Before delving into the importance of Chen Shiyu, let's first clarify the difference in roles between deputy commander and chief of staff. During the Chinese Civil War, both the Kuomintang Army and the People's Liberation Army had deputy commanders who were specifically responsible for assisting the commander in overall command, and they usually assisted the commander in carrying out strategic decisions on the battlefield. However, when there is a need for a critical operational direction of independent action, the commander will usually send a deputy commander to lead a part of the force to carry out a specific task. At the same time, the deputy commander is not directly involved in operational planning, troop deployment, etc., and these responsibilities are usually assumed by the chief of staff.
The chief of staff's main responsibilities include gaining an in-depth understanding and grasp of the enemy's situation, formulating an operational plan based on the battlefield situation, and proposing a number of alternative options for the commander to choose from. Once the commander has chosen one of these options, the chief of staff is responsible for directing the subordinate armies, putting the program into practice.
Judging by the division of duties, the role of the chief of staff in the war often goes far beyond that of the deputy commander. However, why is Chen Shiyu's historical contribution to the Battle of Menglianggu only summarized in a short nine and a half lines? There could be a number of reasons behind this phenomenon, and it is worth digging into.
Looking back at the history of that time, Chen Shiyu initially participated in Song Shilun's troops. However, his performance in a series of battles of the Shandong Field Army was not satisfactory, which posed considerable challenges to the command structure of the Shandong Field Army. Therefore, ** had to urgently dispatch Chen Shiyu to support as quickly as possible.
This support took place in October 1946, and only two months later, the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army joined forces to participate in the Subei and Lunan Campaigns. Although both battles were ultimately won, the whole process was not smooth sailing.
First of all, the Subei Campaign was problematic because the Shandong and Central China armies each adhered to their own plans, which led to an aggravation of the disagreement. The Central China Field Army tended to attack northern Jiangsu, while the Shandong Field Army tended to move south to southern Lunan, each with its own strategic plan. In the face of an emergency, Su Yu had to personally go to the headquarters of the Shandong Field Army and assume the command task to ensure that the fighter plane was not missed.
However, there were significant differences between the operational styles and military philosophies of the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army, which led to disagreements between Su Yu and Chen Shiyu. These differences are not based on personal emotional antagonisms, but are more based on different views on military strategy and philosophy.
The ensuing Battle of Lunan further exacerbated these divisions. After the end of the Subei Campaign, Su Yu insisted on staying in the northern Jiangsu region, while the Shandong Field Army was constantly harassed by the Kuomintang army in the Yimeng area, so Chen Shiyu resolutely advocated returning to the southern Lunan region to continue the battle. Without asking for instructions in advance, Chen Shiyu sent a telegram directly to ***, comparing in detail the two operational plans for attacking northern Jiangsu and southern Lunan.
This action caused dissatisfaction with **, and he expressed dissatisfaction with Chen Shiyu and Tang Liang: "You have a radio station, you can send a report, and you can report me to ***." "In the end, ** made a decision to abandon northern Jiangsu, but also to first ensure the stability of the southern Lunan region, and then expand to the south.
However, these differences did not lead to serious conflicts, since the different field armies enjoyed certain independent powers in their respective geographical areas. The real key divergence lies in military doctrine, which is not perceptible on the surface but has a significant impact on actual tactical decisions.
In the long course of the Chinese Liberation War, the battle of strategic concepts between Su Yu and Chen Shiyu became a striking story. Observing the large-scale annihilation of the enemy during the War of Liberation, it is not difficult to find that Su Yu often tended to use mobile warfare as the main tactic, and this tactic often won victory on the field battlefield.
For example, in the Western Front of the Eastern Henan Campaign, Su Yu, after capturing Kaifeng, quickly retreated to attract Qiu Qingquan's Fifth Army.
