Hu army and the enemies of Sichuan and Kang, they must march from the south to cut off their retreat"; "Take a big roundabout action, insert it behind the enemy, first complete the encirclement, and then fight back. "In accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission, Erye adopted the policy of a large detour and a large encirclement, and began to advance to the Qianchuan border in November to close the enemy's retreat. The 5th Corps, which served as a strategic detour, set out from Xiangxi, occupied Guiyang on the 15th, and then liberated parts of southern Sichuan; The 3rd Corps and the 1st Division of the Fourth Field Corps were dispatched from western Hubei and western Hunan to break through the Sichuan-Hubei border defense line and approach Chongqing. Hu Zong's main force in the south rapidly withdrew from the Qinling Mountains to Chengdu. The 18th Corps of the First Field advanced from the Sichuan-Shaanxi border to the north of Sichuan, encircling hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang party, government, and army personnel in the Chengdu area. In order to strive for the peaceful reorganization of the besieged enemy, Chiefs Liu and Deng proposed the "Eight Chapters of the Law" on November 21, demanding that the military and political personnel of the Kuomintang in the southwest stop resisting and accept the reorganization. On December 9, Lu Han, chairman of Yunnan Province of the Kuomintang, Liu Wenhui, chairman of Xikang Province, Deng Xihou and Pan Wenhua, deputy directors of the Southwest Military and Political Governor's Office, revolted in Kunming, Ya'an and other places, and Yunnan and Xikang were declared peacefully liberated. Subsequently, the five corps of the Kuomintang army in the Chengdu area also revolted one after another, and Chengdu was liberated. Subsequently, the troops of the Southwest Military Region of the People's Liberation Army marched into the whole province of Yunnan and liberated them one after another, and then carried out the Xichang Campaign and the Qamdo Campaign, completely liberating the southwest. 
In the operation of marching into the central and southwestern regions, the PLA adopted the strategy of a thousand miles of detours and outflanking, achieved the campaign attempt of the Central Military Commission, and shattered Chiang Kai-shek's dream of operating in the southwest to standby, which was a very successful example in the strategic pursuit.