Similarly, in the Battle of Jinan, although it seemed like a siege battle, Su Yu's core plan was to prepare reinforcements, and this plan actually occupied the center of his decision-making. He left 140,000 troops to siege the city, but the remaining 180,000 were prepared for reinforcements. This strategy of mobile combat and evading the opponent's ability to attack the fortified position became Su Yu's core tactical concept.
However, Chen Shiyu represents a different strategic concept. In the Battle of Lunan, under his leadership, the entire battle was dominated by fortified battles. As Tao Yong of the 1st Division in Central China encountered difficulties in attacking fortifications, this exacerbated the differences in tactical concepts between the two armies. Su Yu believed that the Shandong troops were not good at attacking fortified positions and insisted too much on attacking fortified positions, while Chen Shiyu believed that the lack of ability to attack fortified positions was unacceptable.
Although the victory at the Battle of Lunan obscured these differences, insiders were well aware of the problems. After the merger of the two field armies in Shandong and Central China, the ** leadership had a high degree of trust in Su Yu and clearly pointed out his military command position as deputy commander. This means that the operational concept of the PLA in the East China Field Army must be consistent.
However, Su Yu's concept of sports warfare is not just based on personal preference, but is based on a comprehensive consideration of the overall situation of the balance of power between the enemy and the enemy. He understood that the tactics of capturing land were not only time-consuming and labor-intensive, but also difficult to maintain. ** Repeatedly expressed support for Su Yu in telegrams, because in the context of the strength of the enemy and the enemy, the movement war is more reasonable. Land-grabbing tactics will only lead to over-consumption of resources and will not be sustainable in the long run.
In this situation, Chen Shiyu was in an embarrassing situation as chief of staff. His duties required him to provide Su Yu with a variety of options to suit different battlefield situations. However, Chen Shiyu's concept of tackling tough battles and Su Yu's strategy of sports warfare conflicted.
The War of Liberation is a battle full of complex variables, requiring military leaders to be able to respond to a variety of situations on a variety of battlefields. The collaboration between Chen Shiyu and Su Yu demonstrated their wisdom and tactical ingenuity, and contributed to the PLA's victory.
Whenever a battle broke out, ** and Su Yu adopted a rather ingenious strategy, they sent Chen Shiyu to the front line and independently commanded several columns to carry out the mission. This arrangement was very sensible, because Chen Shiyu had excellent prestige and command ability, and was able to stabilize his position on the battlefield and give full play to his leadership advantages.
In particular, in the battle of dividing troops in July, Su Yu carefully arranged for Chen Shiyu to command three columns in the old Shandong army: the third column, the eighth column, and the tenth column. These units are all known for being good at attacking fortified positions, especially the Third Column, which originally belonged to the Eighth Division of the Lunan Military Region and was one of the strongest units in the Huaye Army. This arrangement not only showed great respect for Chen Shiyu, but also ensured that he commanded the troops he knew most and used the most proficient tactics.
This coordination not only allowed Chen Shiyu to gain prestige on the front line, but also allowed Su Yu to concentrate on implementing his tactical ideas. Although this compatibility is not always easy to achieve, Su Yu persevered because he deeply understood that war is not a simple game, but requires different leaders to play to their strengths on different battlefields.
However, this compatibility is not always possible over time. In order to avoid overwork of the leadership and resolve tactical differences, Su Yu made important personnel adjustments and promoted Zhang Zhen, deputy commander of the Second Column, to the post of deputy chief of staff of the Huaye Army. In the Eastern Henan Campaign and the Huaihai Campaign, Zhang Zhen, as deputy chief of staff, actually performed the duties of chief of staff and performed well.
Military decision-making and cooperation in the war of liberation is not as simple as some conspiracy theories portray. Only by objectively standing on a historical angle and profoundly studying the rich historical materials can we have a deeper understanding of the basic laws of war. This requires not only wisdom, but also talent and a deep insight into history.
The coordination and tactical adjustments of the leaders of the Liberation War made an indispensable contribution to the final victory, reflecting their ingenuity and determination. It also highlights how leadership responds to changing battlefield situations to remain agile and successful.
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